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 Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
 
1.1. Jensen’s call for mercy, the headscarf case and Danish secularism 
t might not be an exaggeration to claim that Danish secularism is so 
intimately linked to the idea of a Lutheran people (‘folket’), that debates on 
politics and religion and at times revolves around disagreement as to what 
‘Danishness’ truly is. Allow me give two recent examples. 
In a recent debate article from June 2014 the Minister of Trade and 
Development Mogens Jensen (S), a Social Democrat, attacked the nationalistic 
Danish People's Party for not being Danish enough.1 This perhaps surprising 
accusation was launched in the aftermath of the European Parliament elections, 
where the Danish People's Party broke all records with one out of four total 
votes. The two traditionally dominating parties, the center-left Social Democrats 
and the center-right liberal Venstre, suffered a large set-back. The Danish 
People's Party’s slogan during the election run up was ‘More Denmark – less 
Europe’ (see Dahl, 2014).  
Jensen's claim was that the Danish People's Party, which was in opposition 
to the government, had ignored three principal Danish values in their political 
agenda: mercy [‘barmhjertighed’], solidarity and openness. In the article he 
pointed to the sources of these values: they were Christian values, Social 
                                               
 
 
1 Political party names in relation to politicians have been be abbreviated in the 
text unless it carries a particular meaning in the context. For a list of party 
names and abbreviations, see Appendix I.  
I 
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Democratic redistribution along with cultural and economic openness. For the 
purposes of this introduction, let us focus on the first point on mercy.  
‘Mercy’, the minister argued, stems from ‘the Danish Christian cultural 
heritage which most Danes are part of, including myself… As a Dane I am born 
with that basis’ (Jensen, 2014). After establishing that humanitarian aid, which 
he as minister of development is responsible for, is a mark of mercy in contrast 
to indifference, he then continued ‘As a nation we have been imbibed mercy with 
culture's mother's milk. Through the Christian Gospel, yes. But also through… 
the collecting boxes of the [humanitarian] organizations on the doorstep some 
Sundays a year…. If we now and again should forget about mercy, the Queen has 
been lovingly reminding us each New Year’s eve in over 40 years. But the history 
of the Danes as merciful people is being misrepresented and depreciated if 
Thulesen Dahl [the leader of Danish People's Party] again one day becomes the 
editor-in-chief of the Danish story’ (Jensen, 2014). 
The story of peoplehood and its relation to public religion is the main theme 
to be analyzed in this thesis. Jensen's attack on his opponent Thulesen Dahl 
exhibits interesting traits of how ‘the Danish story’ and Christianity is actively 
being used in political language, in order to strengthen or undermine certain 
conceptions of national belonging, ethical worth and political trust. Indeed, 
Jensen went on to establish 'The Christian cultural heritage is a part of most 
Danes including me. I love the songs, traditions and the message of mercy 
teaching us to love your neighbor as yourself. As a Dane I am born with that 
basis' (Jensen, 2014). Thus evoking a certain story of God, Queen and Country in 
line with his own political establishment, Jensen tries to persuade Danish 
constituents of a certain story of peoplehood. And of course by stating that this 
story is the proper Danish one, the story promoted by the Danish People's Party 
is inferior and perhaps even misleading ‘the Danish People's Party owes us to 
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observe the promise of "more Denmark" – and start to take seriously the spirit 
of the people’ (Jensen, 2014). Here, we clearly see an example – not particularly 
rare in Danish politics – of a strong particularistic notion of Danishness evoked 
to promote a range of other policies: European politics, foreign aid, export etc. 
What is central in this case is the way religious heritage affirms political 
identity. Jensen does not question if Christian heritage is relevant in this matter, 
but rather how it is. As we shall see in the empirical analysis in later chapters, 
this take on the relation between religion and politics is characteristic of the 
kind of secularism Danish politics adheres to.  
Take another recent example concerning the so-called ‘headscarf case’. On 
occasion of Constitution Day 2007, former Prime Minister Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen (V) delivered an address on the importance of fundamental freedom 
rights to protect Danish democracy. He particularly emphasized the significance 
of keeping religion and politics separated to ensure equal treatment of all 
citizens: ‘…no matter if you are Christian, Muslim, Jew or whatever it may be. In 
fact, it would cause religious peace in the public sphere if we were much less 
concerned about religious symbols. It is remarkable how Muslim women 
wearing headscarves can cause tempers to flare. Just leave them be. Let the well-
known Danish broad-mindedness [‘frisind’] pave the way for the right to dress, 
as we want to – also in the public sphere’ (Rasmussen, 2007). The following day, 
Supreme Court President Torben Melchior stated that it would be good for 
integration and societal development if more immigrants would become lawyers 
and judges, even Muslim women of faith with headscarves, as long as the face is 
not covered (Melchior as quoted in Jyllands-Posten, 2007). Nevertheless, 
Rasmussen and Melchior’s call for less concern for religious symbols arguably 
proved to result in the opposite effect. 
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Indeed, what followed was a heated 
debate in the public media in which 
representatives from especially the 
Danish People’s Party strongly criticized 
both Rasmussen’s and Melchior’s 
statements. The debate came to circle on 
the one side around the question of 
separating religion from politics, by 
preserving a fully religiously impartial 
and neutral court system. On the other 
side, it was argued that the parliament 
should not interfere and create rules for 
the judges, as this would infringe on the 
principle of the separation of powers. In 
May 2008, the public debate reached its culmination when the Danish People’s 
Party launched a nation-wide add-campaign in newspapers and posters 
depicting a female judge donned in a Muslim veil, the niqab, while holding a 
gavel. The title was: ‘The Verdict of the Court is... Submission’, see figure 1. 
In the beginning of 2009 an amendment to the Administration of Justice Act 
was proposed by the government (supported by the Danish People’s Party), 
removing the right to wear political or religious symbols formerly held by 
representatives of the court system, including judges. The argument was that it 
would ‘…support the common respect for and trust in the courts of law as The 
Judicial Power’ (Folketinget, 2009c). Under protests from most consulted 
authorities, associations and boards representing judges, lawyers and law 
experts, the amendment passed in parliament 29th of May 2009 (see the 
consultation minute, Justitsministeriet, 2008).  
Figure 1. Add-Campaign by the 
Danish People’s Party, April 2007 
Reference: Dansk Folkeparti, 2007 
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What makes this example remarkable 
focus on two aspects. First, as the Danish 
Court Administration pointed out, there has 
never been any recorded cases of judges 
behaving so as to compromise their 
impartiality or neutrality in respect to 
religious or political symbols (Folketinget, 
2008: 7). The law was thus changed due to 
the public debate on the possibility of 
Danish judges wearing a Muslim headscarf in court. Secondly, though the debate 
and legislative amendment was directed at keeping the court system politically 
and religiously neutral, the very logo of the court system holds a crown with a 
Christian cross in it, see figure 2. In fact, the cross is present in most state power 
symbols, from the Danish flag to the logos of ministries, public administrations, 
passports and Danish Defense branches.  
Together, these two aspects of the headscarf case teach us an important 
point about Danish secularism. Highlighting that even explicit efforts to separate 
religion and politics, by keeping the court system religiously neutral is 
enmeshed in state power symbolism in which the established church takes a 
central position. The globus cruciger, the cross-bearing orb [‘rigsæble’] in the 
crown is a more than 1000-year-old state and monarchical symbol of belonging 
to the Christian confession in a Danish context.  
The headscarf case can be seen first, as an example of the deep 
embeddedness of the Folkekirke and its symbolism representing Danish political 
identity. While it can be difficult to distinguish the two, the Folkekirke and 
Danish peoplehood, it is even harder to separate them. This is so, due to the fact 
the centrality of the Folkekirke in the narrative of Danishness does not become 
Figure 2. Logo of the Courts of 
Denmark. 
Reference: Danmarks Domstole, 
2014 
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subject to comprehensive political contestation. Second, the case is an example 
of a church-state regime being challenged by the emergence of citizens not being 
members of traditional institutions of national belonging, in casu the Evangelical 
Lutheran Church of Denmark. Today, many citizens entertain other traditions of 
expressing religious affiliation and devotion in the public. The old symbolic 
order, which is at one time secular and Christian, is thus perceived to be in need 
for protection.  
In this thesis I hope to contribute with an analytical framework to make 
analytical sense of the above cases, by promoting a conceptualization of 
secularism, which pays particular attention to political identity. In this thesis 
secularism is treated as an ideological separation doctrine of religion and 
politics. Secularism relies on central principles such as religious freedom, 
religious equality and the religious neutrality of the state. But the given form 
secularism takes depends on the historical and political context, and thus the 
concept of secularism contains neither hostility nor favorable sentiments 
towards religion per se. There is not one universal version of secularism for all 
countries, but several secularisms with different national interpretations and 
ways of prioritizing these principles.  
Following this understanding, the key research problem guiding the 
following chapters is how we can conceptualize the current separation doctrine of 
religion and politics in a country like Denmark, where the structures of the 
established church and peoplehood overlap? On the one hand I wish to discuss 
religion and state related to peoplehood at a conceptual level, and on the other 
hand I wish to apply the analytical framework developed on current and 
ongoing Danish cases.  
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Correspondently, I see two puzzles in relation to the research question. 
First, why has secularism theory generally not been accommodative to 
establishment regimes? A range of European countries like England, Denmark, 
Norway, Finland and Sweden are considered to be advanced liberal 
democracies, though not secular states in the sense that they do not 
institutionally keep the churches at a clear distance from the state. However 
there may be more to say about the secular status of such states than this. I 
argue that it does make sense to characterize e.g. the Danish separation doctrine 
of church and state as secularism, as Danish state law can be regarded as fully 
secular (e.g. not influenced by dogmatic reasoning or religious authority), and 
thus secures Danish citizens extensive religious freedom, freedom of association 
and expression and various forms of support to religious communities like tax 
exemptions and easy access for foreign religious leaders etc. However at the 
same time, the Danish constitution instructs the state to support the Folkekirke. 
Thus, secondly, while it is not clear that the Folkekirke enjoys far greater 
freedom rights or economic benefits per member than other religious 
communities when everything is accounted for (see e.g. Kærgård and Petersen, 
2012; Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2002), the official symbolic order remains that there 
is religious freedom but not equality. This is because the Folkekirke is regarded 
as one of the essential symbolic sites of national belonging. How and why has the 
establishment regime and political identity merged? 
The fairly strong particularistic notion of political identity, which Jensen 
expresses, is part of the reason why political opponents are occasionally 
portrayed as un-Danish or ahistorical. Significantly, when they dare to question 
the current institutional arrangement of what we might recognize as Danish 
secularism. As will become apparent in later chapters, the way Danish 
secularism interprets the principle of separation is precisely through 
  
8 
establishment: religious reasoning, conflicts and authority is perceived to be 
encapsulated in the Folkekirke, which for the same reason has been denied the 
possibility to speak with one voice as a religious community in public debates, 
and even to fully govern its own affairs. This way, religious conflict is kept away 
from politics. Other religious communities outside this main church-state 
arrangement enjoy full autonomy.  
To interpret the political meaning of Jensen’s call for a more true Christian 
spirit of mercy constituting Danishness, or the headscarf case, we will have to 
study not only the political identity formation of Danish peoplehood as it is 
expressed in political language, but also the dominating doctrine of separation.  
 
1.2. A framework to interpret the place of public religion in politics 
In the following chapters I will discuss and develop a conceptual framework 
based on secularism and peoplehood theory to interpret such state-church 
regimes as the Danish. However, why is this approach to ideological language 
governing religion, politics and peoplehood important? Allow me briefly to 
touch upon three reasons.  
First of all it is important because regimes like the Danish are often not 
recognized as secular states due to their establishments. This is so both in the 
academic literature and in their own public debates, where ‘secularism’ 
frequently is used to signify an anti-religious position in politics, in contrast to 
the traditional pragmatic way of governing public religion. The problem then is 
that too little attention is being directed towards the principles and logic behind 
the actually existing separation doctrines in these countries. In that connection a 
concept of secularism recognizing a theory of peoplehood offers a nuanced and 
promising framework, in order to better understand such regimes.  
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One main claim in this thesis is that we need to carve out a place within 
secularism theory for secular, democratic regimes with established religion. The 
purpose is not to justify or normatively evaluate such regimes, but rather to 
draw attention to these as relevant for secularism theory – and vice versa: that 
secularism theory is relevant for these regimes. I attempt to render this claim 
probable by one hand showing how a modest kind of establishment can be 
compatible with political liberalism, insofar as such regimes in practice treat 
religious communities and citizens as equals despite only one religion 
symbolically hold a privileged status (in Finland two denominations are 
established). On the other hand, I wish to point to the importance of concrete 
cultural context for distinguishing between different types of secularism. In this 
respect I focus on the production and reproduction of political identity, or 
peoplehood, as an important element. Thus, I argue that it is not only how 
religion and politics is arranged institutionally and the political principles used 
to justify this, which are relevant to understand secularism, but also the kind of 
peoplehood evoked in the process. That is, how unity is produced through 
separation.  
In relation to the Danish case, it is particularly relevant to discuss political 
identity in connection with secularism. As I have argued elsewhere, there seems 
to be a 'blind spot' in the Danish political self-understanding, which is related to 
the very raison d'être of the established church-state arrangement, the 
Folkekirke (e.g. Dabelsteen 2011b: 115). The relation between the Folkekirke 
and the state is often considered to be a given part of the national identity – 
something utterly Danish and traditional (see e.g. Gundelach, Iversen and 
Warburg, 2008; Dabelsteen 2011a: Chapter 3; Østergård, 2012).  
The relation between Folkekirke membership and citizenship did not pose 
any problem as long as every citizen was member of the same church, as was in 
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fact the case in 1849, when the current governance structure of the church-state 
arrangement was established. Back then, there existed an almost-perfect 
sociological overlap between the two communities with an astonishing 99 
percent of the population being members of the Folkekirke and at the end of the 
Cold War in 1989, 90 percent were still members (Kirkeministeriet, 2014c). 
However, as Danish society is facing increased cultural and religious 
pluralization, now roughly 25 percent of Danish citizens are not members (a 
number still rising). Therefore, it becomes relevant to ask which role the 
Folkekirke play in contemporary politics related to identity and religion in 
general.  
If we do not have a proper framework through which we are able to distill 
and interpret the political meaning of such cases, we will have a difficult time 
understanding the development in much political thinking – especially in a time 
of increased multiculturalism. This is the second reason why the proposed 
analytical framework is important: To understand the direction changes are 
taking due to the challenge of multiculturalism, we must first understand what is 
being changed.  
As one of the most influential thinkers of our time, the Canadian 
philosopher Charles Taylor recently noted: ‘I believe that secularism and 
multiculturalism are converging. Put somewhat less enigmatically, the issues 
about the proper regime of secularism in Western democracies are becoming 
more and more interwoven with issues about proper ways to deal with the 
growing diversity of these societies’ (Taylor, 2011: 77). He points out that a 
central ethical challenge of our time is to deal with deep cultural and religious 
plurality in secular, liberal democracies. Democracies which were forged in 
largely mono-religious, social contexts. In virtually every Western society we can 
observe public religion becoming center of emotional and controversial political 
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debates, and often these debates stem from tensions between the majority 
culture and various minorities. Importantly, these tensions are frequently 
structured around perceived religious identities, like Christian or Muslim values 
or even traditions.  
When Taylor speaks of the convergence of secularism and multiculturalism, 
he states that pertaining to the ongoing political negotiation of the boundaries 
between religion and politics – between church and state – religious minority 
claims of equal recognition and rights are increasingly becoming relevant across 
different governmental systems. In particular from secular republics like France 
or the USA, to constitutional monarchies with established churches like England 
or Denmark.  
Indeed, much social science literature has been preoccupied with issues of 
public debate such as burkas in the public space and freedom of religion (e.g. 
Joppke, 2009), the Cartoon Crisis and freedom of expression (e.g. Klausen, 
2009), the fear of Islamic radicalization and civil rights (e.g. Norton, 2013), 
building of mosques and equal religious rights (Lægaard, 2010) etc. Such issues 
in the public debate emerge from what has often been called the challenge of 
multiculturalism raising profound questions to our societies including freedom 
rights, tolerance and what constitutes ‘us’ as a national community. 
In a Northern European context there has been a tendency in political 
science studies of religion and politics to be preoccupied with such 
multiculturalist challenges (cartoon crisis, radicalization, burkas, mosques etc.). 
Rather than analyzing the structure and principles of the relations between the 
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established religious majority and the state. Instead, we have seen more studies 
on the effects of a given doctrine being tested, rather than studies on the very 
doctrine itself.2 
In these years the Danish doctrine of secularism seems to be hit by a double 
whammy of increased religious and cultural pluralization of society, and an 
international context in which still more countries separate public religion and 
state by mutual exclusion (rather than establishment). Significantly, the Danish 
case is not alone in these challenges. Other European countries face similar 
tensions between traditional institutional arrangements and political identity on 
the one side, and multicultural pressure testing these regimes on the other.  
I believe that the challenge of multiculturalism demands for theories of 
secularism to consider issues of political identity, in addition to principles of 
separation. This insight I propose we should carry over into our studies of 
traditional institutional arrangements, which were forged in earlier times when 
populations in Europe were much more homogeneous religiously and culturally. 
In other words, now that time-honored and historically accepted ways of 
arranging the relationship between the state and majority religious communities 
                                               
 
 
2 It would be wrong not to mention the existing efforts in a Danish context. We 
have seen some attempts to conceptualize the principles of the Danish 
separation doctrine: e.g. on welfare and Protestantism by Tim Knudsen, 2000; a 
macro-sociological investigation of the religious roots of the welfare state by 
Aage B. Sørensen, 1998; a historical study of the church-state relation by Jens 
Rasmussen, 2011 inspired in part by H.J.H Glædesmark, 1948; an ecclesiastical 
law study by Lisbet Christoffersen, 1998 focusing on the Folkekirke as a legal 
entity; Margit Warburg's studies of Danish civil religion, e.g. 2005; not to forget 
some of the relatively few existing secularism studies of Danish politics by 
Mouritzen, 2006, Christensen, 2010, Berg-Sørensen, 2010, Lægaard, 2014. 
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are being challenged by growing minority religious communities, I argue we will 
have to discuss the very principles and values constituting the old arrangements 
(see also Dabelsteen, 2011a; 2015). Hopefully, this study can act as a step 
towards a better understanding of this development. 
This brings me to the third and final reason why the suggested analytical 
framework is important. It is an attempt to bring political context closer to the 
study of secularism in political theory. In recent years there has been changing 
generations of literature describing the role of public religion in the political 
sphere, drawing upon the concept of secularism. The development in much of 
this literature has been motivated by the drive to move ‘behind’ or ‘beyond’ the 
distinction between religion and politics. Therefore, without dismissing the 
normative salience of such efforts, I argue that we cannot and should not 
overlook that the religion-politics distinction is a continuously crucial idea in the 
reality of politics today, and as such should warrant scholarly attention. Let me 
expand on this final point by drawing up the contours of a theoretical 
development.  
In the first generation of newer secularism literature throughout the 90's, 
secularism stood at a crossroad. As an example, Rajeev Bhargava famously asked 
in the influential anthology Secularism and its Critics: do we need an alternative 
to secularism or an alternative formulation of secularism? (Bhargava, 1998: 2, 
see also Walzer, 1984; Bilgrami, 1994; Audi, 1989: Nandy, 1990; Galeotti, 1993). 
Back then, the question was motivated by the critique that secularism was not 
able to address the problems it set out to solve: to manage religious conflict, to 
check fanaticism and extremism or to maintain a well-functioning democracy by 
establishing an even playing field for all actors irrespective of religious 
affiliation. Not at least, this discussion emerged in parallel to the increased focus 
on the challenge of multiculturalism. Should the political principles on which our 
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matured liberal democracies are based merely be affirmed and strengthened, or 
should they be reformulated to accommodate the increasingly multicultural 
societies? That is, should we abandon secularism as a political concept all 
together?  
During the next decade, new arguments emerged in what we might call the 
second generation of secularism studies. The idea was that modern society with 
its functional differentiation (including the secularization process of separating 
church and state) was perceived by many as changing into a post-modern 
society, indicating its decentralized and individualized structures within 
networks. Thus, the function of secularism separating religion and politics also 
became outdated in much literature. Now, post-secularism indicated a shift in the 
perceived role of the relationship between religion and politics and as a 
consequence, the very meaning of both. As Habermas pointed out, public 
consciousness in Europe 'still has to adjust itself to the continued existence of 
religious communities in an increasingly secularized environment' (Habermas, 
2008a: 19). In this way the secularization thesis and its normative implications, 
understood as the decline and repression of religion by still more enlightened 
citizens, appeared obsolete. Rather, secularization was understood as the 
pluralization and diffusion of religious authority (Casanova, 1994; Taylor, 2007). 
Thus, it did not make sense to rely on modern separation logic in a post-modern 
political world in which religion had not disappeared and therefore remained 
relevant. To some extent, post-secularism came to be understood as a debate on 
whether the political principles of secularism are still sufficient, or whether the 
prevalence of religion in postmodernity should make us think differently about 
the relation between religion and politics. Further and perhaps most crucially, it 
asked whether religion holds a sense of moral potential that contributes to 
secular society if properly translated. If so, what would the consequences be for 
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our conception of principles such as religious freedom, religious equality, state 
impartiality and neutrality towards any religion?  
As the discussion on post-secularism continues, new voices are being heard 
possibly indicating a third generation of secularism studies. While the 
description and solution of post-secularism anchored its critique of secularism's 
notion of religious life and political relevance, it never sufficiently disassociated 
itself from the old understandings of the secular. The secular, the argument goes, 
is just as dependent of the old understanding of religion as religion is dependent 
on the secular. The third generation is thus a critical meta-perspective on the 
religio-secular distinction, and of the potential biases resulting from reading the 
political world through such a lense. We have arguably seen critical readings of 
secularism in earlier works of William Connolly’s Why I am not a Secularist 
(1999), Talal Asad’s Formations of the Secular (2001) and Charles Taylor’s A 
Secular Age (2007), but from the beginning of the new decade of the 21st 
century, there has been calls for a perspective going beyond religion and the 
secular, that is, seeking a perspective both post-secular and post-religious (e.g. 
see Secularism and Religion-Making edited by Dressler and Mandair, 2011, or 
Beyond Church and State by Scherer, 2013). Similarly, a forthcoming anthology 
edited by Cecile Laborde and Jean Cohen even carries the title: Beyond Post-
Secularism, containing reflections of this theme.  
Of course, the phases described above are somewhat crude and 
overlapping. But still, one might wonder if we are running out of prepositions 
when describing the role of public religion in the political sphere. Either this 
third generation of secularism studies signifies the final farewell to perceived 
modernist concepts of religion and the secular, or some fourth perspective will 
emerge (the reentry of secularism?).  
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In the introduction to Will Kymlicka's Multicultural Citizenship (1995) he 
noted that while most political communities have been multiethnic and multi-
religious ‘…most Western political theorists have operated with an idealized 
model of the polis in which fellow citizen share common decent, language and 
culture’ (Kymlicka, 1995: 2). Kymlicka's point being that liberal theory needed 
to catch up with practice in order to gain a more accurate understanding of 
political context (see also Modood, forthcoming: 1). When it comes to secularism 
theory and the question of public religion in politics, I suspect there is a similar 
situation. During the last three decades, theorists have treated religion in quite 
different fashions. Either as a relic from the past, an obscure or even 
museological phenomena containing pre-modern and modern ideas; some have 
treated it agnostic but argued for its removal from politics. Some have also been 
searching for possible comparability between a post-modern religiosity and the 
secular sphere; while others treat the religio-secular dichotomy as a certain 
global view in need of critical scrutiny and normative (re)evaluation.  
However, if we take a minimalist understanding of secularism to mean the 
separation of religion and politics, I am not sure that political theory is in urgent 
normative need of moving beyond this relation, because religion has never been 
politically irrelevant. Rather, I see a methodological need to bring political 
practice and context closer to theory.  
I think the German philosopher Ernst Cassirer made a critical point in The 
Myth of the State when he wrote: ‘"The world of Marduk", says the Babylonian 
epic of creation, "is eternal; his command is unchangeable, no god can alter what 
proceeds from his mouth." The world of human culture can be described in the 
world of this Babylonian legend. It could not arise until the darkness of myth 
was fought and overcome. But the mythical monsters were not entirely 
destroyed. They were used for the creation of a new universe and they still 
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survive in this universe’ (Cassirer, 1974 [1946]: 298). In this book, his agenda 
was to understand how political (totalitarian) myth could come to light so 
vividly in our age despite modern reason and progress. In the final passages of 
the book he acknowledges that myth is an indispensable part of human and 
social nature, even in our language. For that reason myth, here conceived as 
religion, is more than merely a political inclination. It is a constitutive 
component of human civilization, in other words the political.3 I think Cassirer 
was right to point out that religion is an inescapable part of political life 
irrespective of our normative expectations. As we shall see, public religion 
contributes to the constitution of the political identity of a nation. For example, it 
can take the form of perceived providence (i.e. the chosen people) or different 
doctrines of how religion is regulated by the state. The student of the political 
world thus should engage in how religion is being used ideologically, animating 
the political language and thinking in certain directions.  
                                               
 
 
3 Cf. Clifford Geetz, who famously wrote: 'Thrones may be out of fashion, and 
pageantry too; but political authority still requires a cultural frame in which to 
define itself and advance its claims, and so does opposition to it. A World wholly 
demystified is a world wholly depoliticized…' (Geetz, 2000 [1983]: 143). For an 
interesting recent systematic restatement of myth in political philosophy, see 
e.g. Chiara Bottici's A Philosophy of Political Myth from 2007, in which 'a political 
myth can be defined as the work on a common narrative by which the members 
of a social group (or society) make significance of their political experiences and 
deeds.' (Bottici, 2007: 179). This definition both builds on and criticizes 
Cassirer’s work (for being too focused on a single totalitarian myth). 
Importantly, as both Cassirer and Bottici points out, religion and myth does not 
coincide conceptually, but are interconnected phenomena (see Kirk, 1970: 29-
31; Bottici, 2007: e.g. 137, 178).  
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To be sure, in this thesis I will not question the diagnosis that 
multiculturalism seriously challenges existing practices of secularism, that 
'religion' and 'the secular' have been (and still are) undergoing connotative 
developments, or that this distinction shapes our very horizon of political 
understanding. Rather, throughout the thesis I build on many of the thinkers 
behind these claims. However, what I question is the impetus in some literature 
that asserts ideal visions of the political to reality in order to understand it. That 
is, reading political cases with the purpose of identifying what is right or wrong 
according to ideal, just principles. To a much larger extent, we should 
supplement our political theory with actual political thinking and ideology 
present in the policy area of religion and politics (not unlike Veit Bader’s ‘plea 
for an institutional turn’ in the direction of a contextualized political theory, see 
e.g. Bader, 2007: 92). With a focus on the English political theorist Michael 
Freeden I question a political theory, which seeks to rest solely on prescription 
or recommendation in its approach to the political world, in which case it 
‘transforms itself into either ideology or political philosophy, occasionally into 
both.’ (Freeden, 2013a: 53). Instead of trying to move beyond secularism or 
post-secularism, perhaps we should try to understand better the dynamics and 
meaning embedded within actual political practice.  
Allow me to briefly describe the following chapters in which I will attempt 
to approach the research question. 
 
1.3. The structure of the thesis 
In Part I of the thesis I begin by assembling and developing the analytical 
framework as mentioned above.  
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 In chapter 2 I consider how we might think of four different ideal-typical 
secularisms based on the particular discussions of Cecile Laborde, Rajeev 
Bhargava and Charles Taylor's definitions of secularism, along with Rogers M. 
Smith's theory of peoplehood. I suggest that we can distinguish different kinds of 
regimes by taking into account the type of separation and peoplehood 
supported. At the same time, this also allows me to advance the proposition that 
secularism does not entail one model of church-state relations, but instead a 
variety. Indeed, secularism should be understood as an ideological concept 
through which we can analyze how different democratic regimes make their 
varied distinctions between religion and politics. Some have a principle-based 
approach as a wall of separation or laïcité, while others adhere to a more 
pragmatic approach such as modest establishments. The argument therefore 
provokes the interesting question that within a Western context, it is not 
whether a country is secular or not (I argue most advanced liberal democracies 
are). Rather, we should ask how a given country's separation doctrine prioritizes 
various political principles, what the resulting institution expression of this is 
and what the arguments are supporting this. As I will show throughout the 
thesis, secularism works at an institutional level (the formal relationship 
between church and state), a level of identity (contributing with a particularistic 
or universalistic theme in the story of people) and a level of ideas (it follows 
certain interpretations of liberal principles such as of religious freedom and 
equality). On this basis, I begin my conceptual reconstruction of Danish 
secularism by suggesting that we might think of it in terms of the so-called 
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'modest establishment', potentially being compatible with political liberalism. 
This reconstruction will be empirically reflected upon through the following 
chapters and completed in chapter 7.4 
In chapter 3 I then turn to the methodological considerations, which this 
analytical framework gives rise to. In particular I consider the interpretive 
ideological analysis of Michael Freeden, and his ideas of how we can approach 
the political world, what we can know about it and how this will play a central 
role in the thesis. As this study methodologically is placed between political 
theory and interpretive policy analysis, I will not primarily be interested in the 
degree a given country has succeeded in implementing abstract ideals or how 
efficiently it has been done. Instead, what the actual political practice and 
ideological language supporting this means.  
Having discussed and presented my analytical approach, Part II of the thesis 
turns to the empirical studies of secularism and peoplehood. If we are to 
understand the principles guiding much ideological language and practice today, 
the historical roots are a central part of the relevant context. Thus, in chapter 4 I 
reflect upon historiographical readings of Danish secularism, focused on the 
period leading up to the founding of the modern Danish state in 1849. This 
reading seeks on the one hand to trace some of the main components of today's 
separation doctrine and its historical roots. Specifically, I identify three 
important visions or models of church-state relations represented by three 
political figures: the State Church Model represented by J. P. Mynster; the 
                                               
 
 
4 The conceptual expansions in chapter 2 and the reconstruction of Danish 
secularism is based partially on the arguments found in Dabelsteen, 2015.  
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Independent Church Model represented by H. N. Clausen and finally the Civil 
Church Model represented by F. S. N. Grundtvig. Whilst on the other hand, I 
attempt to trace the development of the Danish separation doctrine by reading 
Danish secularization history, conceptually inspired by Charles Taylor. I point 
towards four main drivers of the development of Danish secularism: The 
emergence of enlightenment-inspired liberal ideas, the emergence of revivalist 
groups, the struggle for recognition by the ‘dissenting’ religious communities, 
and finally the emergence of the romanticist notion of the people.  
Having focused on the tradition of the Danish separation doctrine 
historically I then turn to two recent cases in Danish politics, which in different 
ways help expose certain key aspects of the separation doctrine. These policy 
analyses are part of my argument to contextualize the reconstruction of Danish 
secularism and to achieve an empirically rich understanding of current political 
thinking in this policy area. The first case in chapter 5 represents a recent case of 
Danish legislation allowing same-sex church marriage. After briefly laying out 
the political and historical context of same-sex marriage, I analyze the policy. 
Especially, the parliamentary debates and legislative work leading to its 
realization. I find that this case can teach us something far more general about 
secularism: that the policy not only concerns the rights of homosexual citizens, 
but also the affirmation of a particular cultural norm in Danish political identity, 
as well as a particular notion of the Folkekirke in the public sphere.  
In chapter 6 I then turn to an analysis of the ongoing reform process of 
church-state relations. Again, after briefly contextualizing the policy historically 
and politically, it turns to a systematic analysis of central texts of the current 
process. In this case it becomes apparent that a cornerstone of the struggle 
between the two positions of Danish secularism is the meaning of religious 
freedom: should it be granted to individuals only, or should it protect some 
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degree of autonomy of the Folkekirke as an independent religious community 
(like other religious communities in Denmark)? I argue that the conception of 
religious freedom, which will dominate the new governance structure (if 
reformed), will have great influence on the development of Danish secularism. 
That is, it will not only influence the relation between the Folkekirke and state, 
but potentially the relationship with all religious communities. 
In chapter 7 I then complete the analysis of the Danish separation doctrine 
by suggesting a conceptual reconstruction. In the former chapters, I identified 
the existence of a dominating discourse amongst leading Danish politicians 
merging liberal political principles with an idea of the Christian Danish people, 
and as a result, the established church as a public good and an important site of 
national belonging. Within this discourse I then identify two different 
interpretations differing, especially in their take on religious equality and the 
status of the established church as a religious community. By applying the 
conceptual framework developed in the beginning of the thesis, this offers an 
analytical language by which we can interpret the ideological discourses. I 
reconstruct the two positions as assertive Danish secularism and 
accommodationist Danish secularism, respectively.  
I conclude the thesis in chapter 8 by returning to the question of how 
multiculturalism and religious pluralization – including the growing group of 
citizens not affiliated with a religious community – challenge the majority 
narrative outlined in the preceding chapters. I point out that the doctrinal status 
quo of Danish secularism will have a difficult time accommodating the 
multiculturalist demand of equal recognition of religious communities without 
seeing substantial institutional reforms.  
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PART I 
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Chapter 2 Theory and concepts of secularism 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
he primary aim of this chapter is first to provide a broad argument about 
the concept of secularism itself, and second to build on this 
conceptualization in order to reconstruct Danish secularism. The Danish 
doctrine separating religion and politics in general, and the religious 
communities and state in particular, tells the story of one kind of ideal-typical 
secularism often overlooked in the general literature on the topic.  
Thus, the question guiding this chapter is: How can we think of a kind of 
secularism within a framework of established religion, justifiable from the 
perspective of political liberalism?5 As such, this discussion should be of 
                                               
 
 
5 In this thesis, political liberalism is referring to a Rawlsian perspective, see 
section 2.2. below. However, let me clarify my use of liberalism as a concept in 
this thesis. Though I build parts of the discussion on the concept from political 
philosophy, I wish to emphasize that I do not assume its pure existence (or 
appliance) in political reality in Denmark or Western Europe. However, I do find 
it useful to trace its influence as a political logic in the ideological language and 
actions of political reality. As Freeden has argued, ‘Adequate – if inevitable 
partial – illustration is feasible…’ Thus, we should not ‘…aim to construct an 
encyclopaedic compendium of the conceptual variations within given ideologies 
but to demonstrate, through a selective use of sources past and present, the 
dominant features of those ideologies and the range of their conceptual 
decontestations.’ (Freeden, 1996: 139). To mention but a few recent and related 
approaches to studies of liberalism in European politics, though not necessarily 
subscribing to Freeden's interpretivist realism (on his own analyses, see the 
collection articles in Freeden, 2005b: Part II), see Connolly, 2000 on liberalism, 
T 
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relevance for several European countries displaying similar properties and for 
reflections on religion and politics more generally. 
For this purpose, I propose two conceptual expansions to the concept of 
secularism taking a Rawlsian perspective as the point of departure. The first is 
that a modest kind of established religion can be compatible with secularism 
justified within political liberalism. This builds on the premise that Rawlsian 
constraints on public reason are indeterminate, particularly when it comes to 
justifying the concrete institutional arrangement of state and public religion 
affairs. The second expansion embraces a deeper integration of separation 
doctrines into a theory of peoplehood. It is argued that we would expect to see 
no doctrine of separating religion and politics without a concomitant claim to 
political unity of a community that would be endangered without such 
separation.  
While many theorists reject the idea of any institutional establishment 
being compatible with liberal principles (e.g. Habermas, 2008b; Rawls, 1997; 
Bader, 2007; Audi, 2011; Bhargava, 2009 to mention a few prominent), this 
claim has been forcefully made before in a variety of versions, such as Tariq 
Modood's moderate secularism (2013), Daniel Brudney's noncoersive 
establishment (2005), Cecile Laborde's modest establishment (2012; 2013: 
chapter 8), or Sune Lægaard on some forms of religious establishment (2013).  
                                                                                                                                                            
 
 
nationalism and Aboriginal rights; Joppke, 2009: 107-126 on liberalism and 
Muslim integration in European societies; Mouritsen and Olsen, 2013 on 
liberalism, nationalism and immigration in Denmark; or a concept historical 
study of liberalism in Denmark 1840-1940, see Nevers, 2013.  
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A recent anthology, Secular and Sacred? The Scandinavian Case of Religion in 
Human Rights, Law and Public Space, even argued for the existence of a kind of 
Lutheran secularity (se Breemer, Casanova and Wyller (eds,), 2014). The editors 
note in the introduction that there has been a lack of awareness of this Lutheran 
variant, based in the intertwinement of religion and politics, instead of 
considering the Nordic countries as representing an incomplete secularity 
because of their established churches. Two contributions from here, Knut Ruyter 
and Jose Casanova argues that the ‘Nordic pattern of secularization’ should be 
distinguished from a Southern Catholic and an American pattern, by the fact that 
the former pattern does not differentiate religion and politics as much as it 
integrates them (Casanova, 2014: 24-25; Ruyter, 2014: 198-199).  
While I too argue that Northern European established church arrangements 
should not be considered as an incomplete or distorted secularization, but as 
systematic doctrines in their own right, I am reluctant to recognize this 
intertwinement (see also Christoffersen, 2006) as an antonym to separation.  
One reason, which is at the heart of chapter 4 is that it turns our attention 
away from the fact that e.g. Danish and Norwegian regimes was historically a 
result of a particular interpretation of liberal and Natural Law ideas of 
separation, and not its antithesis. I would argue that any meaningful application 
of ‘secularism’ is based on the core component of separation (which can take 
different forms), and thus the kind of ‘secularization without unchurching’ 
(Casanova, 2014: 27) should also be understood in this light. Another reason, 
which will become apparent in this chapter, is that this distinction between 
intertwinement (or soft deconfessionalization) and separation underplay the 
importance of peoplehood in the separation process by being too focused on the 
institutional and legal history.  
  
27 
In this connection, with the second conceptual expansion, I hope to 
contribute with a more nuanced conception of two kinds of establishment 
compatible with political liberalism. One based on a particularistic conception of 
political identity, and one on a universalist conception. Through the chapter I 
will attempt to show why these expansions are necessary in order to 
approximate a more nuanced categorization of secularism sensitive to political 
context (a point I will return to in chapter 3). 
The chapter proceeds in section 2.2 where I set out by reviewing the central 
positions in the political theoretical debate on secularism, in order to identify 
my own point of departure. This allows me in section 2.3 to create a mapping of 
the discussion on secularism structured by the first conceptual expansion, while 
section 2.4. is dedicated to the second. In section 2.5. I briefly discuss Talal 
Asad's notion of secularism, before the concluding remarks in section 2.6. To be 
sure, secularism can be a useful analytical concept, but not just any kind of 
secularism for any political context. As the empirical chapters 5 and 6 will show, 
the particularistic modest establishment of Danish secularism sometimes steps 
beyond what can be justified by rights-based liberalism and republican non-
domination.  
 
2.2. Whither secularism? 
As mentioned in the introduction, there has been an increasing sense that the 
premises on which secularism once was built no longer hold the same 
legitimacy.  
A fairly prevalent version is represented by William E. Connolly who argues 
that ‘the historical modus vivendi of secularism’ which sought to ‘chasten 
religious dogmatism and intolerance’ today has a blind spot: ‘the single, 
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authoritative basis of public reason and/or public ethics that govern all 
reasonable citizens regardless of “personal” or “private” faith’ does not honor 
the present need for ‘a vibrant public pluralism’ containing both religious and 
irreligious perspectives (Connolly, 1999: 4-6).  
I believe this perception of legitimacy-in-crisis relating to secularism rests 
first on the notion of the cultural and religious composition of populations, 
becoming increasingly more heterogeneous and thus not supporting one, but 
diverse and multiple comprehensive doctrines. This overlaps with the second 
notion, which is that the social imaginary supported by secularism has changed 
– a notion perhaps best captured by Charles Taylor. Taylor points out that the 
conditions under which modern separation doctrines function have changed 
considerably from what he termed a Durkheimian imaginary (i.e. a sacralizing 
societal order, or later, building a modern political identify around a religious 
core) to a post-Durkheimian one today (on secularization, see chapter 4). The 
latter supports what Taylor famously has called the ‘immanent frame’, which 
potentially fosters a deep plurality of ways of life exacting a social moral order 
beyond the old dichotomy of religion/politics (Taylor, 2007: especially Part IV).  
While I juxtapose Connolly and Taylor in this context, it is worth noting that 
Taylor seems to share Connolly's understanding of a self-referential secularity 
narrative blind to its own seemingly ‘neutral’ moral foundation. He focuses more 
on the transformation of a world of providential order united by religiously 
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defined political identity mobilization, to an increasingly immanent world 
structure which is closed to religious epistemology (Taylor, 2007: chapter 15).6 
The resulting crisis of legitimacy is thus not of a legal kind as lack of 
harmony between law and separation doctrine, but one related to the 
democratic regulation of people in a society of late modern social imaginaries 
(on democratic public reasoning and legitimacy as developed by Connolly and 
Taylor, see Redhead, 2006: 642; Connolly, 1999: esp. chapter 7; Taylor, 2007: 
445). Culturally fragmented populations, which secularisms regulates as a 
whole, has changed to such a degree today that it is unclear what kind of values 
secularism promotes, and for whom. 
If we accept this diagnosis of secularism today (which I see no reason not 
to), we might also agree that any discussion on secularism must begin with the 
question posed by the Indian political theorist Rajeev Bhargava (1998; 2009). If 
the very foundation on which secularism is supposed to built upon is corroding, 
should we then seek alternatives to secularism or alternative conceptions of 
secularism? This question in turn reflects at least two approaches to secularism 
in the literature. Though often overlapping, they depart from different 
perspectives.7 
                                               
 
 
6 I thank Rogers M. Smith for pointing this out. In this juxtaposition I do not 
engage in Connolly's recent discussion of Taylor's perhaps too rigid distinction 
between a tradition of immanent naturalism and transcendence, see Connolly, 
2010. 
7 Here, I choose a slightly different categorization of secularism literature than 
introduced in chapter 1, as is serve another purpose in this discussion. While the 
generational categorization described in the introduction can be conceived as an 
ongoing conversation on secularization as the condition of possibility of 
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Secularism for some has come to be equated with the institutional policy of 
separating religious beliefs and practices from the state, justified in ethical 
principles of individual rights (as portrayed by e.g. Bader, 2007: 94). From this 
perspective, secularism is the ideological concept that can be labeled naturalist 
humanism, ‘neo-Kantian’ or ‘postmetaphysical’ secularism in Connolly's words 
(2011: 648). It is rooted in post-Enlightenment ideas of promoting rationality, 
disenchantment and human prosperity by self-creation. This position is often 
identified with French style republicanism in the form of ‘laïcité de combat’, with 
exclusion of religion from the public sphere and state neutrality towards religion 
(Laborde 2008; Joppke 2009).  
Such a social imaginary founded in reason, completely detached from any 
notion of transcendence, not only seeks to separate religion from the political 
sphere but also pursues an independent public ethics to ‘govern all reasonable 
citizens regardless of “personal” or “private” faith’ (Connolly 1999: 5: see also 
Scherer 2009: 63; 2013: 21). As such, supporters of this kind of secularism in 
their demand for pure public (i.e. ‘secular’ or non-religious) reason as the 
backbone of democracy are often identified as secularists (as e.g. Habermas 
does, see Habermas, 2009: 74; or Connolly, 1999). In turn, these secularists and 
their political agenda are fairly or unfairly contrasted to more pragmatic and 
not-so-hostile political approaches to religion. One could mention strategies 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
 
secularism (and for some even its the ontological status as a political category, 
see e.g. Scherer, 2013: 5-12), the categorization presented here is rather guided 
by how secularism is treated. As a doctrine of strict separation or as an 
analytical concept (stemming from Bhargava’s question on analytical expediency 
of secularism)? 
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such as Connolly's ‘deep plurality of religious/metaphysical perspectives… 
incorporated into public discourses’ in a democratic culture or ethos of 
‘profound contestability of deep judgments…, forbearance and generosity’ 
(Connolly, 1999: 185-186). Or ‘institutional pluralism’, which is thought to be 
more in accordance with decent liberal morality and tolerance in conditions of 
deep pluralism (Bader, 2007: 92).  
Another perspective in the literature insists on maintaining secularism as a 
significant concept in a democratic context. From this perspective, rather, the 
agenda is to accommodate and reconstruct secularism so as to meet the new 
social conditions and political demands of modern liberal democracies (e.g. 
Taylor, 1998 or Bhargava, 2009). Secularism is seen not as one universal 
prescription of the relationship between religion and the state, but instead as a 
contextualized, systematic response to certain political principles such as 
religious freedom, equality or even state impartiality. Thus, we can imagine 
various secularisms compatible with justifiable state policies and practices 
according to different national contexts, what Bhargava theoretically has called 
‘contextual secularism’ (Bhargava, 2009; 2013). For Bhargava secularism can be 
justified particularly if formal separation is understood as principled distance 
rather than mere exclusion, that is, not equal distance but equal treatment of 
religious communities by the state (see also the discussion of this idea in section 
2.3.) Others have correspondingly operated with the notion of viewing 
secularism from a comparative perspective (e.g. Laborde, 2008; Jakobsen and 
Pellegrini (eds.), 2008; Kuru, 2009; Cady and Hurd (eds.), 2010; Warner, 
Vanantwerpen and Calhoun (eds.), 2011; Berg-Sørensen (ed.), 2013), thus 
pushing less for secularism as a prescriptive agenda, and more as a critical-
analytical tool to understand and compare different traditions of relating 
religion to politics. 
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This thesis departs from the latter perspective. No more than we can 
assume the exclusive existence of only one version of secularism in a given 
national context, we can assume a universal ‘blue print’ model of state-religion 
regulation across all liberal democratic states. However, this does not imply the 
rejection of secularism all together as Bader would have it (Bader, 2007: 94).  
Bader has recently summed up five reasons for rejecting the concept of 
secularism (2011). 1) Secularism is too fuzzy a concept, 2) liberal-democratic 
constitutions can do the job without secularism, 3) the morally significant issue 
is not if a state is secular, but whether it is liberal-democratic, 4) secularism is 
potentially in conflict with liberal-democratic constitutionalism and 5) it blurs 
our attention towards tension between liberalism and democracy. I will reject all 
five objections for the following reasons. First, to identify a significant idea or 
doctrine as being fuzzy or cacophonous should not in itself disqualify it as a 
useful analytical concept in a contextual-sensitive political theory. With Michael 
Freeden we should rather expect any political concept to be ambiguous and 
indeterminate both in theory and in practice (see Freeden, 2005a). By the same 
token, I am not convinced that Bader's own preferred associational democracy 
supporting a ‘politics of maximum accommodation within the constraints of 
moral minimalism’ (Bader, 2007: 292) intuitively makes for a less fuzzy case in 
relation to governance of religious plurality. Secondly, while it is true that 
constitutional language rarely take use of ‘secularism’ or ‘the secular state’ we 
cannot derive from this that secularism, as an ideological doctrine consisting of 
various concepts like religious freedom or religious equality, is not a relevant 
systematic way of thinking politically in political reality. This point is related to 
my third answer. While I agree that it is more important that states and politics 
are conducive to liberal-democratic principles than whether they are secular in 
an immediate moral sense, secularism might still be a relevant concept in many 
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political contexts. For example, secularism as an analytical concept can be useful 
in contexts where principles of separation are considered so natural and 
decontestable that just naming the presence of the concept in the political 
discourse does much critical work. In other words, at the level of interpretation 
(and not prescription) I argue we are still in need of secularism as a concept (on 
interpretive realism, see also Freeden, 2012; 2013: 54-66). The fourth and fifth 
reason Bader provides for abandoning secularism I agree with in so far as we 
are targeting a strict, wall of separation-style doctrine legitimized by an 
‘independent political ethic’ as Charles Taylor has identified it (see e.g. Taylor, 
1998: 33). But in the form of e.g. Bhargava's contextual secularism legitimized 
by principled distance (see Bhargava, 2006: 648-653), we might not face such 
tensions vis-á-vis liberal democratic constitutionalism, which Bader points to. 
Coming from a Freedenian approach to politics and ideology, I am not convinced 
that Bader is able stand on a platform distant from ideology or philosophy, made 
out of ‘a meta-constitutional and meta-legal theory explaining the constitutional 
essentials…’ (Bader, 2011; see also chapter 3). 
In the context of Western democracies, separation of religion and politics 
often connote liberal freedom principles. Therefore by confronting liberal 
principles of secularism with different empirical contexts, we might ask what it 
means to separate?  
 
2.2.1. Separation of what? 
At the end of his career John Rawls was particularly interested in seeking out 
ways to think of a just liberal, political society: ‘How is it possible for citizens of 
faith to be wholehearted members of a democratic society who endorse society's 
intrinsic political ideals and values…?’ (Rawls, 1997: 781). To be sure, this 
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question still seems to linger in political theory. Cécile Laborde has recently 
pointed out that the demands of liberal justice are inconclusive on whether the 
liberal state should ‘be a state of separation (of state and religion) or of 
recognition and establishment (of religion by the state)’ (Laborde, 2013: 67).  
Taking a mainstream Rawlsian understanding of liberalism as a relevant 
point of departure in connection to secularism, I follow Cécile Laborde. She 
points out that his notion of liberalism not only tries to explore how liberal 
rights secured by the state can be legitimized in a society, particularly one 
characterized by deep plurality of comprehensive doctrines, but of these Rawls 
pointed to religion as one of the most important. That is, he invited us to explore 
how we offer political reasons to grant each other equal rights in a world of 
potential religious conflicts (see Laborde, 2013: pp. 69). 
What are then the demands of liberal justice? Rawls captures these in the 
proviso of political liberalism pertaining to political and social institutions. 
Regardless of one's actual background reasons (e.g. religious), political 
arguments should be translatable into public reasons with the ability to ‘be 
affirmed by all free and equal citizens, given the fact of reasonable pluralism’ 
(Rawls, 1997: 776, 795). Although Rawls believes that the principle of 
separation of church and state supports the political values of such a liberal state 
(Rawls, 1997: 795), in practice it is still not clear what exactly separation entails. 
Does the proviso require the liberal state to be impartial towards all religious 
communities, or the state to take a complete hands-off approach to religion per 
se? Cf. also Habermas in this context, who explicitly points to the first option 
(2006: 6). As Laborde argues, depending on different possible interpretations of 
the proviso, both separation and establishment can be criticized for not meeting 
the requirements of public reason (i.e. being only justifiable for non-public, 
religious or secularist reasons). At the same time Laborde argues that within 
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Rawlsian requirements of political liberalism, it is possible to provide political 
reasons for both institutional arrangements in some moderate form (Laborde, 
2013: 82).8 
Following Laborde's discussion of Rawlsian political liberalism I therefore 
ask: How can we think conceptually about Danish political tradition and similar 
separation doctrines with established religion? In order to arrive at this, I will 
try to reconstruct the concept and position it in relation to other ideal-typical 
secularisms.  
 
2.3. Mapping concepts of secularism 
As stated my point of departure notes that the concept of secularism 
remains a useful concept in the study of politics not only as a descriptive concept 
of formal institutions, but as an expression of political thinking and practice 
serving a particular function (to separate religion and politics). In this 
formulation, I am drawing on Michael Freeden and his notion of ‘conceptual 
morphology’ (Freeden, 1996: chapter 2; see also chapter 3 and 7 in this thesis). 
Secularism can be treated as an analytical tool to identify a particular kind of 
political mechanism, to exercise ideological power through political language. 
The version of secularism that comes to dominate in a given political context 
                                               
 
 
8 And critique – both scenarios might violate ‘democratic citizenship and the 
idea of legitimate law’ (Rawls, 1997: 771; see also Laborde, 2013: 70).  
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may change over time, and with this competing doctrines are constantly 
challenging the status quo.9 
In the following I suggest two conceptual expansions to the authoritative 
story of contextualized secularisms. The modest hope for this thesis is to 
contribute to a move towards an even more nuanced and precise analytical 
concept of comparative secularisms.  
 
2.3.1. First expansion: modest establishment 
Even though several analysts consider secularism in the case of a state with 
established religion, calling these arrangements forms of secularism might be 
seen as a rather controversial claim.  
If we go back to Bhargava's approach to secularism he is dismissive of the 
idea of states with established religion being defines as secular. He distinguishes 
between theocratic, established and secular states (2006: 641).10 He argues that 
                                               
 
 
9 Some interprets this dynamic as a constant ideological struggle (Kuru, 2009: 
chapter 1) or as a process of conversion (Scherer, 2013). My understanding of 
the distinction between religion and politics draws on Taylor’s notion of what 
‘religion’ means in relation to ‘modernity’ (Taylor, 2007: chapter 12, particularly 
p. 429-31). A related account is the one of José Casanova (2012), and Talal Asad. 
The latter made a central point in that context: ‘The interesting thing about this 
view is that although religion is regarded as alien to the secular, the latter is also 
seen to have generated religion… Thus insistence on a sharp separation between 
the religious and the secular goes with the paradoxical claim the latter 
continually produces the former.’ (Asad, 2003: 193). 
10 Bhargava recognizes, however, that establishments do not necessarily lead to 
a connection of religion and the state at the institutional level (2006: 641). In 
later writings he does seem to recognize the existence of establishment regimes 
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we should think of a kind of moderate secular state not based on absolute 
separation (which he objects to), but on the before-mentioned contextual 
secularism ‘…that meets the secularist objection to non-secular states, and the 
religious objections to some forms of secularism’ (Bhargava 2006: 646).  
Contextual secularism is possible qua the notion of principled distance, which I 
will return to below.  
However, two questions should be raised at this point. First, it is not clear 
why a formal connection between religious communities and the state should 
result in compromising disconnection at the level of laws and public policies. For 
example, countries like Norway, England, Denmark, Finland and others, in 
general do not have religious laws, but they are rather secular and democratic 
(for England, see Woodhead, 2013; for Nordic countries see Christoffersen, 
2010a: 193-196). It is not entirely obvious why Bhargava draws a line against 
establishment of religion, especially considering his central argument of opening 
up the concept of separation to two meanings: either as exclusion of religion, or 
separation as a boundary or ‘principled distance’. Principled distance as the 
guiding principle for contextual secularism shows that the state acts in a non-
sectarian way which best promotes ‘religious liberty and equality of citizenship’ 
(Bhargava, 1998: 515). However, it seems to me that looking at democracy in 
Western Europe the lesson ‘…lies not in the need for a “wall of separation” 
between church and state but in the constant political construction and 
reconstruction of the “twin tolerations”’, as Stephan has pointed out (2000: 41). 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
 
as secularism, but is critical towards their stability and normative appeal, see 
also chapter 8.  
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If the principle of mutual respect between the church and the state, in order to 
promote acceptable religious liberty and equality, appears to be the main 
concern for Bhargava's principled distance, why should we assume an a priori 
institutional arrangement of separation? 
This leads to the second question, which pertains to the level of ends. Is 
establishment of religion compatible with some account of liberal democracy 
where the state itself is supposed to be secular?  
In a recent article Cécile Laborde (2013) offers a helpful ideal-typical 
categorization of state-religion regimes ranging from militant separation, over 
modest separation and modest establishment to full establishment. Through a 
reconstructed Rawlsian liberal theory of justice she argues that both modest 
separation and modest establishment can be, ‘…compatible with the full exercise 
of religious rights by all citizens’ (Laborde, 2013: 81). From this perspective, 
some version of establishment of religion can be justified: If it is but symbolic or 
non-coercive, it can be considered a non-justice-infringing case possible within 
the realm of political liberalism. That is, not undermining fundamental 
principles like freedom of conscience or equality between citizens.  
The institutional set-up of modest establishment might not be incompatible 
with the idea of a Rawlsian ‘overlapping consensus’, since it stresses the value of 
neutrality on the grounds of public reason (not of conscience). In Political 
Liberalism, Rawls developed his concept of overlapping consensus as a contrast 
to a mere modus vivendi between comprehensive doctrines (e.g. see Rawls, 
2013: 147-150). Within secularism theory, Taylor especially has operated with 
the idea of ‘overlapping consensus’ as a doctrine of secularism where we can 
‘converge on some political principles, but not on our background reasons for 
endorsing these’ (Taylor, 1998: 51). According to Laborde's reconstruction of 
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Rawlsian public reason, the kind of demands the public sphere is subjected to 
are indeterminate about non-justice-infringing religious symbols such as modest 
establishment (Laborde, 2013: 80). 
This understanding of Rawlsian liberalism appears to run counter strong 
proponents of liberal freedom rights and public reason, primarily as the 
foundation of a just societal order. One could think of Habermas, who is a strong 
advocate for formal and institutional separation of church and state. Yet, I would 
still argue that Laborde's reconstruction applies to Habermas. He opens up for 
the possibility of non-neutral worldview statements (or symbols) beyond a 
strictly formal context: ‘… to extend this principle [the neutrality of the state] 
from the institutional level to statements put forward by organizations and 
citizens in the political public sphere would constitute an over-generalization of 
secularism’ (Habermas, 2008b: 128-129). But even while maintaining strict 
state neutrality at the formal level, he does argue that ‘this principle should not 
be reduced to the laicist demand that the state should refrain from adopting any 
political stance that would support or… constrain religion per se, even if this 
affects all religious communities equally’ (Habermas, 2008b: 124). Thus, 
Habermas does seem to be sensitive to the consequentialist side of these 
principles, which may leave the reader unclear as to what in his theory may 
validate strict separation.  
Another prominent example could be Martha Nussbaum, who roughly 
follows a similar concern of not ‘creating an in-group and out-group’ (Nussbaum, 
2008: 25) of citizens in society through state policies endorsing a particular 
religious orthodoxy. But as Franken and Loobuyck have pointed out within 
Nussbaum's discussion that although in favor of American constitution style 
separation, they imply that ‘…how these essential presuppositions are 
implemented in a particular state-church regime is less important as long as the 
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freedom of religion and state neutrality are protected’ (Franken and Loobuyck, 
2012: 2).  
For Rawls, Habermas and Nussbaum there seem to be tensions between a 
clear warning against ‘the dangers of establishment’ (e.g. Nussbaum, 2008: 225) 
and principles not decisively determining or supporting this. This tension seems 
to have been carried over in Nussbaum's book on European and American 
approaches to principles of equal dignity, respect conscience and recognition of 
vulnerability (Nussbaum, 2012). When she discusses modern European 
establishment she notices that there ‘is something unequal about the situation’ 
(Nussbaum, 2012: 92). But Nussbaum does not appear to point to a violation of 
Rawlsian principles of justice (which her own notions of vulnerability, equality 
and liberty are very close to, Nussbaum, 2008: 64), since there are ‘no tangible 
consequences’ (Nussbaum, 2012: 92). The objection Nussbaum does raise, 
however, is of another kind, which Laborde amongst other republican political 
liberalists also points to: the unequal symbolic recognition of citizens by the 
state.  
Of course, even though secularism and liberalism are highly aligned, some 
forms of secularism cannot be justified by liberal political arguments. Think here 
of Laborde's ‘militant’ secularism (Laborde, 2013: 68) or Bhargava's ‘amoral 
secular states’ (Bhargava, 2006: 642; see also Bader, 2007: 97). Similarly, some 
forms of liberalism are not necessarily secular (Connolly, 1999: 10). With 
Laborde I try to make the point that modest establishment is one out of several 
formations of secularism possible within a liberal framework of justice. Building 
on her reconstruction of political liberalism, even Bhargava's pragmatic 
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Dworkinian notion of ‘treating everyone as equals’ rather than equal treatment 
(Dworkin, 1978 quoted in Bhargava, 2006: 649)11 evoking an ethos of the 
secular republic to protect equal citizenship, does not in itself appear to conflict 
with a modest version of establishment. As I will argue in chapter 5 and 6, not all 
positions of Danish establishment can be reasonably considered to be 
comparable with the minimal requirements of liberalism, in particular because 
of the demand of equality.  
This ends up in the following illustration in figure 3 below, which contains 
two dimensions. One horizontal on the kind of separation the doctrine is based 
on, and one vertical on the kind of political identity formation connected to the 
separation, which I will elaborate on in the next section 2.4. Figure 3 thus 
exhibits forms of secularism, which Bhargava would call rights-based forms of 
secularism (Bhargava, 1998: 512) compatible with basic (Rawlsian) demands of 
political liberalism. He distinguishes between three types of political secularism. 
The first two types are based on separation-as-exclusion (Bhargava, 1998: 493). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
 
11 A similar distinction is made by Rainer Forst between ‘formal equality’ and 
‘qualitative equality’, both within a notion of toleration based on mutual respect 
(2012). 
  
42 
Figure 3. Secularism between separation and peoplehood - an ideal typical model 
 
One he phrases ‘hyper-substantive’ secularism (1), a strict enlightenment-
inspired doctrine which is ‘comprehensive, universally applicable, authoritative 
and final’, (Bhargava, 1998: 514). The other is termed ‘ultra-procedural’ 
secularism (3), a doctrine ‘suspicious of all ultimate ideals… to disengage 
ourselves from all substantive procedures, possessing absolute priority over all 
substantive values’ (Bhargava, 1998: 514). He then points to another logic of 
separation, that of separation-as-principled distance in which his preferred 
contextual secularism (4) is positioned. Now, as noted before, Bhargava does not 
accept establishment of any kind: ‘Only contextual secularism grasps that many 
forms of separation lie between exclusion and complete fusion’ (1998: 516).  
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Inspired by Laborde's reading of Rawls' political liberalism, I suggest we 
can imagine one further type of separation-as-principled distance; that of 
modest establishment (2). This represents the first conceptual expansion. 
Modest establishment and contextual secularism are both disconnected at the 
level of policy, law and institutions but also do not share ends with the given 
religious communities. If a state shares its end with the established or any other 
religious community, indeed it would be hard to call it secular. But what makes 
them different in particular is the kind of peoplehood supported by separation 
as principled distance. I discuss this in section 2.4. as the second expansion. We 
can thus understand the four ideal-typical secularisms as four possible ways 
within the framework of political liberalism, to enforce the distinctiveness and 
the worth of a political community in relation to religion in the public sphere.  
One main point of figure 3 is to emphasize that the ‘question about the kind 
and degree of equality under a given institutional regime of state–church 
relationships is different from the question about the concrete institutional 
forms of such relationships.’ (Lægaard, 2008: 164). Not at least in relation to 
religion, what if the most relevant challenge to ‘a fair distribution of more 
intangible forms of social recognition’ (Laborde, 2013: 86) in practice is to be 
found at the institutional level in, say, Denmark, while it is to be found at the 
discursive level in the United States? To be more specific, in countries with 
symbolic modest establishment we often see a defense for the symbolic 
establishment for reasons of peoplehood and not out of religious reasons (which 
is rare in the fairly secularized political debates there). In contrast, religious 
reasoning often permeates US political debates, but nonetheless they strongly 
observe state neutrality towards religion (e.g. Smith, 2012; Modood, 2013: 178).  
As Taylor has claimed, ‘American secularists often confuse total separation 
of church and state from that of religion and state’ (Taylor, 2009: 1149). What if 
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secular state institutions supported for whatever comprehensive reasons can be 
as alienating to its citizens in actual politics (because of discursive dominance 
of one or few comprehensive views constituting the institutions) as a 
symbolic non-coercive state officially recognizing religion? Far from being able 
to satisfyingly settle this question here, I would like to suggest that one possible 
approach could be to consider the politics of peoplehood as one additional 
category of the concept.  
 
2.4 Second expansion: peoplehood 
A defining difference between the right side of figure 3, separation-as-exclusion, 
and the left side, separation-as-principled distance, is whether formal 
disconnection of state institutions from public religion is considered the 
implementation of the neutrality principle, or whether the main concern is to 
treat all citizens fair and equal. 
An additional difference in figure 3 on the vertical side is that ultra-
procedural and contextual secularism share a consensus on the proper church-
state arrangement, based on what in short can be termed universalistic 
peoplehood. Hyper-substantive and modest establishment secularism share a 
rather strong (or particularistic) notion of political community (I will expand on 
this below). The difference between the two sides designates which kind of 
political community they evoke. Of course, liberal secularism of the Rawlsian 
strand is also concerned with the question of political community, but here I 
wish to stress rather the type of community involved. The contrast is between 
whether the rights and duties derived from political identity finds its source 
from particularistic themes of peoplehood, or whether it springs from common, 
universalistic standards indifferent to particularistic grounds.  
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This is the second suggested conceptual expansion of secularism: to 
consider more directly the question of what kind of political community the 
given type of separation evokes. Admittedly, various thinkers have been 
concerned with the connection between the development of secular doctrines 
and the mobilization of modern political identity (e.g. see Bhargava, 1998: 508-
511; Taylor, 1998: 38-48 and 2007: 445-459; Connolly, 1999: 73-96; Asad, 
2003: 181-202; Bader, 2007: chapter 5). But it seems to me that understanding 
how secular institutions and their underlying political principles are in practice 
‘translated’ to, correspond to, or even affirm the inevitable narrative of 
belonging to a particular people as part of the concept of secularism, would 
contribute to a better understanding of current doctrines of secularism.  
Before proceeding to the more precise theory of peoplehood (section 2.4.2) 
I will qualify what I mean by integrating secularism and peoplehood 
conceptually from an interpretive, ‘Freedenian’ perspective.  
 
2.4.1. Integrating secularism and peoplehood 
First, at a conceptual level I conceive peoplehood as being part of the concept of 
secularism. I deliberately do not mean to make the (different) claim of 
secularism an explanation for a certain mechanism for creating a people. Allow 
me to briefly expand on this point.  
While I propose that the concept of secularism logically implies certain 
kinds of peoplehood to be normatively appropriate, this does not exclude the 
possibility that secularism also partially explains the kind of peoplehood 
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observed empirically. My emphasis is not only on peoplehood as an empirical 
phenomenon by which political principles are conditioned, but also on 
peoplehood as a certain political idea in line with liberty or democracy.12 As 
such, ‘people’ is a category along with a particular range of other categories 
which help secularism become not just an abstract, vacuous concept of 
separation. However, that the notion of people exists as part of secularism does 
not exclude that it also find simultaneous application ‘outside’ – that is, in the 
concept's idea-environment as its explanation. This assumption that ‘political 
concepts do not relate to each other entirely by negation’ (Freeden, 1996: 67) 
allows me to assert that while ‘people’ in much political theory, is considered to 
be a distinct political (and sometimes even moral) category, at the same time it 
is often used as a quasi-contingent category as part of the concept of secularism, 
like autonomy or liberty, as Freeden has pointed out (Freeden, 1996: 67). 
                                               
 
 
12 Indeed, the political thinker Margaret Canovan has recently insisted ‘”The 
people” is undoubtedly one of the least precise and most promiscuous of 
concepts. For that very reason, however, it has a claim to be regarded as a 
quintessentially political concept…’ (Canovan, 2005: 140). In this book she 
discuss the relevance of the concept in relation to political theory and trace its 
conceptual history in particular for the Anglo-Saxon world revealing many 
different meanings developed in constant political struggles to obtain power 
(Canovan, 2005: chapter 2). In a Danish context Ove Korsgaard has 
correspondently done a conceptual history of “Folket” (the people) throughout 
the last 500 years emphasizing the various kinds of people, which he argues 
have had at least three main meanings (demos/political, ethnos/cultural and 
pléthos/social entity or mass,; Korsgaard, 2008: 13). Different meanings of the 
same political concept have been dominating in different periods, but always 
they have co-existed as possible interpretations.  
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Second, what does it mean to treat peoplehood as a conceptual expansion to 
secularism? Here, Freeden’s discussion of political concepts is helpful. The 
definition, or better, the specificity of political concepts is derived on the one 
hand from components, whose empirical absence in political discourses would 
make the very concept unintelligible, and therefore can be considered 
ineliminable (the following reading is based especially on Freeden, 1996: 60-67). 
Regarding the political concept of secularism, the ineliminable feature would be 
the separation of religion and politics. Without separation, the concept of 
secularism would collapse into meaninglessness. On the other hand, Freeden 
argues that the concept cannot be reduced to its ineliminable component. 
Rather, the specificity of political concepts is secured by a range of non-random 
additional components in a limited number of recognizable patterns. These 
components Freeden calls quasi-contingent categories since they refer to a 
defining component of the concept, but its specific features are dependent on 
particular context and circumstances.  
It is important to recognize, however, that peoplehood as a quasi-
contingent component of secularism does not follow logically from the notion of 
separation. Rather, peoplehood should be seen as a culturally adjacent 
component to secularism. By this I mean that while logic and some political 
philosophy possibly would not allow this combination, in actual politics we 
nevertheless see attempts to grant separation social and ideational legitimacy by 
reference to a particular rendition of peoplehood. One case in point is the Danish 
same-sex marriage (see chapter 5). One might consider this kind of conceptual 
combination ‘illogical’ or ‘false’, and thus either reject it as an object of study, or 
label it purely strategic or populist rhetoric not relevant to political theory. I 
would disagree, and point to actual political thinking and practice as the object 
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of study, and not philosophical concepts (on cultural adjacency, see Freeden, 
1998: 71; on interpretive realism see Freeden, 2013a). 
Coming back to a secularism justified by Rawlsian political liberalism, 
additional categories such as religious liberty, religious equality and 
governmental neutrality are common denominators (here, I quote Robert Audi's 
three principles of church-state separation to ensure toleration, which can be 
considered an authoritative voice from within the liberal tradition, see Audi, 
2011: chapter 2). Yet, while Audi discuss democratic governments and political 
conduct by individuals (Audi, 2011: 4), he remains silent on the subject of 
political community, which the polity should regulate. I wish to identify political 
identity as an additional category to the concept of secularism.  
Peoplehood conceptually understood is thus a quasi-contingent category 
since the intelligibility of secularism as an abstract concept is not dependent on 
particular types of people (e.g. whether we are observing separation in an 
ethnically homogenous or multicultural nation). I argue that the category of 
peoplehood is important in order to grasp actual political meaning in empirically 
prevalent separation doctrines. Taken together, the recognizable patterns of the 
additional components correspond in this conceptual reconstruction to the four 
ideal-type formations of secularism displayed in figure 3, which I explain further 
below.  
While a defining feature for secularism is separation, the precise 
architecture of the doctrine in a given context is prescribed by the whole range 
of additional categories, which together constitutes the specificity of the concept. 
Therefore we can we can critically analyze the culturally particular layout of a 
given country's secularism, by looking at how its additional components are 
interpreted. 
  
49 
Certainly, naming the additional categories should not be understood as a 
claim to historical or cultural universality of secularism. However, I do wish to 
claim that a necessary piece of the puzzle to understand the meaning of 
secularism in a Western context is rendered by the quasi-contingent category of 
a people. Put differently, the empirically ascertainable cultural commonalities of 
Western-style secularisms ascribe to separation some minimal element of 
peoplehood. Here, we would hardly see any separation of religion and politics, 
without some degree of a claim to political unity.  
 
2.4.2. Religion as an ethically constituting theme 
Let us now return to the question of how to categorize different ways of 
belonging to a people. One way to approach the ideological production of secular 
ideals as they confirm and animate civic ideals of peoplehood is to address 
Rogers M. Smith’s theory of peoplehood (2003). The project of Smith is to render 
intelligible the production and reproduction of political identities. The intention 
is understand how political elites seek to ‘inspire allegiance among relatively 
politically inactive as well as active constituents’ (Smith, 2003). This helps to 
explain why certain visions of political order are given particular priority. 
Religion is often part of this construction of national belonging (though far from 
the only element), which is why we can imagine secularism as a particular 
narrative of peoplehood (e.g. see Smith, 2013).  
Smith's approach to political identity was developed first in relation to deep 
historical studies of American citizenship and constitutional politics, which 
resulted in the important book on American political history, Civil Ideals. 
Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History (1997). The purpose of this study 
of American citizenship laws was to provoke attention to the often racist, violent 
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or chauvinistic themes also present in American national identity, which have 
been ignored in favor of the idealized story of the immigrant democracy. Instead 
of telling the story of American civil culture from the perspective of what Smith 
called the Tocqueville-Hartz perspective of the egalitarian liberal democracy, he 
tells the story of multiple ideological discourses of American peoplehood. Of 
liberalism, democratic republicanism and ascriptive Americanism (Smith, 1997: 
26, 36). The empirically-rich study based on political debates and formal 
legislative documents, eventually lead to the more general and theoretically 
reflected Stories of Peoplehood. The Politics and Morals of Political Membership 
(2003). This theory, which is one of the main inspirations of my 
conceptualization of secularism, draws on a historical tradition of studying 
political identities which Michael Böss has identified as ‘the study of master 
narratives’, with roots going back to Jean-Francois Lyotard and Claude Lévi-
Strauss' conception of people and nations as narratives: ‘The new critique of the 
very idea of “national history” now made it an object of research in its own right 
to identify and deconstruct national grand narratives’ (Böss, 2012: 322). It is a 
perspective within social studies providing a constructivist reading of political 
identity also shared by scholars such as Benedict Anderson's Imagined 
Communities from 1983, Alexander Wendt's Social Theory of International 
Politics from 1999 and Homi K. Bhabha's Nation and Narration from 1990.13 
Importantly, Smith emphasizes the political construction of identity in 
particular, arguing that while social factors like culture, language or religious 
                                               
 
 
13 This approach often is contrasted to so-called ‘primordialist’ and ‘essentialist’ 
positions. For a more detailed discussion of his own approach, see also Smith, 
2003: 32-71; 2004.  
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affiliation are important, actual law-making political institutions, economic 
conditions and political movements are most the central (Smith, 2003: 38).  
In order to see where religion fits in Smith’s theory of peoplehood, we will 
have to briefly look at how he breaks the concept of political membership down 
into at least three fundamental ‘themes’ that all successful stories of belonging 
must include.14 The economic theme concerns the material worth of being a 
people. Here, political leaders might promise economic security and justify the 
accumulation of wealth (by the few). Thus, it is a narrative balancing between 
security and wealth (Smith, 2003: 61). An example of such a theme could be one 
of having a welfare state as a safeguard against personal economic and social 
decline, as well as the best way to generate wealth. The political power theme 
deals with how to promise citizens personal physical security and power as a 
collective, and how leaders can gain support within their own power base 
(Smith, 2003: chapter 1). Focus here is on the empowerment of members by 
political institutions, and policies for the sake of enhancing the political elite’s 
trustworthiness and the worth of the people. A recent example could be how 
MPs in some EU member states are arguing for the closing of national borders to 
ensure both the physical security of its citizen from cross-border crime, and to 
symbolically maintain the territorial and political integrity of the national polity. 
                                               
 
 
14 While in Smith in his 2003 book termed the narrative elements of a 
peoplehood stories (economic, political and ethical constitutive stories), in later 
publications he termed these themes and the master narrative of political 
community for stories of peoplehood (e.g. Smith, 2008). I follow the recent 
terminology in the thesis.  
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Without going into depth with these, I want to bring attention to the final 
ethical constituting theme, which explains who the citizens normatively are and 
accordingly what is expected of them. This is the element of people-making 
which indicates that a people does not simply choose its own identity. Persons 
are conceived to be ‘organically’ embedded in the nation due to a common 
heritage, an original race, shared ancestry or some comparable tie. Civic identity 
or virtue, Smith finds, is particularly bound with religion and ethical myths 
which affirm both their worth and obligations (Smith, 2003: 64). Such themes 
might be the numerous founding myths of nations, of how they fought for 
independence in the past or even in pre-historical times. As Smith concludes 
‘…enduring successful accounts of peoplehood inspire sense of trust and worth 
among members of a people by weaving together economic, political power, and 
ethically constitutive themes tailored to persuade a critical mass of constituents 
while also advancing partisan elite interests’ (Smith, 2003: 70).  
One vital point is that it is very difficult to imagine any stable political 
community without an ethnically constitutive theme. At the same time, Smith 
invites us to be cautious of categorizing different kinds of peoplehood as either 
‘civic’ or ‘ethnic’. While this is a distinction in much nationhood literature, it 
seems to imply that some nations are purely civic e.g. in the sense of 
Habermasian constitutional patriotism, or nationalistic-exclusivist. 
Smith instead distinguishes between ethical themes constitutive of either 
‘universalistic’ people (e.g. universal human worth qua human rights; or 
universal worth because we are all children of God) or ‘particularistic’ people 
(e.g. common French language or culture; or a Lutheran religious heritage). Of 
course, in reality no kind of peoplehood would exist purely in any of those 
categories. Coming back to figure 3 (page 42), Bhargava suggests that hyper-
substantive secularism ‘involve qualitative distinctions of worth’, while the 
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ultra-procedural secularism instead insist to ‘disengage ourselves from all 
substantive values in order to arrive at a set of universally acceptable 
procedures, possessing absolute priority over all substantive values’ (1998: 
514). These are two quite different forms of worth evoked. With Smith I will 
stress that within Bhargava's political secularism (including his own contextual 
secularism) we should distinguish between two strands of ‘ethical worth 
themes’: one particularistic and one universalistic. Both of which are variants of 
what Smith calls ethically constitutive themes, but with quite different ways to 
affirm a people.15 
At this point I wish to raise several questions about the conception of 
peoplehood as Smith puts forward. 
 
a) What is so ‘special’ about the people? 
First, looking beyond the universalistic-particularistic distinction, are not all 
stories of peoplehood particularistic to some extent? That is, if the very function 
portrayed in Smith's theory is to designate boundaries between one community 
and other, then there must always be some efforts even in universalistic stories 
to evoke particularistic belonging? In a sense this is true as most national stories 
emphasize why they are ‘special’, relative to other communal identities. 
However, Smith's point of the universalistic-particularistic distinction is to ask 
which kind of moral resources are mobilized, so as to legitimize (or morally 
                                               
 
 
15 In fact, even Rawls gives us reason to assume that both particularistic and 
universalist kinds of peoplehood can be imagined within the framework of his 
justificatory liberalism (Smith 2003: 139-141). 
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constitute) the political and economic measures made. Is the ideological 
language, through which political leaders seek to gain support for their own 
power base, articulated in hierarchical, narrow racial or cultural doctrines 
(particularistic), or are they based on doctrines pertaining in principle to all 
human beings (universalistic)?  
Importantly, I understand this distinction as being analytical, with the 
purpose of identifying different stories of peoplehood. Yet, it does not 
necessarily involve a truth-claim or normative category. That is, identifying a 
theme in a peoplehood story as universalistic in itself entails no claim about the 
normative scope of the theme in political realities. Rather, Smith invites us to be 
skeptical when ascribing normative substance to this analytical distinction, as he 
points out that ‘…all “universalistic” stories often operate politically as partisan 
ones. The main reason that proponents of conceptions of “civic” nationhood do 
not explicitly endorse any single supporting ethically constitutive story is that 
they cannot agree on one’ (Smith, 2003: 81). The trouble is that just as we can 
think of large number of particularistic themes of peoplehood, the same applies 
to universalistic themes. Refer to a Marxian versus a Lockean concept of 
freedom, or an Islamic versus Christian perspective of human salvation. In a 
political context they are all universalistic in their narrative appeal, yet at the 
same time they are historical sources for very violent partisan struggles of 
power between (particularistic) peoples. According to Smith, even though we 
might wish to establish social order and authority on universally just principles 
of political conduct and regulation, in practice, one faces the question: ‘How far 
can a liberal society go to make expatriation, emigration, and immigration 
practical choices for all humanity, as Habermas seem to wish, while at the same 
time seeking to maintain an at least mildly distinctive form of liberal democratic 
constitutionalism for its members?’ (Smith, 2003: 145).  
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b) Pluralism and political identity 
Making a people ‘special’ demands an ethical grounding beyond economic and 
political themes, which can be done by either particularistic or universalistic 
claims. Therefore, we might then direct a second question to Smith's theory of 
peoplehood: How we can conceive cultural and religious pluralism within 
identity narratives, which has been politically constructed to evoke a sense of 
particular worth and trust in one shared, national identity?  
As already touched upon in the first question above, the theory of 
peoplehood assumes the possibility of several particularistic themes (e.g. based 
on perceived religious identity), conducive to the same national regime. In other 
words, we can imagine several contested stories of peoplehood within the same 
national state community. Here, in relation to pluralism and peoplehood, lies an 
analytical and a normative point.  
On the one hand, Smith's theory of peoplehood aims to contextualize 
narratives of political identity by referring to their historical and political 
origins, in order to identify the main elements in telling a story of a people (see 
Smith, 2003: 32). On a meta-level, this allows the observer to show how there is 
not one narrative of, say, Danish national identity, but several – what Smith has 
referred to as ‘multiple political traditions’ (see e.g. Smith, 1993). The theory 
thus assumes that because any political community is a result of a political 
struggle and identity construction (i.e. not naturally existing), we should expect 
to see continuous political contestation of identity in order to inspire competing 
senses of trust and worth (see Smith, 2003: 53). One could also say that Smith 
tries to show how peoplehood as a concept, holds an immanent plurality 
because it is open to constant political contestation (i.e. attempts to exclude 
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certain elements in the story). In the context of contestation of national identity, 
political struggle of peoplehood can thus be identified as attempts to override 
the obligation to obey national law, military service, or the allegiance to the 
nation. On issues characterized less by high-politics, we could also imagine 
attempts to change or abolish political practices traditionally associated to be a 
particularistic identity marker for a political people. This contestation would 
question the old ways, and propose a new and far more appealing one (more 
just, more modern, more morally correct etc.).  
While this form of plurality-as-political-struggle can be observed between 
stories of peoplehood, another form of plurality possible is within a given story. 
For example, while some might think that Denmark is the best place to live for 
Evangelical Lutherans because of its religious origins, established church and 
historical tradition, this particularistic story is most often revised along a 
democratic and rights-based theme. In this sense allegiance to the Danish people 
as conducive to religious identity is only partial, as few would pose totalistic 
demands of religious affiliation as a requirement for being member of the 
political community (i.e. being a Danish citizen). Along similar lines, we might 
also imagine Danish Muslim citizens regarding membership of Denmark as the 
political community in which their civic loyalty lies; neither compromising their 
own cultural and religious narrative as Muslims nor confirming any Christian 
faith. Of course, this scenario is possible for any citizen of religious or areligious 
conviction supporting an ethical peoplehood theme not constituted by religious 
elements. From these examples, we can reflect upon two available stories of 
Danish peoplehood for Danish citizens to belong – one affirming an ethical 
theme of Christian identity, another affirming a multi-faith or areligious theme.  
It appears therefore, that there are varying levels of allegiance which can 
dictate a political group's membership base. Smith roughly distinguishes 
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between weak, moderate and strong forms of political community, in which the 
two latter forms do not hold clear and absolute primacy over competing 
stories.16 Thus ‘…they are logically required to accept the legitimacy of multiple 
political memberships, multiple citizenships, so long as those alternative 
allegiances do not prevent them from governing in their areas of authority and 
accommodating their distinctive purposes’ (Smith, 2003: 130; see also pp. 19-
32). We can also imagine that allegiance to a political people can be widened or 
narrowed in scope. For example, a state could choose to impose anti-
discrimination legislation on all civic organizations within its jurisdiction, thus 
forcing e.g. religious communities not to discriminate on the basis of gender 
when hiring staff or religious leaders. This would of course put many group 
identities in that society on coalition course, with the new demands of 
obligations to the national identity. This form of plurality-as-multiple-political-
memberships tells us that political peoples are not limited as being national in 
range, just as not all national identities have their own state, not all peoples have 
their own nation (Smith, 2003: 70).  
Nevertheless, the theory of peoplehood in this thesis is mostly applied on 
exactly national and state-based political identities, as the focus is on the 
majority narrative as an important element in national church-state separation 
doctrines.  
                                               
 
 
16 In addition to the categories strong, moderate and weak peoples (signifying 
the hierarchical strength of obligations to this people over others), Smith 
operates with wide, midrange and narrow (signifying the range of issues a group 
can assert primacy over). For example, the US would be a strong and wide 
people, Wales moderate and midrange people and on organization such as 
Oxfam would be a weak and narrow group or people (Smith, 2003: 21).  
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On another note, highlighting the question of plurality in relation to 
peoplehood, Smith also attempts to make a normative point. One of his main 
focus areas is not to repress or abolish particularistic themes in political identity 
narratives, but to embrace them and even facilitate their expression. He adopts 
what he calls a Madisonian approach, where ‘if we encourage the articulation of 
these stories in political processes, we can reasonably hope that, to a certain 
degree, conflicting stories will work to check each other's excesses as they vie to 
win broad support in political contests’ (Smith, 2003: 159). The ideal is thus a 
form of ongoing democratic experimentation, explaining how political 
peoplehood can be legitimized and constituted ethically. In a European context a 
Madisonian approach might seem optimistic at best, since there is a 
considerable degree of asymmetrical relations existing between different 
articulations of ethical themes in most European countries. Think especially of 
the Christian majorities versus the Muslim minorities. However, Smith's point is 
to encourage different democratic and human rights based variants of 
particularistic themes supporting the same regime. If the Madisonian ‘politics of 
conflicting stories of peoplehood’ (Smith, 2003: 173) are to succeed, it appears 
that it would require all groups to embrace and accept that their account of 
national identity is historical, that is, not natural but ultimately a partisan 
construction.17 
In a sense this normative approach does indeed seem to share the approach 
of what Bader has called ‘a realistic utopia developed by democratic 
                                               
 
 
17 In the essay Reflections on a new ethos for Europe, Paul Ricoeur propose a 
rather similar approach to solving the problem of telling the story of a people 
under conditions of plurality (1996 [1993]). 
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experimentalism’, which Bader's associative democracy and Bhargava's rights 
based political order also adheres to. Yet what makes this approach 
substantially different is the insistence that one should allow for concrete senses 
of national belonging, and not propose a theory of political identity ‘…too 
voluntaristic, and “universalistic” to… define the “people” who are to self-govern 
consensually’ (Smith, 2003: 89, see also 164). It should be able to tell people 
exclusively where they belong and why. In this way, Smith's normative account 
of peoplehood holds a universalistic demand of all members' acceptance of 
plurality (ethnic, religious, culturally etc.), but also a particularistic ambition of 
evoking a sense of worth and trust exclusively in one people.  
 
c) Peoplehood and the paradox of politics 
Such an act of balance between liberal universalistic ideals and particularistic 
expressions of the majority identity in various democratic decisions leads to a 
third, rather profound question which Bonnie Honig recently identified as the 
paradox of politics: ‘In order to for there to be a people well-formed enough for 
good law-making, there must be good law for how else will the people be well-
formed? The problem is: where would that good law come from absent an 
already well formed, virtuous people?’ (Honig, 2007: 3).  
Smith's discussion of peoplehood is primarily concerned with the how a 
people come to be constituted by political leaders through ideological language 
(given certain conditions), from which he criticizes deliberative democratic 
theorists like Rawls and Habermas for having too much faith in ‘abstract’ liberal 
rights and democratic procedures such as constitutive of stable and coherent 
political communities (e.g. Smith, 2003: 144). However, while Smith supports a 
political community working within liberal democracy and respect of human 
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rights, he does not appear to approach the paradox of politics as formulated by 
Honig. 
This of course would confront Smith with the normative discussion of 
people, liberalism and democracy in political theory, yet the question is whether 
he can avoid standing responsible for this problem? What Honig also calls the 
‘paradox of founding’ is essentially a diagnosis of politics as an Aristotelian 
infinite sequence between the law and its author resulting in the condition of 
‘politics, in which plural and contending parties make claims in the name of 
public goods, seek support from various constituencies, and the legitimacy of 
outcomes is always contestable’ (Honig, 2007: 14). Thus, the problem is not 
whether democratic theory holds the potential to support ethical constitution 
beyond liberal rights and norms, or to solve the potential tension between 
liberal norms and majoritarian decisions. Nor is this a problem for Smith, as he 
does not recognize the difference between what Oakeshott has called origin 
stories of ‘in the beginning’ and ‘once upon a time’ (Honig, 2007: 14). On the 
contrary, Smith points exactly to the necessity of ‘historical’ ethically 
constitutive themes portraying a people's story of origin not as a natural truth 
(the former origin story as myth). Instead, as something constructed through 
political action in history (the latter origin story as a story). However, the 
problem is that while Smith contends that ‘no political “people” are natural or 
eternal’, at the same time he notes that there are ‘preexisting senses of identity, 
interests, and ideals’ available to political leaders to feed off (Smith, 2003: 34).  
Thus there is some kind of relation between the ruler and the ruled, which 
appears to constitute the very meaning of both. Yet undoubtedly, it is still 
unclear how Smith would position himself in relation to the condition, which 
Honig emphasizes that if the people as the general will (a sovereign source of 
legitimacy to state power represented by the will of all in a democratic process) 
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and the law (liberal rights of equality and freedom in the constitution) are two 
finite things in an infinite relationship, to quote Roy Sorensen (as quoted in 
Honig, 2007: 13), then what is the source of “the people” as a political 
phenomenon? I believe this question is relevant to Smith's theory in the sense 
that his ambitions are not only analytical but also normative. In the latter case 
one will inevitably be confronted with the perhaps uncomfortable ‘paradox of 
politics’. As Honig convincingly has argued, how one chooses to stand in this 
matter deeply influences how one stands on the issue of self-governance, or 
agency by the people vis-á-vis constitutional democracy (Honig, 2007: 1-2). 
Even though Smith's account also takes as a point of departure that people is not 
a problem to be overcome by law and rules. That is, the general will might reside 
in the will of all and how we speak of this entity as ‘people’. This may mean 
different things to its members; therefore it remains unresolved how Smith 
establish just (liberal?) standards for democratic decisions.  
 
d) The people as authors of their own identity? 
A fourth and final question targets the role of agency in producing or 
reproducing stories of peoplehood. Smith's approach to the constitution of 
political identity is predominantly focused on the role of political elites acting in 
relation to various pressures (e.g. Smith, 1997: 35; 2003: 42). In that connection, 
Smith mentioned three forms of limitation upon elite's ability to construct 
certain stories of political belonging. First, what he calls internal constraints in 
the form as mentioned before – ‘senses of identity, interests, and ideals’ which 
the elite separate themselves and thus create a certain set of conditions of 
possibilities for their stories. Second, he points to what we could call external 
constraints such as economic conditions, international politics and technology. 
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Finally, Smith mentions ‘mass pressure’ in the form of democratic voting, 
existing alternative stories of allegiance, and resistance of voluntary aid to the 
system supporting the particular political identity (Smith, 2003: 34-42). Thus, 
Smith does see a kind of agency relevant to the creation of a political people, 
stemming from the individuals who are discursively summoned or made subject 
to a group identity. As Smith points to as a premise for his theory of people-
building, ‘both leaders and constituents possess meaningful political agency’ 
(Smith, 2003: 36). 
With Jeffrey E. Green, one could add another kind of limit or pressure on 
political elites: the eyes of the people as a type of popular power, and the 
derived democratic ideal of candor (2013: 179-183). Green also questions the 
perception of the popular self-government and point to the ideological and 
strategic interests of leaders, but in particular he notice how far from practical 
reality the ideal of deliberative and democratic action is. Instead he point to and 
normatively underpin the capacity of the people as a mass spectator of political 
elites. As he argues ‘the ocular model of popular empowerment is justified 
because its mechanics do not assume that everyday citizens are what they 
clearly are not (choice-making, speech-making, legislating, active deciders of 
public affairs) but, on the contrary, acknowledge the passive, nonparticipatory, 
spectatorial nature of everyday political life.’ (Green, 2013: 17-18). The eyes of 
the people conceived as an ocular pressure, would create a panoptic, 
disciplinary condition in which political leadership would be lived. Pertaining to 
modern mass democracies this would result in a demand for candor in the 
political processes of which only the elite participates actively. This original 
contribution to democratic theory of Green's would also be relevant for Smith's 
understanding of political elite pressures. 
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However, relating this take on agency to Jason Frank's recent book, 
Constituent Moments: Enacting the People in Postrevolutionary America (2009), 
makes one consider whether political groups as a mass hold agency not as a 
constraining effect but as a self-constituting entity. Frank's historically and 
literary informed theoretical approach to how peoples are constituted in many 
respects share with Smith a notion of the people, as an enacted and discursively 
produced political category, first and foremost an authorizing narrative. 
According to Frank, ‘the people are the entity in whose name the state governs, 
and a higher power that can resist the authority of the state… the people both 
menace and ground the political order; they are at once a constituent and a 
constituted power’ (Frank, 2009: 7).  
Nevertheless, an interesting point of Frank's approach is his emphasis on 
what he terms the ‘constituent moment’ when both sides of this equation are 
brought into play. And exactly when ‘…imposters, radicals, self-created entities 
seize the mantle of authorization… constituent moments dwell in a space where 
there is enacted felicity that nonetheless breaks from the conventions of 
authorized context, a felicitous infelicity’ (Frank, 2009: 8). What Frank highlights 
here is not only the advent of new rebellious leaders creating a new obedient 
people supportive of their own powerbase, but also a group or mass itself 
constituting power (c.f. his contemporary examples in the concluding chapter).  
One could also say that the inherent ambiguity and multiplicity of meaning 
of what the people is, leading to a condition of constant contestation as Smith 
also points to, allows Frank to emphasize the ability of groups to claim 
representative status (or enact political power). Therefore, acting as potentially 
disruptive to authoritative stories of peoplehood. In his book from 2003, Smith 
appears to understand groups as potentially limiting elite power by ‘mass 
pressure’. Yet if I assume his proposals correctly, he does not seem to directly 
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emphasize agency understood as group's role as disruptive authors of their own 
identity.  
 
2.5. Talal Asad's secularism and sites of belonging 
Analyzing the doctrine of separating or distinguishing religion and politics 
through the lense of Smith’s politics of peoplehood, suggests that secularism is 
partially maintained for the purpose of telling a specific story of a people. One 
might say that religion in political discourse serves the function of contesting or 
decontesting whom the people is, and why each member belongs to it. In other 
words, how a democracy treats its religious communities tells much about the 
political production of its people.  
In the beginning of this chapter I suggested two approaches to secularism 
inspired by Bhargava's question on the crisis of secularism. There are those in 
search of an alternative secularism, and those in search of an alternative to 
secularism. After having discussed and developed a concept of secularism within 
the former position, we could ask how this conceptualization is different from 
other accounts of alternative secularisms. Namely, sharing an interest in the 
conceptual origin and current contextual meanings of secularism, whilst 
emphasizing the importance of introducing the question of political identity. 
Perhaps one of the most prominent voices in the debate is the 
anthropologist Talal Asad. Importantly Asad belongs to the former position, as 
he continuously reads political reality through the concept of secularism. Of 
course, Asad does so with the purpose of critically assessing on the one hand 
how the doctrine is articulated to serve certain political interests (how gets to 
define what is secular, and thus indirectly what is the religious? see Asad, 2003: 
191). On the other hand, the author shows how modern political communities in 
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the form of nation-states are structurally dependent on concepts of the secular. 
This is due to the fact that political allegiance and modern nationalism insist on a 
duality of ‘a world of self-authenticating things in which we really live as social 
beings…’ in contrast to ‘…a religious world that exist only in our imagination’ 
(Asad, 2003: 194). As I read Asad, a central point in relation to his notion of 
‘complex space’ and ‘complex time’18 as expressions of what we could call the 
conditions of multiculturalism, is that he understands secularism exactly as a 
doctrine which homogenize and synchronize the subject of the nation-state. As 
Asad noticed in relation to French secularism or laïcité, this doctrine of the 
religious and the secular indeed appears as ‘a matter of social cohesion (or 
integration) within the body politics. The personality of the republic has a 
history and a repertoire of symbols anchored in deep emotions (the Revolution, 
empire, the creation of a unified nation independent of the Vatican).’ (Asad, 
2006a: 218). Thus, Asad considers the politics of secularism to be a doctrine 
separating religion and (secular) politics relying on and producing certain 
visions of social order, and as such his agenda is to ‘unpack the various 
assumptions on which secularism – a modern doctrine of the world in the world 
– is based’ (Asad, 2003: 15). Or more directly put: ‘My suggestion is that we need 
to explore the assumptions underlying judgments made by historically situated 
states regarding the proper place of religion’ (Asad, 2006: 219).  
While I too build on a an approach questioning the modernistic conceptions 
of ‘religion’, ‘the secular’, ‘secularism’ and how these concepts are articulated in 
                                               
 
 
18 Multiple ways of being a political subject in terms of traditions, identities, and 
relation to the past and present, see Asad, 2003: 179. 
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actual political context, Asad's conception of secularism does not seem to offer a 
clear identification of the sites of national belonging. That is, the ways in which 
unity works through separation, how senses of ethical belonging are evoked 
through secularism doctrines. Rather, he (rightly) points to ‘the new forms of 
subjecthood’ or governmentality created in the dawning modern age of the 19th 
century constituted by secular discipline and the idea of moral progress (Asad, 
2003: 24). In other words, secularism as a strategy to render the religious aspect 
of society governable involved some sort of ‘national politics’ (Asad, 2003: 130). 
Asad notes this argument himself: ‘Although the historical connection of 
secularism with the formation of the modern nation-state is well known… the 
way nation-state's self-declared national personality affects the practical 
application of its religious neutrality, and its guardianship of freedom, needs to 
be examined more systematically. The specific practices, sensibilities, and 
attitudes that undergird secularism as a national arrangement – that give it 
solidity and support – remain largely unexplored…’ (Asad, 2006: 223-224).  
My account of secularism is an explicit attempt to contribute in this 
direction. Further I should think, that Asad's fairly state-centered approach to 
secularism (Bangstad, 2009: 189-192) would need to open up for not only ‘the 
multiple ways of life’ for groups inhabiting a society (Asad, 2003: 180), but also 
for multiple stories of national unity as told by different political elites (on this 
point, see also the end of section 3.1.). As Smith has argued, these multiple 
stories of national unity can be categorized differently according to which kind 
of ethical theme that is evoked. Applying this approach to secularism therefore 
left me with four ideal-typical secularisms as illustrated in figure 3, which I will 
now return to when concluding this chapter.  
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2.6. Concluding remarks: Four ideal-types of secularism  
Having discussed the two expansions to secularism theory, I will briefly 
elaborate on how the suggested categorization helps differentiate the different 
types of ideal-typical secularisms. 
If we start with the fourth quadrant in Figure 3 (page 42), what makes 
contextual secularism universalistic is Bhargava's ambition to legitimize such 
doctrines morally with reference to a ‘politics of the common good’, that is, an 
idea of participating democracy which presumes a myriad of different 
comprehensive doctrines to exist.19 Contextual secularism assumes that all 
participants undergo ‘a transformation of identities with which they first enter 
the process. In other words, they must prepare to forge new identities that refer 
to a common good realized in future through a process to which they are 
committed by their participation’ (Bhargava, 1998: 537). Thus, Bhargava does 
not imagine a politics of identity contestation as a result of a politics of the 
common good, but quite the opposite. ‘There is a bigger, imagined community 
lurking in the horizon of every community that enjoys rights’ (Bhargava, 1998: 
542). Even though Bhargava is inclusive to religion in the public sphere (that he 
acknowledges reasonable disagreements between ethical outlooks), the issue 
here is what status he ascribes disagreement when constituting a political 
identity at a national level. Here, I argue that he morally constitutes his 
separation doctrine in what Bader has also called ‘contextual universalism’ (see 
Bader, 2012): context and difference sensitive separation of religion and politics 
                                               
 
 
19 A premise for Bhargava's argument is ‘a minimally overlapping good’ to be 
shared by the participating actors and groups, which he identifies as ‘the politics 
of right’ (Bhargava, 1998: 537-538).  
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grounded in the universalist language of the democratically negotiated common 
good. While difference and disagreement exist in this perspective, it is not a 
political aim to maintain this state of identity contestation.  
The same point could be made with the ultra-procedural secularism, which 
in contrast to contextual secularism dismisses ultimate ideals from political 
processes, but similarly legitimizes its stance ‘…on grounds claimed to be 
comprehensive, universally applicable, authoritative and final’ (Bhargava, 1998: 
514). One such view could be represented in the article Popular Sovereignty as 
Procedure by Habermas, in which he defends constitutional democracy based on 
‘proceduralized popular sovereignty’. ‘The sole substantial aim of the project is 
the gradual improvement of institutionalized procedures of rational collective 
will-formation, procedures that cannot prejudge the participants’ concrete goals. 
Each step along this path has repercussions upon the political culture and forms 
of life’ (Habermas, 1997 [1989]: 61). Here we see a strong emphasis on a 
procedural understanding of political community. In later writings he related 
this with the problem of religious pluralism: ‘…the constitution of the liberal 
state can satisfy its need for legitimation in a modest way by drawing on the 
cognitive resources of a set of arguments that are independent of religious or 
metaphysical traditions’ (Habermas, 2008: 104). Thus, when Smith's theory of 
peoplehood inquires which kind of ethical constitutive theme to be evoked, 
Habermas' secularism offers a fairly clear answer. ‘The “unifying bond” sought 
for is a democratic process in which the correct understanding of the 
constitution is ultimately under discussion’ (Habermas, 2008: 105). Thus, its 
separation doctrine is articulated through an ideological language of universal 
grammar, as it too appeals to a universalist theme in a story of creating and 
maintaining a political community.  
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Looking at the upper half of Figure 3, hyper-substantive secularism and 
modest establishment both operate with Bhargava's (rather disapproving) 
words ‘…qualitative distinctions of worth, necessitating a contrast between the 
valuable and the demeaning and lowly. Competing ultimate ideals, it follows, will 
have incompatible ideas of what is worthy and what is not’ (Bhargava, 1998: 
514). Thus, what is distinctive of these two types of secularism is their political 
appeal to one, particularistic source of worth and trust as legitimization for 
drawing a line between religion and politics in their given ways. The former as 
establishment, the latter as mutually exclusive separation.  
A variant of what we might call hyper-substantive secularism could be the 
‘official republican’ interpretation of French laïcité, which Laborde in length has 
reconstructed and analyzed (2008). In that connection she notes that ‘…Laïcité is 
often translated as “secularism”, but I argue that it in fact encompasses a 
comprehensive theory of republican citizenship, articulated around three ideals. 
Equality (religious neutrality of the public sphere or secularism stricto sensu), 
liberty (individual autonomy and emancipation from religious oppression), and 
fraternity (civic loyalty to the community of citizens) (Laborde, 2008: 7-8). 
However, as I conceptualize secularism in this thesis, it makes sense to 
categorize official laïcité as secularism endowed with a doctrine of separation-
as-exclusion, evoking a particularistic ethical theme of French peoplehood (or 
republicanism).20 The kind of ethical theme here is the strong sense of 
republican solidarity and national unity, which amongst other things is 
                                               
 
 
20 That the official French republican separation doctrine must be understood in 
connection with the question of political identity has also been suggested by for 
example Bowen, 2008: chapter 7 or Joppke, 2008: chapter 2.  
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protected by the particular tradition of separating church and state. In contrast 
to Habermas' procedural constitutive democracy, a distinct national culture is 
the civic bond (Laborde, 2008: 173-184).  
Finally, modest establishment also belongs to the particularistic type of 
peoplehood, as its separation doctrine is based on a certain notion of national 
identity. As I will elaborate on exactly this point in the following chapters, it 
should be sufficient to note here that the Danish established church is perceived 
as an important site of national belonging, thus evoking a national identity 
constituted by certain religious, historic and traditional themes.  
Thus, merging the two dimensions of figure 3 invites the student of 
empirical secularism to consider the principle of separation and the type of 
ethically constitutive theme used to legitimize this. Importantly, a framework 
that offers four ideal-typical variants. Following Smiths theory, the variants 
should support the analysis of multiple ideological discourses within the same 
national context. As different civic ideals of Americanism have always co-existed 
and competed (indeed placing substantial parts of American peoplehood in the 
particularistic spectrum) different versions of secularism simultaneously exist. 
One country cannot be unambiguously placed in one category, but one can distill 
multiple traditions of different categories.  
Nevertheless, while each of the four types of secularism I have suggested 
can be defended within the broad framework of political liberalism, they might 
also be open to critique. Let us consider but a few here.21 
                                               
 
 
21 Veit Bader has identified at least 12 types of secularism open to various kinds 
of critique, which gives an overview of the many interpretations and normative 
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A common but strong critique of the hyper-substantive secularism is that 
the rigid understanding of public reason, which is evoked, potentially induces an 
atheist political culture and polity hostile to religion. Significantly, it cannot 
allow for or recognize religious (or other competing politically substantive) 
ways of legitimizing public law and order. As a consequence, it might end up 
abolishing the very principles of liberty and pluralism it sought to defend (e.g. 
Connolly, 1999: 19-46; Bader, 2007: 93-125). This critique of ethically based 
exclusivist secularism is, as noted above, often identified as 'secularist'. Ultra-
procedural secularism too seeks unconditional exclusion of religion, but seeks 
rather to exclude any kind of comprehensive worldview from the public sphere. 
This has among other things been criticized for being insensitive to many 
citizens' ordinary life, in which comprehensive worldviews are all-encompassing 
and constitutive of their personal identity (e.g. Taylor, 2007: 514). Thus, the 
liberal state should ‘not transform the necessary institutional separation 
between religion and politics into an unreasonably mental and psychological 
burden for its religious citizens’ (Habermas, 2008b: 130).  
While contextual secularism appears not be vulnerable to the same 
objections as the two before because it is supposed to be ‘an ethically sensitive 
negotiated settlement between diverse groups and divergent values’ (Bhargava, 
2006: 651), it may still have shortcomings. One objection could be that this 
reliance on constant ‘fresh interpretations, contextual judgments… 
reconciliation and compromise’ (Bhargava, 2006: 651) might simply put too 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
 
challenges each face (Bader, 2010; see also Bader, 2007: chapter 3, which also 
gives a fine (but critical) introduction to the different positions of secularism 
theory and its critique).  
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heavy a burden on the deliberating public and its political practitioners. 
Practical politics under conditions of limited time and resources might need 
readily available standpoints on which to judge simpler and more intuitive 
principles, in order to reduce complexity and arrive at decisions. In addition this 
kind of political secularism based on abstract moral principles, might also have 
its shortcomings in relation to contributing to a coherent political community. 
The objection then is not the absence of a notion of political identity but 
potentially the presence of too many identities, rendering the social imaginary 
deeply fractionalized.  
Modest establishment shares the first objection of contextual secularism in 
lacking simpler and more intuitive principles of separation. Indeed, some would 
find any kind of religious establishment incompatible with secularism (Lægaard, 
2013 discuss this kind of objection to establishment). But one can also raise the 
further objection to modest establishment that religious symbols do matter to 
the equality of citizenship. This critique is not derived from a mainstream 
political liberalism, but from the republican conception of political liberalism 
(Laborde, 2013). Here, the objection is that even modest establishment would 
infringe on civic status, recognition and citizenship. ‘The state’s symbolic acts 
and speech affect the status of citizenship, as they enhance or diminish the sense 
of self-respect that citizens derive from being able to identify with their political 
institutions’ (Laborde 2013: 86; on this point see also Brudney, 2005). 
In the following chapters this last objection to modest establishment will 
surface periodically, as I apply the conceptual understanding of secularism 
developed here to the Danish case. As I have argued, my emphasis on 
peoplehood in relation to secularism is necessary because the given national 
interpretation of secularism also tells a story of a people. Following Smith's 
theory of political struggle between multiple stories about the same people, I 
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will analyze historical and current ideological language in Danish secularism. 
Such a framework helps to distinguish between one national variant of 
secularism, which is based on establishment justified by basic liberal principles, 
from another which falls out of framework of liberally justified secularism. As 
will become apparent during chapter 5 and 6, the general doctrine of Danish 
secularism often finds two dominating and conflicting interpretations in political 
discourse. One interpretation is (mostly) within non-justice based state 
recognition of religion, and another is placed in the muddy waters mixing ethical 
and religious reasons with political reasons.  
In chapter 7 I conclude my analysis of the Danish separation doctrine by 
reconstructing both the general secularism prevalent today, and the two 
competing positions into what I call assertive and accommodationist Danish 
secularism.  
In an earlier study I have showed how the assertive discourse dominated 
the debates in the parliament, the parliamentary church committee and in the 
general political debates in the media, while being constantly contested by 
accommodationist arguments (Dabelsteen, 2011a: chapter VI). One interesting 
development since then has been the shift of balance between the two 
competing doctrines. This I will argue is not only due to changes in the 
parliamentary power balance, but also due to an ideological development 
amongst the parliamentarians and within the Folkekirke. Some principles have 
simply been harder to promote in the political discourse, while others have been 
strengthened. Since then, assertive principles of a privileged Folkekirke and the 
Danish people as a Christian people have been downplayed somewhat, but the 
principle characteristics of the accommodationist doctrine such as increased 
religious equality and church autonomy have been inconsistently promoted. As 
we shall see in chapter 6 new initiatives have on the one hand been made to 
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prepare for policies to grant further autonomy to the Folkekirke. Yet on the 
other, in the preceding case of making same-sex marriages legal (chapter 5) such 
an arm's length principle in relation to the Folkekirke's internal affairs appeared 
to be set aside. Only time will tell how these often conflicting principles of 
separation will be balanced against one another other.  
However before engaging in the empirical analyses of chapters 4, 5 and 6, 
let us turn to the methodological questions which the developed analytical 
framework has raised.  
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Chapter 3 Methodological considerations 
 
 
n the introduction, I presented the main research question and outlined its 
theoretical and empirical relevance. Chapter 2 presented my 
conceptualization of secularism with an emphasis on peoplehood. I showed 
that my approach taken to political concepts is inspired by Michael Freeden’s 
ideological analysis. In this chapter I will turn to a discussion of what it entails to 
study politics, following such a way of knowing as it guides the remainder of the 
thesis. To be sure, the thesis in its entirety can be considered an attempt to 
adapt Freeden’s approach to a specific theoretical problem, establishment and 
secularism, in a specific empirical area, Danish politics. The purpose of this 
chapter is to contribute with clarification as to how and why I go about this.  
The chapter will proceed as follows. In the first section I will discuss 
Freeden's morphological approach to ideology, which is related to the 
methodological position of interpretive realism within political theory, as 
discussed in the second section. Here I also touch upon what means to do 
problem-driven research from an interpretive approach, which is related to the 
discussion of the inevitability of normativity taken in the third section. In the 
fourth and final section I consider some methodological points relating the kind 
of approach taken in this thesis, which we may call interpretive policy analysis.  
 
3.1. Michael Freeden and studying ideology as an expression of political 
thinking 
In the first section I will lay out the general approach taken in this thesis. As 
stated in the previous chapter, I treated secularism as an ideological concept and 
I 
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I showed how we might think its conceptual architecture to be. However, in 
order to see why such a conceptualization is necessary to answer the research 
question, we will have to consider the methodological approach taken, that is, 
what we can know about the phenomenon and how we come to attain such 
knowledge.  
Freeden’s approach offers a certain understanding of ideology, and here I 
am interested in the term’s general attributes as a way of understanding politics. 
This understanding spills over into a more general approach to the political – a 
certain way of knowing within social sciences. In particular the two books, 
Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach from 1996 and The 
Political Theory of Political Thinking: The Anatomy of a Practice from 2013 and in 
a range of articles (e.g. 2002, 2005a, 2012, 2013b), Freeden has developed an 
approach to studying ideology. Increasingly, he creates an understanding of 
political theory more broadly which he calls the morphological approach to 
ideology or interpretive realism.22  
To begin with we might ask how we can recognize something as an ideology 
from Freeden’s perspective. In his book from 1996 he states that ‘…an ideology 
will link together a particular conception of human nature, a particular 
conception of social structure, of justice, of liberty, of authority, etc. “This is what 
liberty means, and that is what justice means”, it asserts. Ideologies need, after 
all, to straddle the worlds of political thought and political action, for one of their 
central functions is to link the two’ (Freeden, 1996: 76). Already in this 
                                               
 
 
22 Before and during these publications, Freeden has dedicated much attention 
to studying especially liberalism as an ideology in a historical context.  
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definition, we see that ideology is not defined as a universal or static system of 
ideas, but rather as a political phenomenon between ideals and action. 
Specifically, strategic attempts to reduce an infinite range of possible 
understandings and actions to a finite and manageable view of social order. 
Indeed, ‘…ideologies are strategies, deliberate or not, for managing the 
underlying pluralism of political ideas in all societies, permitting it in culturally 
acceptable doses or trying to suppress it publicly and artificially. Ideologies are 
in the main counter-pluralist discourses’ (Freeden, 2013b: 117).  
Analogous to the discussion in chapter 2 of the morphology of secularism as 
a concept, Freeden too considers the form or structure of ideologies. He argues 
that ideologies consist of two aspects. The first is the three-tier formation of 
ideologies comprising concepts, components of concepts and the relations 
between concepts. Like concepts, the second aspect is that ideologies contain a 
certain hierarchy of a core concept organizing the surrounding adjacent 
concepts, and peripheral ones of significance in the idea-environment.23 Such a 
structure Freeden calls an ideology. For example, analyzing a specific tradition of 
liberalism at a given place and time could identify the core concept as liberty 
(without liberty as its core liberalism would hardly be recognizable), human 
rights, democracy, and equality as adjacent concepts (understood as certain 
particularly important concepts inferred from liberty) while nationalism is 
situated as a peripheral concept to liberalism (Freeden, 1996: 77). How the 
specific conceptual relation of an ideology is arranged, depends on its logical and 
                                               
 
 
23 As I have already touched upon concepts, components and their relation in 
chapter 2, I will proceed without further definitions at this point.  
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cultural coherence both between concepts and between components of 
concepts: ‘…many combinations are logically possible, though acceptable 
cultural combinations are fewer, and any combination will still find itself with a 
pile of unused spare parts, located outside the specific conception that is being 
employed’ (Freeden, 2013b: 119, see also 2005a: 120). We might even think of 
some combinations as logically inconsistent but culturally sound in ideological 
discourse, as long as it successfully gives finality, legitimacy and accessible 
answers to the challenges of a political system. Which specific combinations of 
concepts and components of concepts will ‘fit’ with each other are limited by 
history, specific national context, sudden events etc. as much as logic. Therefore, 
it is the structure or morphology of an ideology which gives its concepts a 
political specific meaning. Thus, Freeden emphasizes the context of concepts to a 
large extent.  
What characterizes an ideology and a premise for its continued life, is thus 
its ability to produce a coherent chain of specific responses to the issues that 
general political systems need to address ‘…from the general and abstract to the 
concrete and practical, from the core to the periphery, as well as in the reverse 
direction’ (Freeden, 2002: 750).  
My interpretation of Freeden at this point is that we can trace and decode 
ideologies starting from its explicit mentioning in political discourse (e.g. ‘this is 
socialism’ or ‘I am a conservative’), and then continue analyzing the ideological 
morphology. However, we might also approach ideologies and ideological 
concepts by directly identifying its structure of components and concepts, even 
without the direct articulation of the whole entity. In relation to this thesis it 
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entails that I will be tracing the morphology of unity-through-separation (in casu 
modest establishment), even though Danish tradition does not operate with the 
explicit use of ‘secularism’.24 Thus with the morphological approach to 
ideological language I highlight an phenomenon in order to expose its many 
points of decontestation25 of separation, religious freedom, religious equality 
and state neutrality (and as we shall see in the later chapters the related concept 
of ‘church autonomy’). Furthermore, it should be clear that secularism as I have 
conceptualized it in chapter 2 cannot be considered an ideology, as the scope of 
meaning and values it fixates is very limited. Instead, I treat secularism as an 
ideological concept or ideological separation doctrine, as I will also name it 
throughout the thesis.26  
However, I wish to draw attention to Freeden’s more general 
understanding of discourses in the political sphere. Here, ideological language as 
a form of discursive power systematically uses political concepts in a language of 
                                               
 
 
24 If ‘secularism’, ‘the secular’, or ‘secularist’ is used in Danish discourse it most 
often connotes a political and atheist stance actively repressing religion, 
religious symbols and religious reasoning from any public context. Examples of 
prominent public debaters taking such an understanding are: Mikael Rothstein: 
Sekularisme går forud for religion [‘Secularism preceeds religion’] (2005), Erik 
Bjerager: Gud bevare Danmark. Et opgør med sekularismen. [’God save Denmark. 
Confronting the secularism’] (2006), Tøger Seidenfaden: Hold øje med den hårde 
sekularisme. [‘Keep an eye on the strict secularism’] (2009), Iben Tranholm: 
Islamisme og sekularisme er fælles om at knuse kristendommen [‘Islamism and 
secularism are partners in crushing christianity’] (2014). 
25 On decontestation, see below. 
26 In this thesis I understand a ‘doctrine’ as a specific tradition of government 
policy embedded in current and historical context. This doctrine will be treated 
as an ideological concept analyzable through a morphological approach to 
ideological structure.  
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universality and finality, with the purpose of creating a sense of holistic 
worldview (Freeden, 1996: 76). At a general level, if we insist that the political – 
as opposed to ideology – is to be characterized first and foremost as ambiguous, 
undeterminable, inconclusive and vague (Freeden, 2005a: 117-124), then all 
articulations of final or conclusive public policies can be considered as politically 
constructed reality. Therefore, with the intention to reduce the fundamental 
complexity and uncertainty of the situation at hand.  
This approach to ideological language, which concepts are constituent of, 
assume the meaning of any political argument to be essentially contestable 
(including ideal theory and political philosophy). That is, the meaning of e.g. 
liberty or equality is not stable or fixed yet always open to contestation 
(Freeden, 1996: 55-61, see also Gallie, 1956, who first philosophically grounded 
the notion of essential contestability). As a result, Freeden asks us to look for 
and decode attempts of ‘decontestation’ in ideological language. This 
fundamental feature of the political he also calls ‘the finality drive of the 
political’ (see e.g. Freeden, 2013b: 120), because decision-making is vital. As 
politics demands finality, the decisions made based on a certain ranking of 
conceptual significance, will need to be decontestated. Decontestation is to limit 
the infinite conceptions and to solidify the fluidity of meaning, by treating 
arguments so that they should not or cannot be contested. The purpose is to of 
obtain stability in the political order. Jensen's call for mercy from the 
introduction is exactly an example of ideological language seeking to render one 
story of Danish peoplehood natural, normal and reasonable. Indeed what the 
discussion on Smith's theory of peoplehood from chapter 2 shows, is that 
decontestation in relation to political identity can be in the form of economic, 
political or ethically constitutive themes as part of an overall story of a people. 
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What I will be looking for in the ideological language within the policy area of 
public religion is especially the ethical theme, as argued for in the last chapter.  
Thus, political order articulated in public discourse can appear to be 
socially legitimated, correct and even ‘natural’ as it upholds the preferred 
ideological structure. It is in this sense, that plurality is always a political 
potential and what ideologies attempt to counter. ‘Even societies whose policies 
profess to promote pluralism or multi-culturalism exhibit a preferential ranking 
of the kinds of pluralism that are permissible’ (Freeden, 2013b: 117). From the 
perspective of morphological analysis, this is the structural reason why 
peoplehood and secularism as ideological concepts inherently hold the potential 
of plurality, particularly in the form of alternative and competing (i.e. 
contesting) variants of the dominating discourse. As crucially pointed out, ‘the 
category of ideology in general contains within itself the potential for infinite 
variety and alteration, but in every society some routes are regarded as 
impermissible or illegitimate’ (Freeden, 2013b: 126). One could say that even 
though all positions seek to apply a specific ranking or distribution of 
significance to relevant ideas, their very existence represents the plurality or 
essential contestability of political concepts. 
More generally in relation to my conceptualization of secularism, Freeden’s 
approach is necessary as it provides a set of assumptions about the political 
world. This allows me to treat ‘secularism’ as not only one ideal concept, but as a 
term naming a range of related political constellations of concepts, components 
and structures. Inspired here by the main features of ideologies, which Freeden 
recently has pointed to (Freeden, 2013b: 134), I sum up four aspects of 
secularism which help understand why the concept find different expressions in 
different contexts.  
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First, I assume morphological variation in secularisms according to its 
proximity to other concepts in its environment. I have argued that the core or 
ineliminable component of secularism is separation, and due to its proximity to 
other concepts in the given national context, the core itself may vary as either 
separation-as-exclusion or separation-as-principled-distance. Furthermore in 
chapters 5 and 6, I discuss how the core component of Danish separation of 
religion and politics is in an interrelationship with a Lutheran notion of public 
religion as ‘church autonomy’.  
Secondly, there is the permeability or non-exclusive nature of secularisms 
making them overlap each other on substantive issues. In the coming chapters I 
identify competing but intersecting positions in Danish political discourse, 
which in chapter 7 will be reconstructed as assertive and accommodationist 
Danish secularism.  
Thirdly, there is the proportionality or the importance assigned to 
ideological components of secularism, allowing different types of secularism to 
hold different components as central. In chapter 5, we will see how religious 
equality is not assigned importance in Danish secularism in the same form as it 
would in e.g. the United States (see also figure 6, in chapter 7, page 273).  
Finally, secularisms vary by how the components are prioritized. 
Prioritization means that the assigned centrality of different components 
including the core will be used to prioritize, which values and goods are 
considered socially important, and which are not. Therefore, Freeden also calls 
ideologies for ‘ranking devices’ at several occasions. Thus I use Freeden’s 
morphological approach to secularism as my methodological platform, from 
which I decode and interpret the conceptual patterns in empirically occurring 
political thinking relating to public religion. 
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What Freeden contributes to in my analysis is the understanding of political 
concepts in general, and the resulting approach to political thinking in 
particular. Thus using the terminology taken from Freeden’s morphological 
approach to ideology allows me to argue that the conceptual morphology of 
secularism pertaining to proportionality and priority are in an interrelationship 
with stories of peoplehood as a culturally adjacent component (as also pointed 
out in chapter 2).  
This points to the reason why a morphological approach to secularism will 
contribute with a perspective on secularism different from the related 
theoretical approach, e.g. represented by influential works by Talal Asad on the 
genealogy of secularism. While he shares a similar methodological concern for 
sensitivity to historical context, decontestation and the plurality of sources to 
the same phenomenon, Asad does not consider political identity as part of 
secularism, but as related to it (Asad, 2003: 187-194). A reason might be that his 
genealogical approach considers the emergence or epistemological implications 
of the development of one historical object: 'The genealogy of secularism has to 
be traced through the concept of the secular' (Asad, 2003: 192) as he establish. 
Being occupied by the interdependent relationship between the emergence of 
‘the secular’ and ‘religion’ and how power as political discipline transforms itself 
through time, he does not seem to recognize adjacent components in secularism 
beyond these, which will is subject to both internal and external contestation. 
Thus, Asad does not explore how secularism might be part of ideological 
attempts to evoke certain conceptions of a political people, but instead asks (and 
rejects) whether nationalism should be considered secularized religion.  
A related critique comes from Anders Berg-Sørensen, who argues that ‘with 
reference to the Schmittian conception of political theology and sovereignty, 
Asad draws a picture of the secular state as a united and indivisible entity…’ 
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making him unable to ‘pay sufficient attention to the institutional complexity of 
a secular state and the cultural pluralism of a secular society.’ (Berg-Sørensen, 
forthcoming: 43). The point here seem to be that while Asad's anthropology of 
secularism holds the potential to recognize a ‘plurality of perspectives at play in 
the regulation of religion and politics in a democratic regime’ (Berg-Sørensen, 
forthcoming: 44) through his genealogical approach, he does not take this step.  
As the component of peoplehood is not often explicated in relation to the 
conceptual structure of secularism in the literature, I discussed it in length in the 
last chapter. Furthermore, it is for this reason that I search for not one ideal, 
blueprint secularism (or peoplehood for that matter), but an ideological doctrine 
of separation within a national context for which several positions struggle over 
domination.  
 
3.2. Problem-driven interpretation 
As mentioned in the beginning of this section, Freeden’s understanding of 
ideologies represent a more general methodological approach to the political 
within political theory, from which this study draws on.  
One fundamental feature of this approach according to Freeden, is that 
ideologies and ideological language does not distort or alter ideal political 
principles, but are the expressions of existing political thinking and therefore 
what students of the political should focus on. In fact, if we wish to study actual 
political thinking or political reality ‘…we have no access to political ideas and 
thinking except as ideologies’ (Freeden, 2013b: 118).  
This approach takes a hermeneutic stance in the sense that it renders 
nobody a privileged position to distance herself from the political, or to project 
any objective stance for that matter. ‘To the question, “are we all ideologists?” 
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the answer is that we all have occasion to use political language in a selective 
manner, we all piece our political concepts together in particular patterns, we all 
interpret them in logically indeterminate but culturally significant ways, and 
these thoughts have bearing on the political activities of ourselves and of others’ 
(Freeden, 1996: 44-45).27 Neither political philosophy, the history of ideas, post-
structural political theory nor practical politics allows one to come closer to 
political truth than others. According to Freeden: ‘Ultimately, ideologies are 
configurations of decontested meanings of political concepts, when such 
meanings are ascribed by methods at least partly foreign to those employed in 
currently predominant approaches of scientists, philosophers, linguists, or 
political theorists’ (Freeden, 1996: 77). 
Such an approach might at first glance come close to what Donald Green 
and Ian Shapiro has identified as problem-driven research (as opposed to 
method-driven or theory-driven which they consider as one position in that 
discussion) in the book Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory (1994). According 
to Green and Shapiro, problem-driven research is characterized by asking what 
explains a given political phenomenon, while method-driven asks how a given 
theory explains it (Green and Shapiro, 1994: 33). Method-driven research may 
be associated with causal and often probabilistic theory testing, or theoretical 
formalism evaluating logical stringency or accepted moral standards. Problem-
                                               
 
 
27 This comes very close to the point in Truth and Method where Hans-Georg 
Gadamer points out that hermeneutic interpretation abolish the false antithesis 
of dividing ‘…the subjectivity of the interpreter and the objectivity of the 
meaning to be understood’, that we should ‘… recognize that historically effected 
consciousness is at work in all hermeneutic activities.’ (Gadamer, 2013 [1975]: 
321, 349-350). 
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driven studies tend to emphasize the empirically rich and complex research 
design, by specifying ‘…the problem under study in ways that are not mere 
artifacts of the theories and methods that are deployed to study it.’ (Shapiro, 
2005: 180). Within the positivist tradition of qualitative research, we may also 
recognize ‘grounded research’ as problem-driven.  
Green and Shapiro contend that we should be careful not to be either 
(empirically irrelevant theorizing creating self-serving problems) or (post-hoc 
theory-mending), never to rest contently with revised theory (Green and 
Shapiro, 1994: 203). As specified by Shapiro ‘… political scientists have an 
ongoing role to play in exhibiting what is at stake in accepted depictions of 
reality, and reinterpreting what is known so as to put new problems onto the 
research agenda. This is important for scientific reasons when accepted 
descriptions are both faulty and influential in the conduct of social science. It is 
important for political reasons when the faulty understandings shape politics 
outside the academy.’ (2004: 39). While I do not claim that the theory of 
secularism is faulty, I do however claim that when confronted with different 
political contexts (identified as political identity or peoplehood), it needs to be 
conceptually expanded.  
A stance of refusing to claim access to political principles beyond 
ideological language (and thus not itself contributing to decontestation of the 
meaning studied) in turn renders the above distinction between method-driven 
and problem-driven research somewhat problematic. In that connection Anne 
Norton has put both approaches of political science to the test of a Foucaultian 
understanding of power and knowledge, as she points out that even problem-
driven research creates new problems. Norton operates with the distinction 
between ‘method-driven’ and ‘problem-oriented’ research, in which the former 
adheres to an ethics of ‘science as a duty… to subordinate our political to our 
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scientific ideals’ and in the latter ‘we ought to be scholar activists conscious of 
our political roles, and performing those roles conscientiously, in accordance 
with our political principles.’ (Norton, 2004: 67-68). From this perspective, 
identifying a problem and trying to solve it, is also ultimately ‘…an effort to enlist 
all political scientists in a common ethic… the all-too-imperial desire for a rule, a 
single standard that can measure all, a maxim that applies in every case. 
Problem-solving here reveals its likeness to the method-driven political science 
it condemns.’ (Norton, 2004: 78). The notion of problem-solving as closing down 
meaning of language, the hope of scientific neutralism embedded in it, and the 
blind spot of problem-solving (that it creates new problems), makes Norton 
prefer a scholarship, which is willing to ‘… see different ethics made real… 
Science is impelled by the drive to know the alien, the desire to comprehend the 
other.’ (Norton, 2004: 79-80).  
This drive for the mapping of existing ethics and different worldviews has 
received increased attention recently, in the form of ‘new realism’ or ‘political 
realism’ within political theory (e.g. Geuss, 2008, Floyd, 2010, Freeden, 2012 or 
Stemplowska & Swift, 2012). As Freeden has pointed out this discussion of 
realism has been led by a renewed theoretical focus on context, conflict and 
deconstruction of the political by such thinkers as Raymond Geuss, James Tully 
and Bernard Williams (Freeden, 2013a: 55, see also Honig & Stears, 2011). They 
are seen to represent an agenda to ‘reject the ahistorical, abstract, false 
universalisms of most contemporary philosophy’ (Honig & Stears, 2011: 201). 
However, while these realist research ambitions are largely shared by Freeden, 
he criticizes them for still overlooking something deeply political in politics: 
power relations, coercive power, ideology, strategic rhetoric, or discursive 
‘mythological’ legitimations of authority (Freeden 2013a: 55-56). 
  
88 
Freeden's point in this connection appears to me to come close to Norton's 
skepticism of problem-solving political science. Since many realist scholars will 
not consider ideological language as part of their field of investigation, but as 
something to be filtered out, they cannot see that their own research effort itself 
exhibits ideological characteristics. He argues that the above ‘political realism 
cannot shake off moral purposes’ (Freeden, 2013a: 56), because this sort of 
political realism ‘… espouse an ethical mission to reclaim ground never before 
trodden by the dispossessed, a highly focused critical realism in its objective of 
improving the empirically demonstrable plight of the unequal and the 
marginalized, but not a realism in allotting due scholarly concern, say, to the 
multiple voices – in various registers – of the “oppressors”, the apathetic, or the 
misinformed, for they too occupy space in the “real” world’ (Freeden, 2013a: 
57). Thus, this sort of realism Freeden calls prescriptive in contrast to 
interpretive realism. The latter distinguishes itself from the prescriptive variant, 
in that it seeks to give ‘…an empirically related account of the features of the 
political as a basis to understanding politics’ (Freeden, 2012: 1).28 
                                               
 
 
28 I believe it is especially at this point Freeden's morphological approach to 
ideology differs from other related forms of ideology analysis, namely post-
structuralism and discourse analysis, which are also focused on language and a 
Gramscian interest to uncover, decode and interpret ‘hegemony as a conception 
of ideology preeminently serving to safeguard the power of a dominant class 
over the masses’ (Freeden, 1996: 19). However, besides that morphological 
ideology analysis is primarily interested in concepts rather than units of 
language, according to Freeden, post-marxian thinkers like Chantal Mouffe will 
replace one ideological vision with her own (Freeden, 2013a: 61), and thus 
perform a type of critical prescriptive political theory (see also Freeden, 2013b: 
132-133).  
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Interpretive realism is an epistemological stance, derived from the 
assumptions of the morphological approach to ideology (especially structural 
pluralism, essential contestability, decontestation and contextual conditionality 
of political meaning including the constant competition within and between 
ideologies). Preoccupied with ‘…exploring and investigating the actual and 
potential patterns of political thinking‘ as ‘…both a precondition for and a limit 
on what philosophers and ethicists can then recommend’ (Freeden, 2013a: 64). 
In an interesting contribution, Matthew Humphrey points out the latent 
realism in Freeden's morphological approach to ideology criticizing the ideal 
theory of analytical political philosophy. According to Humphrey, what unites 
realism and Freeden's approach ‘… is a conception of the political as a distinct 
field of enquiry, to which the application of methods developed for moral 
philosophy is, at best, far from straightforward, and at worst leads political 
philosophers badly astray’ (Humphrey, 2012: 242). This realist critique is aimed 
at ideal theory for its ‘abstraction, misguided idealizations, impracticality, 
acontextuality, utopian aspirations, and embodiment of a kind of ethical 
imperialism…’ (Humphrey, 2012: 241). As we saw above while Freeden shares 
such critique of much ‘Anglo-American political philosophy’, his morphological 
approach in addition distances itself methodologically from much realism. 
Freeden wishes to make a fundamental distinction between political philosophy 
and political theory, in which the former represents a kind of first-order activity 
of ‘thinking politically’ (and, following Norton's critique this includes traditional 
problem-driven research), and a second order activity ‘thinking about politics’ 
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(Freeden, 2008: 197-208; see also his 2013 book dedicated to this definition of 
political theory and interpretive realism)29.  
However, as Humphrey points out Freeden's own interpretive approach to 
the political might not escape the normativity that it seeks to analyze from a 
second-order position, as its understanding of ideology itself ‘…reflect a certain 
liberal ontology’ (Humphrey, 2012: 255).  
 
3.3. Political reality between interpretation and critique 
As Humphrey's discussion suggests, the distinction between thinking politically 
and thinking about politics might not be as stable and clear-cut as Freeden's 
hermeneutics of the political appear to suggest. In this section I will touch upon 
the discussion of the inevitable normativity in an interpretative framework. 
Norton and Freeden are both critical towards problem-solving, prescriptive 
analysis of the political, insisting on truth as interpreted knowledge (and not the 
other way around), in order to maintain openness to the plurality of voices and 
world-views in the political sphere. Instead they seem leave the answer 
unresolved, what it means to distance oneself from the political if any act of the 
political scientist is political? Can the second-order analyst claim to escape 
normative prescriptions in her work? When I write in my introduction: ‘The 
purpose is not to justify or normatively evaluate such regimes, but rather to 
bring attention to these as relevant for secularism theory’ do I not make myself 
vulnerable to exactly this question? 
                                               
 
 
29 In his earlier work, Freeden called this ‘the distinction between the ideologist 
and the analyst of ideologies’ (1996: 133).  
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This problem appears to reflect a discussion reaching back to the seemingly 
unsolvable tension between Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics and 
Habermas' critical hermeneutics. It highlights tensions between reflections of 
what we can know through interpretation (inseparability of the reader and the 
text and their embeddedness in tradition), and critique of ideologies for the sake 
of freedom and emancipation (Prasad, 2002: 14-23; Wargenaar, 2007: 324-330). 
In other words, it is a discussion of whether interpretation can and/or should 
contain normative ambitions, in the form of power critique and resulting 
prescriptive measures. Freeden is rather stringent in his insistence on analysis 
being ‘…neither substantively normative nor prescriptive…’ and argues that 
failing to keep this hermeneutic distance would transform analysis ‘… into either 
ideology or political philosophy, occasionally into both’ (Freeden, 2013a: 52-53). 
Perhaps this position mostly resides with Gadamer's philosophical 
hermeneutics, which ‘instead of aiming at intellectual control, conceives of 
knowing as a form of dialogue… an ongoing, gradual “coming-to-an-
understanding”’ (Wargenaar, 2007: 316; see also Freeden, 1996; 113-117, 
where he emphasize the Gadamerean interpretation as understanding).  
In Paul Ricoeur's essay, Hermeneutics and the critique of ideologies, he 
points out that while the discussion between the hermeneutics of tradition and 
the critique of ideology – personified by Gadamer and Habermas – indeed 
cannot be reconciled into one grand scheme, since they each ‘take a privileged 
place’ and ‘different regional preferences’ (Ricoeur, 1981: 100). Therefore, we 
should not radically separate the two different interpretive activities of 
‘reinterpretation of cultural heritage received from the past, and the interest in 
the futuristic projections of a liberated humanity’ (Ricoeur, 1981: 100). The 
distinction between the ontology of hermeneutic understanding (Gadamer 
would call it tradition, Freeden would call it ideology) and critique (by reference 
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to an ideal not achieved, e.g. Habermas' ideal of unrestricted and unconstrained 
communication, Bader's notion of a minimally decent, liberal moral order or 
Laborde's critical republican virtues of non-domination and voice) thus should 
not be considered mutually exclusive, but as different modes of relating to the 
political. If these two perspectives lose sight (and respect) of each other's 
perspective, ‘then hermeneutics and critique will themselves be no more than… 
ideologies!’ (Ricoeur, 1981: 100). Thus according to Ricoeur, to position critique 
and hermeneutics as opposites (or even mutual critiques), amounts to a false 
antinomy like between reminiscence and hope. It should not be regarded as an 
antinomy, but as two different intellectual activities of relevance to social and 
political knowledge.  
Ricoeur's take on the Gadamer-Habermas discussion does clear some 
ground for a hermeneutic position prioritizing interpretation and understanding 
over prescription. However it still does not directly answer whether a 
hermeneutic, Freedenian approach can escape some degree of normativity or 
ideology? I believe that the short answer is ‘yes’, and the longer answer is ‘no, 
but…’. Let me explain.  
Coming back to Norton's critique of problem-orientated research she is 
skeptical towards the impetus of identifying problems in order to solve them, as 
such an activity holds a danger to close down meaning and to narrow ethical 
possibilities. However, in this article she does not recognize what I believe is an 
important distinction: between problem-driven research giving primacy to 
current political problems as they are observable in the political discourse, and 
problem-solving research often building on the former, but encompass 
recommendation and prescription too.  
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To answer the above question: yes, with Freeden I too argue, that a second-
order perspective does not in itself produce or reproduce ideology, but rather 
decode and map existing ideological discourses in political reality. Indeed, this is 
my method applied in the next three empirical chapters. That my approach is 
problem-driven does not entail that it is problem-solving in ambition. But this is 
not the whole answer.  
To answer the question again: no, nobody can escape the muddy waters of 
normative claims embedded in one's research activity, but this sort of 
normativity belongs to another level. To illustrate this point, I will take 
Freeden's use of a map as a metaphor, which in his texts operate at two levels. At 
the first metaphorical level he considers ideologies as competing maps of the 
same terrain, offering different routes (logical or cultural ways) between the 
same towns (main political concepts) (e.g. see Freeden, 1996: 85-86). Here, 
maps are the metaphorical ways in which ideologies structure political thought. 
The other level is when Freeden himself draws a map, an ideological mapping, 
through his morphological analysis of ideology. As when he states: ‘…one of the 
tasks lying ahead of the political theorist of political thinking is to map and 
analyse the power aspects of those patterns of thinking that concern 
collectivities’ (Freeden, 2013a: 280). Or ‘Morphological analysis is appraisive 
rather than descriptive in its investigation of its subject-matter, imposing a 
selective map instead of reproducing existing contours.’ (Freeden, 2013b: 133). 
Certainly, in chapter 7 I too offer both an ideational and visual representation of 
Danish secularism's conceptual structure – one might consider this a 
metaphorical mapping of sorts.  
As the latter quote hints the map drawn by the analyst from a second-order 
perspective is not an objective description of reality, but an interpretation of 
reality, which inevitably will be selective: ‘Ultimately, we must take account of 
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hermeneutic insights in realizing that an ideological map is a peculiar sort 
of map, one in which the cartographer plays a modest, though not decisive, role 
in fashioning the terrain itself.’ (Freeden, 1996: 128). With a second-order 
analytical approach I do not claim to stand on normatively neutral ground, as I 
am contributing with a certain story of the world that I am interpreting, but this 
does not make the endeavor problem-solving per se. 
Thus, to study ideological language and identity formation is to follow an 
epistemological assumption that social science best can expose intersubjective 
truth through language in the form of narratives30 or discourses. By this, I mean 
neither to devaluate or relativize inherited cultural or religious dispositions 
which any nation and citizen carries (and which I am part of myself), nor to 
deem transcendent ideas and/or truth to be irrelevant or meaningless. Rather, I 
insist that any ideology or institution must be called by their proper name in a 
political context and be taken serious as such, even if justification in politics 
takes religion as its basis. If successful this study does not raise the question of 
how politics and religion should be arranged, but rather pushes the reader to 
contemplate with which political narrative we choose to establish order in the 
world. In that regard this study rather prepares the way for normative critique, 
but does not perform it itself. For example, while this thesis utilizes and builds 
on Smith's theory of peoplehood in its problem-driven, interpretive point of 
                                               
 
 
30 By narrative I draw on Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes who defines it as 
‘…pointing to conditional connections that relate people, events, and ideas to 
one another explaining actions and practices without evoking the idea of 
necessity. Although these narrative structures also appear in works of fiction, we 
need not equate political science to fiction.’ (Bevir and Rhodes, 2010: 78).  
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departure to political identity, it does not attempt to ‘construct political 
peoplehood in morally defensible ways’ as is part of Smith's project (Smith, 
2003: Part II).  
In sum, the interpretive policy analysis I have in mind holds the same 
epistemological ambitions as Freeden's morphological approach as a second-
order analysis, in that it offers a theory of secularism based on empirical analysis 
of the political world. Even if this runs counter our normative and theoretical 
expectations, but I will not claim to stand on normatively neutral ground due to 
the hermeneutic impossibility to separate the reader form the ‘text’.  
The reader-text relation also means that as a Danish student of Danish 
politics, I should be aware that I myself am part of the tradition about which I 
seek to extract knowledge. Nevertheless, from an interpretive perspective I do 
not regard this circumstance as a limit to my knowledge about Danish 
secularism. As Gadamer pointed out, the historical consciousness must ‘think 
within its own historicity. To be situated within a tradition does not limit the 
freedom of knowledge but makes it possible’ (Gadamer, 2013 [1975]: 369). 
However perhaps like Freeden, I cannot claim to take a pure second-order 
position. This realization of my own boundedness in the ideological language 
which I analyze, should in best case facilitate a readiness for openness to the 
phenomenon under interpretation, in the sense it can change and inform the 
observer with unexpected and new possibilities (Gadamer, 2013 [1975]: 369; 
Freeden, 1996: 116). This should make the student of politics aware of his own 
empirical boundedness on the one hand, and on the other that the truth of the 
political knowledge we can gain, for the former reason, cannot be objective in 
any meaningful sense.  
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This kind of study, informed both by interpretive political theory and 
analysis focusing on one particular empirical complex, finds its inspiration from 
existing scholarly work such as Roger M. Smith's Civic Ideals (1997). This work 
investigates not just one grand idealized story of American political identity, but 
several conflicting and often disquieting stories of American peoplehood from 
the Declaration of Independence, to World War One. Another would be Mark 
Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes' Interpreting British Governance (2003), in which they 
seek to uncover changes in both the conditions and the understandings of 
governance narratives in Great Britain. One could also mention Cécile Laborde's 
Critical Republicanism (2007), where she performs a critical reading of French 
identity politics in relation to immigration and concrete issues such as the hijab 
controversy, through which she is able to identify several competing narratives 
of French republicanism. Finally, one could consider the recent Making Money – 
The Philosophy of Crisis Capitalism (2014) by Ole Bjerg, where he interprets the 
political phenomenon of money through a philosophical and historical 
investigation, asking not if money works according to economic theory, but 
rather start by simply asking, what is money? 
What these academic pieces have in common is to offer a more nuanced and 
precise language of how to speak about important political phenomena. They do 
this not by asking whether existing theoretical expectations are being met, but 
by opening up existing political categories fixed in meaning. Often these 
endeavors are cross-disciplinary, bridging political theory with e.g. economics, 
philosophy or history. That too is the methodological ambition of this thesis. The 
endeavor is to prioritize understanding over criticism, interpretation over 
justification.  
Thus, I do not wish to identify the conceptual expansions from chapter 2 
with a purely normative or an explanatory exercise. To use Freeden's phrase, 
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‘thinking about’ the proper place of religion in the public sphere and its 
governance does not entail answering (normative) questions like ‘How should 
religion and politics relate?’, but rather ‘In which ways are religion and politics 
related politically?’. While the former question might render prescriptive or 
normative answers, the latter question does not merely imply descriptions of 
how things are, but rather interpretations or decoding ‘features of the political 
as a basis of understanding politics’ (Freeden 2012: 1).  
 
3.4. Structure of the analysis 
As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the structure of this thesis is a 
methodological attempt to apply Freeden's morphological approach to not an 
ideology, but an ideological concept (peoplehood embedded in secularism – 
unity through separation). Furthermore, I will focus on a specific national 
context of this concept (Denmark and the established church in particular).  
The methodological approach discussed above can also be considered as a 
form of interpretive policy analysis. This is a broad and varied collection of 
approaches to politics, which may be said to contrast itself from traditional 
policy analysis by not asking ‘what does this policy cost?’, or ‘how is the policy 
most effectively implemented’. But instead, ‘what does this policy mean?’ (see 
e.g. Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003: 1-30: Yanow, 2000 and 2007; Hajer, 2009: 
chapter 2, Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, 2013: xiii-xxxi). To be sure, I will analyze 
specific policies in chapters 5 and 6 in order to decode the ideological language 
surrounding these, and to conceptually reconstruct Danish secularism in chapter 
7. As the second section in this chapter showed, I will be looking in the political 
language specifically for plural meanings of concepts, points of contestability, 
the contextual conditionality of political meaning and the struggle over 
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interpretive hegemony within and between concepts and their components 
(decontestation). Relating to secularism and peoplehood, this means looking for 
especially claims of unity through separation: how is religious freedom, religious 
equality and governmental neutrality grounded in a political people, in a Danish 
context through the above-mentioned ideological features? In connection to my 
interpretive policy analysis, I wish to point to three final methodological points.  
First, I wish to note that in this study, we might consider secularism as an 
ideological concept to be both explanans and explanandum. On the one hand I am 
seeking to reconstruct the conceptual structure of secularism as an ideological 
doctrine (in constant contestation and competition), and on the other I seek to 
identify secularism thus conceptualized in concrete cases to understand the 
given policy. I use such a design firstly because the kind of secularism explored 
(modest establishment), has to be developed conceptually before proceeding. 
Secondly because I have to introduce secularism to an empirical context not 
familiar to this concept, by showing its relevance as explanans. Finally because 
applying my conceptually expanded secularism to a context like the Danish, can 
help nuance and deepen our conceptual understanding of secularism.  
This design is based on the premise that it is actual politics, which is our 
limitation and point of departure of understanding political thinking, rather than 
ideal theory. Of course, it is not that ideal theory is irrelevant to this study, but 
rather the opposite. However ideal theory is part of ideological or political 
thinking, which consists of a wider spectrum of political utterances and acts.  
A second methodological point regarding the analysis is that its empirical 
sources are primarily text-based. While I do subscribe to a hermeneutic or 
interpretive tradition, I do not use ethnographic observational studies as 
interpretation, but rather accessible texts. To explain, I will take Jutta Weldes' 
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(2013) helpful distinction between high data and low data as my point of 
departure. Where the former include official policy documents, parliamentary 
debates, laws, public debate in newspapers etc., the latter is popular culture such 
as movies, fiction, commercials, informal correspondences, architecture etc. 
Different kinds of data demand different kinds of investigation. In my attempt to 
access the political world in which policies are living, I build on high data texts 
while trying to pay attention to the actual context these exist in. Thus chapters 5 
and 6 build empirically on legislative material such as passed law, draft laws, 
explanatory memoranda and parliamentary debates in addition to committee 
reports, public consultations (and views), debate articles in national newspapers 
and other public debate engagements.  
Without denying the relevance of sources such as interviews, observations, 
questionnaires of relevant respondents or various low data in order to 
strengthen my argument empirically, I have chosen to limit myself in this 
respect. The mentioned alternative sources and the associated different 
methods would indeed be interesting to use as further analysis of the policy 
area. But I believe the mostly official sources are sufficient make my argument 
empirically sensitive, and not at least make me able to point to the relevant 
communities of meaning (political actors), and to the dominating discourses 
(what I called separation doctrines in the last chapter).  
A final methodological point pertains to a dimension which I have not yet 
touched upon, but which is of vital importance: history. To answer the research 
question of this thesis in a meaningful way, indeed implies paying close 
attention to the historical dimension of Danish secularism. The historical 
dimension as an ideological and conceptual context plays a central and natural 
role in both Freeden's and Smith's work, and in this thesis it will do the same but 
without being a study dedicated to political history (e.g. Freeden, 1996: Chapter 
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3, Smith, 1997). The next chapter thus contains an investigation of the roots of 
the Danish separation doctrine, in order to contextualize the present ideological 
language. Whilst chapters 5 and 6 analyze two current policies they also contain 
some degree of historical contextualization. 
However, when approaching the political world from the perspective of 
political theory, ‘is reading about historical events a blessing or a curse, or even 
an imbecility? Is it the royal road to political understanding, or a dark and 
damning diversion from true political principles?’, as Melissa Lane (2011: 128) 
asks in her discussion of the role of history in political theory. She distinguishes 
between history as constraint, and history as freedom in the context of political 
theory. Whereas the in the former history represents a distortion to seeing pure 
moral principles of justice, the latter kind of historical inquiry (like Skinnerian 
genealogies) might render ‘more mental options than we previously had, so 
enhancing freedom to think’ and thus to intervene in in our own culture's 
discourses ‘so as to modify… the languages in which those assumptions are 
embedded’ (Lane, 2011: 142; note also the familiarity to Gadamer's notion of 
openness in hermeneutics). She points to the productive interaction between 
political philosophy and history in the example of John Rawls' reformulation of 
the demands of public reason. After being confronted with the deep 
interconnectedness of religion and anti-slavery or religion and the civil rights 
movement (Lane, 2011: 150), he turned to a new understanding of a just 
interaction of religious reasons and politics as described in chapter 2. It is this 
perspective of history as freedom (to think), from which I depart.  
Interpretation is a frame which focuses on decoding or reconstructing 
meaning, which accepts and insists of the plurality of meaning and not at least 
which is conscious of the historicity of politics. Particularly when studying the 
political enterprise of making citizens think as a people and even act as such, it is 
  
101 
important to acknowledge that nothing in these concepts is ‘natural’ or 
unambiguous. Nor is the production of knowledge of the social world. On the 
contrary, these concepts all have a history of different connotations in 
accordance to the power constellations and structures at the time. Thus a 
historicist dimension of analyzing political ideas and concepts is essential to 
understand the identity politics of today, and as part of the endeavor of 
conceptualizing the context. Hermeneutic research operates at both a 
synchronic and a diachronic level (e.g. Prasad, 2002: 24; Freeden, 1996: 120). 
When analyzing political concepts with an interpretive approach like the one 
applied in this project, history play an inevitable role as Freeden has expressed 
it (Freeden, 1996: 97).  
History as context for political concepts is vital, because we could not 
otherwise understand the discursive usage qua the specific historical 
connotations attached to them in real public debates. Almost all political 
concepts as part of narratives of peoplehood contain a temporal conception. It 
could be an imagined past from which we should be dissociated today, a special 
path to progress or moral worth, a sense of pride of status quo etc.  
Such a focus on the history of concepts sounds similar to the discipline of 
conceptual history, which treats concepts as the primary unit of analysis, and 
considers changes in the conception of these through time to be of essential 
importance to our contemporary understanding. It has its background in the 
works of German historians of 'Begriffsgeschichte', of which probably the most 
prominent figure would be Reinhart Koselleck (see especially 2004). However, 
my take on conceptual history operates in the wake of Fredeen’s reading of the 
Kosselleckian tradition (Freeden, 1998: 117-123, 2013b: 132). Building on 
Koselleck’s focus on inquiring political conflicts as a discursive competition over 
‘correct’ concepts, this may be done through history and thus the understanding 
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of the plurality of (historic) meaning in politics. Freeden importantly points out 
that while traditional conceptual history serves the understanding of history, the 
aim of historic interpretation of political ideas instead should make concepts of 
‘…history, place, culture, and morphology [of ideology] feed political theory’ 
(Freeden, 1996: 119; see examples using historical analysis in Freeden, 2005b). 
Thus, the historical reading of concepts are part of the Freedenian interpretive 
analysis, and for these purposes the aim is to inform discussions of the 
normative nature of present political matters. 
As I have mentioned in chapter 2 and which will become more evident in 
the following chapters, underlying the question of Danish secularism is the 
problem of the unresolved legal boundaries between the church and the state. It 
results in a political struggle of how to understand Danish peoplehood in 
relation to religion. Thus one point of departure will be to compare the 
identified political concepts with relevant historic ones, in order to map the 
architecture and roots of the constitutive ideas of peoplehood. Indeed, it is to 
history which we shall now turn.  
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PART II 
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Chapter 4  Political struggles over the 
constitution of the church 
 
 
4.1. Introduction  
ecularism is often regarded to be one of the most essential products of 
political modernity, and thus mainstream representations of secularism 
are expected to entertain certain core liberal values as portrayed in 
chapter 2. But as in many other Western countries, early political modernity in 
Denmark was not only influenced by liberal and to some degree republican 
currents, but in addition by romantic ideas.31 As will be elaborated on in greater 
extent below, one of the most powerful ideas from this period is romanticism's 
idea of the people or the nation. In the construction of the national church of 
Denmark, Folkekirken, one church was created to peacefully contain most 
denominations, from revivalist pietism to rationalism and positions in-between. 
I say most, as some religious groups never found themselves included. But the 
Folkekirke was a political compromise between liberal and conservative ideals, 
in the name of romantic notions of the individual and the people. 
This chapter has as its aim to render intelligible some of the historical 
sources of the present-day formation of secularism in Denmark. This period is 
                                               
 
 
31 In this chapter ‘liberalism’ or ‘political liberalism’ will not be treated as an 
ideal concept, corresponding to for example Rawls' similar notion as discussed 
in chapter 2. Rather, liberalism will be treated as a historically prevalent 
ideology influencing political thinking of the period (see e.g. Freeden, 1986). For 
a recent morphological and conceptual historical treatment of Danish liberalism, 
see Nevers, Olsen and Sylvest, 2013.  
S 
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relevant since it was the last time the question of religion was a profound 
political concern, and an actual constitutional matter. The settlement of this 
compromise at the founding period of the modern Danish state came to have an 
enduring impact for the years to come. Interestingly, the fundamental religion-
politics relationship in Denmark ever since has been relatively undisputed, with 
only minor controversies in the way.  
Though the Folkekirke was established by the Constitutional Act of 
Denmark in 1849, it was never granted its own legal framework to protect and 
define its autonomy vis-à-vis the state, notwithstanding this being the explicit 
intentions of the founding constitutional assembly (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2006: 
421-422), see also section 4.3.32 However, while the Folkekirke did not arrive at 
a constitution formally settling its relation to the state, a political doctrine to 
regulate the relationship between religion and politics in Denmark did evolve to 
restrain the state’s interventions in the internal affairs of the church, and to 
restrain the church’s political activities.  
As discussed in chapters 2 and 3, I consider doctrines of secularism to be 
considered ideological concepts inspired by the political theorist Michael 
Freeden. In general, such an ideology-like separation doctrine maintains a 
secular polity and political people which it regulates. To conceptually 
reconstruct secularism with such a strong emphasis on a theory of peoplehood 
as I have done is not to claim, however, that secularism essentially is a 
sacralizing narrative, seamlessly merging supreme Godly authority with worldly 
government (a civil religion style argument). That secularism relates to religion 
                                               
 
 
32 Article 66 in the applicable constitutional act states: ‘The constitution of the 
Established Church shall be laid down by statute’ (Folketinget, 1999).  
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politically neither necessarily entails religious politics nor political religion. 
Rather, secularism is a political relation constantly negotiated, and the 
ideological power exercised is one of boundary setting.  
As a preliminary sketch of current Danish secularism (which will be further 
analyzed in chapters 5 and 6 to be conceptually reconstructed in chapter 7), I 
identify three analytically distinct but related elements of Danish secularism. 
First, the political identity dimension; a defining feature of the identity of the 
Danish people (‘folket’) that still appears to be related to the Folkekirke. Though 
Danes at a macro level have been found to display a remarkably high degree of 
non-religious practices and beliefs in an international comparison, self-
identification with the nation still appears to be related to certain Christian 
symbols and traditions. Secondly, the institutional dimension. The church is 
formally considered to be the fourth branch or pillar of the state alongside the 
tripartite system of political power. We can consider this formal arrangement of 
an established church to be the main institutional expression of current Danish 
secularism. Finally, the dimension of political principles. The aim of this doctrine 
is to promote religious freedom and equality in order to maintain a secular 
polity. While religious freedom is universal and comprehensive in Denmark, the 
principle of religious equality has traditionally been applied only within the 
parameters of the Folkekirke. The reason has been that the principle of equality 
was implemented in a religiously unified culture, what I call the multilutheran 
culture.33  
                                               
 
 
33 I accredit the term ‘multi-Lutheran’ to Marie Vejrup Nielsen at Department of 
Culture and Society, Aarhus University. 
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Consequently, a central but simple point throughout this thesis is that when 
politicians or other important public figures argue for the preservation or 
reform of the status quo of church-state-relations with reference to 'Danishness' 
or the Danish way, they exercise a particular kind of ideological power through 
decontestation. In Denmark, this power is strongly related to the Folkekirke. 
Thus, the Folkekirke not only functions as the Evangelical Lutheran body 
organizing its 4,4 million members on 2300 churches, but it affirms particular 
political ideas of regulating public religion pertaining to Danish citizens. This is 
how I phrase Danish secularism, based on separation-as-principled distance and 
an ethical notion of community. This chapter is about how we arrived at such a 
doctrine. 
 
4.1.1. The diachrony of Danish secularism 
As several genealogies have shown, secularism was an early modern ideological 
devise to distinguish initially higher times from secular times. Only after this did 
secularism start to signify the more contemporary meaning of the spatial 
separation of religion and politics (Connolly, 1999; Asad, 2003; Taylor, 2009: 
1147).34 Arguably, secularism contains both meanings today. It is not only about 
ensuring a proper distance between organized public religion and state 
institutions, but also about maintaining a secular sphere of reasoning which do 
not draw validity from religious statements. Alongside Freeden's terminology, 
these two meanings can be understood as ‘conclusive devises’ which functions 
                                               
 
 
34 For a similar point in relation to the interpretation of Luther's two kingdoms 
doctrine in Danish politics, see Kritik (2010) no. 195, especially Korsgaard: 3-11. 
I will elaborate on this point below.  
  
108 
to decontestate meaning (Freeden, 2013a: 23). It enables political practices by 
ensuring finality of meaning within this particular policy area, devices perceived 
to safeguard stability and certainty in a social order. As Freeden observes, there 
exists ‘a general desire in contemporary politics as well as in past practices to 
identify institutions and devices that dispense such (reassuring) finality’ 
(Freeden, 2013a: 109). In the context of Danish politics this has historically been 
the Folkekirke.  
But there is a particular quality to such finalities, be they spatial or 
temporal, which is the raison d'etre of this chapter. As an example when the 
biggest political party in Denmark, Venstre, in their policy agenda lay down that 
‘the constitutional exceptional status of the Folkekirke shall be maintained’ 
(Venstre, 2014a; several other parties have similar formulations), we clearly see 
they use a language of necessity and closure in a time where the status of the 
Folkekirke is debated. The political party's attempt to deconteste may embolden 
the argument with finality and unconditionally, but the point of this chapter is 
that such a discourse is analytically distinct and historically situated. As Freeden 
notes ‘the ending of debate relates to establishing its commencement rather 
than its temporal conclusion… The temporal boundary, then, is not inserted to 
distinguish between two contiguous zones, but indicates the site where the 
construction of the political commences, and towards which political thinking 
must gravitate as the anchor point of its subsequent and further assertions 
regarding the allocation of social competences’ (Freeden 2013: 94-95). Even 
though ideological language, and in this case the language of Danish secularism, 
seem to claim spatial and temporal finality of meaning (‘this is how we relate the 
church and the state', and 'that is how tradition/the constitution prescribes it’), 
there existed a formative time in Danish politics where it could not be 
decontestated.  
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As the previous chapter on the Freedenian methodological approach to 
political ideas discussed, this chapter points to the historicity of formal and 
ideational institutionalization of a secular imaginary in Danish politics. It does so 
by attempting to ‘reconstruct the conscious intentions of the thinker within his 
or her social context…’ (Freeden, 1996: 101).  
To do this the following will proceed in two main steps. The first is to 
approach the contextual history of Danish secularism by a reading of Danish 
secularization, partly inspired by Charles Taylor. Here, I wish to emphasize three 
drivers of the development of a secular political sphere distinguished from a 
religious one (i.e. secularization), which influenced the emergence of a doctrine 
of Danish secularism in the late absolute monarchy:  
 
1) The emergence of enlightenment-inspired liberal ideas. Both 
theologically and politically.  
2) Revivalist groups, while religiously orthodox, had a politically liberal 
outlook as they demanded religious liberties and pluralism in society. 
3) Ideas from romanticism, especially the emergence of romantic 
nationalism or peoplehood replacing a ‘paleo-Durkheimian social order’.  
 
From a historical perspective, Danish secularism did not develop formally 
adherent to explicit institutional principles of separation as we saw it in France 
or The United States, but subscribed to a mixture of enlightened principles and 
monarchial tradition.  
Having outlined this early modern political context, the second part of the 
chapter then turns to reconstructing three of the most important models of 
state-church relations from this period.  
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The purpose is to read a rather well documented part of Danish church 
history, from the theoretical perspective of secularism and peoplehood. 
Contrary to the existing historical body of literature, focus would not be on why 
the various political attempts never came to be realized, but rather on the 
common threads revealed in the political discourses on peoplehood and 
secularism. These discussions may reveal much about the dominating political 
narratives of the Danish identity. Point to the way certain narratives came to 
dominate and therefore possibly how the horizon of possibilities for the present 
commission work on the church constitution (chapter 6) and how it has come to 
be conditioned from such a legacy.  
 
4.2. The early modern context 
The period surrounding the political system changed towards the first 
constitution of 1849, which was indeed a turbulent part of Danish history 
(Østergård, 2006; on the European wars and revolutions, see Breuilly, 2013: pp. 
97) For the purposes of this thesis I will focus on the struggles and changes in 
the doctrine of separation, which gradually developed during the 18th century. 
Before the time of the absolute monarch there existed no formal distinction 
between the state and the church (Glædesmark, 1948), and therefore no direct 
phenomena of relevance to study for this chapter. Quite explicitly a number of 
ritualistic, dogmatic and formal requirements were in place to ensure a state 
church generating a people forged in true Lutheran belief and morality. In this 
process, the church was an organic extension of the state body. They were one 
unit.  
The unity was documented in detail in the Danish Act of Succession of 1665 
('Kongeloven'), the Danish Law of King Christian V ('Danske Lov'), the libri 
symbolici and the books of rituals and service (Glædesmark, 1948: 9-16). From 
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these the Danish people were defined as Lutheran, which was to be taken quite 
literally as only citizens baptized in the true Lutheran faith could achieve actual 
citizenship (Glædesmark, 1948: 57). The unity of a political and religious 
identity in the supreme authority is evident in the first section of Danish Act of 
Succession of 1665, which technically was applicable law until 1849. In this 
constituting piece of legislation, the absolute monarch commands all 
descendants of the throne ‘for the next 1000 generations’ to serve and worship 
the only true God in manners and practices revealed in the Bible and the 
Augsburg Confession (the protestant manifesto of Melanchthon and Luther 
presented to the Emperor Charles V at Augsburg on 25 June 1530).35 It is the 
duty of the absolute monarch ‘… to hold the countries' citizens firmly by the pure 
and unvarnished belief and [the monarch] shall enforce and protect these 
countries and kingdoms against all heretics, fanatics and blasphemers’. The next 
section established that the monarch holds the absolute authority to do this: 
‘The absolute monarch of Denmark and Norway shall from now on be 
recognized and esteemed as the most superior and supreme head on earth by all 
subjects, and no other head or judge shall find himself above neither in clerical 
nor in worldly affairs, save God alone’ (see Kongeloven, 1665).  
The fact that a strict formal regime existed in social, political and religious 
matters did not mean that people in practice observed the orthodox spirit of the 
laws. As the Danish church historian H. J. H. Glædesmark has emphasized, the 
                                               
 
 
35 After the introduction of the absolute monarchy in 1660, King Frederick III 
promised the nobilities to formalize the new regime into an everlasting founding 
inheritance Act. While it was signed by Frederick III in 1665, it was not known to 
the wider public until the later King Christian V was anointed in 1670 where it 
was read aloud, and officially publicized in 1709, see Østergård, 2006: 67.  
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absolute monarch’s church-state regime in fact saw an ongoing disintegration in 
favor of Enlightenment theology and rationalism from 1750 onwards 
(Glædesmark, 1948: chapter II; also Rasmussen, 2011). 
 
4.2.1. Political secularization: Unity challenged by early liberalism 
As touched upon in the introduction, the emergence of enlightenment-
inspired liberal ideas was part of the secularization process. I will focus on the 
political and theological ideas.  
Political liberalism became increasingly instrumental to the process of 
differentiating religion from politics. It was part of the gradual transformation 
from the organically coherent society to one ruled by a free constitution.36 This 
early-modern conception gained its inspiration from the social theory in 17th 
century natural law. From here, the idea of a church constitution parallel to a 
state constitution was developed, and these ideas were carried on all the way up 
to important Danish political figures surrounding the first free constitution of 
1849 like D. G. Monrad (1811-1887) and A. S. Ørsted (1778-1860), along with 
important legal scholars such as H. Ussing (1743-1820) and J. L: A. Kolderup-
                                               
 
 
36 This development was probably not independent of the turmoil in European 
politics in the 1830's. The second French Revolution in 1830 lead to a more 
liberal constitutional monarchy, which arguably sparked the rebellion and later 
independence of Belgium from the Netherlands. One could also mention the 
failed November Uprising in Poland crushed by Russia etc. (Bregnsbo, 1997: pp. 
287; Grane, 1982: Chapter II). Internally in the Kingdom of Denmark, 
consultative assemblies representing the Estates of the Realm were created in 
1834, to which a small proportion of the wealthy population could be elected. 
Within this system, liberal voices also started to organize themselves (Bregnsbo, 
1997: 289).  
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Rosenvinge (1792-1850). These politicians operated with the notion of so-called 
‘collegial’ theory of church government ('Kollegialsystem'), which was inspired 
by Enlightenment ideas and natural law (Rasmussen, 2011: 43-46).  
In particular, the German scholar Samuel Pufendorf (based in Sweden) is a 
relevant source to understand a history of European and not at least Danish 
secularism, inspired by early Protestant natural law.37 Not at least did he 
conceptually distinguish between an ecclesiastical and a state sphere of justice 
and these ideas were very influential in Danish legal and political thinking up till 
the mid-19th century (Rasmussen, 2011: pp. 44). His social theory of justice was 
intended to be based not on Christian arguments, but on reason (Dufour, 1994: 
570). From this perspective, Pufendorf build a theory of church governance 
differentiating between jus circa sacra and jus in sacra; between state power and 
ecclesiastical power pertaining to the inner affairs of the church (this itself 
inspired by the Lutheran two kingdoms doctrine, more on this below). In the 
book Of the Nature and Qualification of Religion, in Reference to Civil Society from 
1687, he was concerned about when a Prince of temporal governance 
transgressed his bounds of the church (e.g. Pufendorf, 2002: §44).  
The relation to God, the spiritual sphere, cannot be touched or divided by 
any worldly power. ‘If we take a full view of the whole Structure of Civil 
Societies, and by what means Subjects were united under one Government, we 
shall find them to differ as Heaven and Earth from that Union, which belongs 
properly to the Body of a Church’ (Pufendorf, 2002: §32). Thus Pufendorf argued 
                                               
 
 
37 Of the early natural law thinkers one could also have mentioned Grotius, 
Hobbes or even Spinoza, all of whom Pufendorf was in a critical theoretical 
dialogue with (Seidler, 2013). 
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that the state did not find its raison d'etre in religion, but rather in the 
protection of human freedom including the protection of the individual's 
religious freedom (Zurbuchen, 2002: xi). While the protection of religious 
freedom seems modern, he maintained the supreme authority of the 
monarchical sovereign above all worldly matters including the church and the 
duty of his subjects to obey in accordance to natural law (Pufendorf, 2002: §7; 
Zurbuchen, 2002: xi; Rasmussen, 2011: 44). Yet within his social theory a 
distinction of the spiritual and the worldly had been integrated, and with that 
the foundation to a modern conception of religious tolerance had been forged. 
As he concludes near the end of his book: ‘Sovereigns may, nay ought with a safe 
Conscience to tolerate such of their Subjects as are of a different Opinion from 
the Established Religion’ (Pufendorf, 2002: §50). It can be argued that Pufendorf, 
in the wake of the Edict of Nantes in 168538 tried to strike a balance between a 
rational social theory protecting some degree of religious liberty and a tradition 
of centralized monarchical state power, which was regarded as the safeguard for 
social order and public morality (see also Zurbuchen, 2002: xii-xiii). This balance 
seemed also to have been a concern in Danish political thinking.  
Before returning to Pufendorf's influence upon the Danish context, I will 
have to briefly treat the before mentioned connection between the Two 
Kingdom's Doctrine and a political order conducive to separation between 
church and state. To be sure, the Lutheran two kingdoms doctrine has been, and 
                                               
 
 
38 Where the French king, Louis XIV upset large part of European Protestant 
intellectual circles by renouncing laws granting toleration of Protestant 
minorities. 
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still is today, an influential idea in Danish politics (see also Dabelsteen, 2011: 73-
75).  
 
a) Martin Luther's Two Kingdoms Doctrine and its interpretations  
The basis of the often referred to doctrine can be found in Martin Luther's 
famous work on the relation between Christianity and politics, Temporal 
Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed from 1523. Here he writes: ‘…For 
this reason God has ordained two governments: the spiritual, by which the Holy 
Spirit produces Christians and righteous people under Christ and the temporal, 
which restrains the un-Christian and wicked so that, no thanks to them, they are 
obliged to keep still and to maintain an outward peace... Both must be permitted 
to remain. The one to produce righteousness, the other to bring about external 
peace and prevent evil deeds. Neither one is sufficient in the world without the 
other. No one can become righteous in the sight of God by means of the temporal 
government, without Christ's spiritual Government’ (Luther, 2014 [1523]: 4-5).  
This distinction between the spiritual and the temporal is interesting in a 
Danish context, as it appears to have been coupled with a notion of Danish 
peoplehood from the early modern period (indeed also in a Scandinavian 
context, see Witte, 2014). As is also the case today, this doctrine has been taken 
to mean the separation between church and state – a spatial or physical 
distinction keeping the religious communities and state institutions apart. In this 
understanding, the Lutheran Two Kingdoms Doctrine comes close to a 
separation doctrine of secularism, legitimized by Lutheran or Protestant 
theology. It might appear as a paradox that the Lutheran doctrine is the 
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foundation to the separation of religion and politics, and in this sense it might be 
tempting even to speak of Christian secularism.39 
Together with other rebel Wittenberg theologians, Luther was one of the 
most authoritative counselors in the process of implementing Protestant state 
churches in public law around Europe. Likewise, the newly reformed King 
Christian III (1503-1559) arranged that the Danish reformation would be guided 
by some of Luther's closest allies, and that the Church Ordinance (the law 
regulating internal and external affairs of the Evangelical Church), was 
personally overlooked and approved by Luther (Lausten, 2004: 126-139). In this 
way, Luther's ideas of temporal, monarchical power were expressed in the new 
church institutions of the King's church (Auken, 2005: 49; Lyby, 2006: 21-24; 
Korsgaard, 2010: 7).  
In that connection it may be regarded as a paradox that it is the Two 
Kingdoms Doctrine, which is pointed out to be the constitutive idea of 
separating religion and politics. As Luther's thoughts were conceived almost half 
a century ago, it is an important point that he did not know of modern 
conceptions of 'state', 'people' or 'democracy' and very little in his own writings 
would suggest that his doctrine should result in the separation of religion and 
politics, quite the contrary (Auken, 2005; Korsgaard, 2010). In a sense Luther 
                                               
 
 
39 A current example on this use could be that of the prominent Danish People's 
Party member, Søren Krarup: ‘No, where the gospel is not preached and claimed 
to be the truth about human life and the life of the people, then religion and 
politics are confused… not before the difference between God's and the 
emperor's kingdom underlie the temporal government will it be secular and able 
to distinguish between religion and politics.’ (Krarup, 2008). See also the quote 
of former Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs, Birthe Rønn Hornbech (V) in 
chapter 7 on the Two Kingdom's Doctrine.  
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was one of the first to point to the problem of the church-state relation as part of 
his confrontation with medieval theology, but ‘…the discovery was part of a 
theological consideration and not a state philosophical one. It must be 
maintained that his potential influence on the secular state and democracy was 
not foreseen, nor desired by him’ (Lyby, 2006: 19).  
The idea of keeping religion restrained to the private sphere would be an 
absurdum for Luther living a medieval time of feudalism. Luther's Two 
Kingdoms Doctrine was not a dualistic category of spatiality to separate church 
and state, but an interactive category of relations united by God to distinguish 
between the spiritual and the temporal (Auken, 2005: 48; Korsgaard, 2010). In 
other words, Luther placed the church in both kingdoms as both visible 
(temporal) and invisible (spiritual) respectively, and both kingdoms were 
Christian. ‘If the spiritual rule of the church governs only public matters, how 
dare the mad temporal authority judge and control such a secret, spiritual, 
hidden matter as faith?’ (Luther, 1523: 12-13). The extent of the temporal power 
even if unreasonable is thus absolute, save the spiritual kingdom where the 
monarch, according to Luther, holds no authority or power. But the implication 
of Temporal Authority was also that Luther abolished civil disobedience as 
legitimate under any circumstance (besides if the monarch transgress the 
boundaries of faith or becomes mad) (Korsgaard, 2010: 7; Luther, 1523: 19-21). 
The fact that Luther's doctrine has been and still is being used as a 
reference to justify a certain spatial demarcation between religion and politics, 
thus appears to be an ideological construction stemming from the 18th and 19th 
century. The emerging social and political movements which were partially 
derived from the popular pietistic currents of the 18th century and the liberal 
theology in the 19th century (more on this below), needed simple and appealing 
concepts to operate with (Auken, 2005, 46; Østergaard, 2010: 46).  
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We thus saw the transformation of the Two Kingdom's Doctrine from a 
relational to a spatial differentiation, so that it could be more consistent with the 
popular ideas of the nation and the people, in an age of emerging liberalism and 
freedom rights.  
When ‘the people’ gradually became regarded as a category of sovereignty 
it replaced common religion as the source of coherence and legitimacy for the 
state. However, for deep cultural and religious reasons Lutheran theology could 
not be abolished in the 19th century, despite the presence of Enlightenment and 
liberalism. Therefore, Lutheranism's paternalistic social theory had to be 
reinterpreted and adapted to a system ruled by the people. However, it should 
be noticed that Luther's social theory was not purely elitist, static and 
patriarchal, but also brought about new innovative ideas of political order (see 
Witte, 2014). It is this ideological construction from the Danish theological and 
political heritage, which allows one variant of Danish secularism to combine 
liberal and Lutheran vernacular.  
 
b) Important figures in early Danish Enlightenment 
Arguably, one of the most central figures in Danish and Scandinavian 
Enlightenment, and whom Pufendorf particularly influenced, was the scholar 
and author Ludvig Holberg (1684-1754). Through dissertations on natural law 
and other ‘improving literature’, he contributed to Danish intellectual and 
political thinking with themes such as anti-authoritarianism, anti-elitism, 
equality, progress and rationalism (Bredsdorff, 2004: 52; Glædesmark, 1948: 
21). Not to mention his work about tolerance. Toleration in early Enlightenment 
was mostly associated with religious tolerance, and later was secularized to be 
associated more broadly with political freedom and citizen rights (Kjældgaard, 
2004: 65). Much of the most monumental works of tolerance and natural law-
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based principles of freedom can be considered as reactions to absolutist states 
restricting, banning or prosecuting religious minorities. The before-mentioned 
Edict of Nantes did not only inspire Pufendorf but also John Locke to initiate a 
series of works on toleration, of which A Letter Concerning Toleration from 1689 
might be the most famous. Here, Locke explicitly speaks of separation. ‘I esteem 
it above all things necessary to distinguish exactly the business of civil 
government from that of religion and to settle the just bounds that lie between 
the one and the other’ (Locke, 1824 [1689]). The just boundary Locke has in 
mind is based on exactly the ‘duty of toleration’, which in the same text equals 
churches abstaining from violence, civil rights being independent of religious 
affiliation, religious authority pertaining only within the church and religious 
leaders preaching peace and tolerance.  
In particular Locke's works on religious toleration were known by Holberg, 
who introduced these ideas to a Northern European audience through his own 
literature (along with Pufendorf and Grotius's natural law theory, see Tamm, 
2004). The themes of religious tolerance and the notion of civic equality drawn 
from natural law were seen in such works of satiric travel romances and in other 
pieces by Holberg. In one text he formulates one version of religious tolerance. 
‘A zealous maker of heretics, when overrun by great enthusiasm or zeal and 
persecuting heretics, need only imagine this. If I became a citizen in another 
country where my orthodoxy was considered heresy and for that reason found 
myself being persecuted, as I persecute others now, would I not want to 
condemn the Princioium Intolerantiæ, which until now I have loved so much?’ 
(as quoted in Bredsdorff, 2004: 47-48). This quote may be one of the most 
explicit utterances of tolerance as Holberg, while influenced by early European 
Enlightenment champions like Pufendorf, Locke, Montesquieu and Bayle had a 
more indirect, satirical and metaphorical approach possibly because of the 
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monarchy's censorship, who hardly accepted his writings (Kjældgaard, 2004: 
71). Perhaps the most prominent example was the fable The Journey of Niels 
Klim to the World Underground from 1741. This was a fantastic account of the 
journey to a world with different forms of government, cultures and customs 
underground. As a satiric metaphor for Europe, the protagonist is confronted 
with outlandish and exotic peoples different from his own. From this, Niels 
starts to develop an understanding of the strange customs of foreigners. ‘Ever 
since then I always judge with greater care those who might go astray, and now I 
unceasingly cry out for tolerance’ (Holberg's Niels Klim quoted in Kjældgaard, 
2004: 72).  
A quite remarkable demonstration of Holberg's influence on the elite in the 
Danish Kingdom was one of the most influential political figures in the 
generation following Holberg's: the royal physician to the mentally ill King 
Christian VII, German Johann Friedrich Struensee. For a brief period between 
1770-1772, he became the de facto ruler of Denmark-Norway, making ‘one of 
the most sweeping, resolute attempts to reform European society from the top 
downwards on a libertarian basis’ (Israel, 2012: 823). He was strongly 
influenced by Enlightenment ideas of Spinoza, Locke, Voltaire and Rousseau as 
well as Holberg (who translated or introduced quite a few of the European 
thinkers), and wanted to ‘liberalize the economy, liberate the serfs, and 
generally bring his idea of Enlightenment to Denmark’ (Laursen, 2000: 192). 
With almost unrestricted access to reforms Struensee encouraged the mad king 
to introduce unrestricted freedom of the press (including religion and politics), 
to all parts of the united kingdom of Denmark-Norway in 1770 as the first 
county in the world (Laursen, 2000: 189; Israel, 2012: 823).  
Besides conservative and Denmark-loyal forces fearing these radical 
reforms (some of which Struensee's opponents later watered down), his 
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reputation did not improve when it was revealed that he had a scandalous affair 
with the Queen. His reign was short as he was arrested and beheaded for high 
treason in the Palace Revolution of 1772.  
Yet the influence of Struensee's short de facto rule introducing radically 
progressive reforms of Danish society had a lasting impact. The scandal had both 
exposed the weakness of absolute monarchy (a mad, incompetent and 
powerless king being a strong symbol of this), and the unpopularity of radical 
Enlightenment as it had changed the popular perception of the role of the 
monarchy and public opinion (Horstbøll, 2007: 182-3). The conservative and 
nationalist forces taking power (led by the conservative and patriotic O. Høegh-
Guldberg), portrayed Struensee as a German heretic advocating immoral 
Spinozism trying to dissolve a divine social order (Laursen, 2000). Struensee 
had not only dishonored the Danish throne, but had disgraced God's 
representative on earth, the Church and the Christian social order (Bach-Nielsen, 
2012: 356). The unusually brutal public execution of Struensee had the form of a 
religiously staged rite of exclusion of the philosophy he represented, in order to 
win the hearth of the common people (Horstbøll, 2007).  
Even though the symbolic and divine strength of the absolute monarchy 
had been restored, something had changed. In the years to come Denmark saw 
neither the complete breakdown of the monarchy in the form of republican 
revolution, nor a fully despotic and absolute rule. Something in between 
emerged which maintained the absolute monarchist order, but still with a 
stronger emphasis on Enlightenment, Danish nationalism and public opinion 
(Bregnsbo, 1997: 250-264; Bach-Nielsen, 2012: 358).  
The fall of Struensee was not so much due to his Enlightenment ideas or the 
comprehensive reforms of the state administration, as was the style of 
governance, or that he was German or even his many enemies in the state 
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system. It was the fact he had slept with the Queen, which became the official 
reason (a ‘lèse-majesté’) for his arrest.  
 
4.2.2. Theological secularization: Unity challenged by revivalism 
The cultural and political influence of Enlightenment thinkers in Denmark 
was strong after this and ideas of tolerance, constitutionalism, democracy and 
freedom rights were certainly not unknown (e.g. Korsgaard, 2008: chapter II; 
Østergård, 2006: 60-65). Enlightened political ideas had many influential 
supporters in the Danish unified kingdom, and did not stop with Struensee.  
When the son of the mentally ill King Christian VII took power in 1784 (but 
was not officially monarch before his father's death in 1808), King Frederik VI 
and likeminded politicians such as A. P. Bernstorff (1735-1797) and C. D. F. 
Reventlow (1748-1827) continued the liberal reforms in the decades to come 
based on Enlightenment-inspired liberal ideas (Glædesmark, 1948; Laursen, 
1998, 2000; Rasmussen, 2011, Østergård, 2006).  
As part of the secularization process, the rationalistic influence in politics 
especially spilled over to leading clerics in the church under the rule of Frederik 
VI (Bach-Nielsen, 2012: 375). Within the state church, the rationalist influence 
came to heavily dominate the theology and more leading figures within this 
highly conservative absolutist church. It then started to promote reason, 
freedom of preaching and enlightened naturalist teaching both in religious and 
worldly matters (Bach-Nielsen, 2012: 376-378; Bregnsbo, 1997: 299-304). The 
influence became so strong that they started to change the liturgy accordingly, 
even in cases contrary to formal enactments subscribing to orthodox Lutheran 
theology. The rationalistic influence saw its peak in the 1820's, known as liberal 
theology (Glædesmark, 1948: 29; Koch, 1944: 95-119). This period also 
indicated the height of the distance between the absolute monarch's state 
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church's principle of dogmatic, liturgical and spiritual unity and the 
Enlightenment ideas.  
These kind of enlightened ideas were the first time we saw the early steps 
being taken towards a separation doctrine within the church itself. The 
separation came in two disguises. The first was that official dogmatic and 
liturgical order was simply not observed.40 The leading clerics of the state 
church did not follow the official principles, and the church was in itself a threat 
to the absolute monarchical order, as it per definition can only contain one 
dogmatic order. The second was more substantial; liberal theology and related 
theological currents influenced by rationalistic or based on Enlightenment ideas 
considered the church to be a society within the society, a realm different from 
the state. These ideas of the civil people being something different from the 
absolute monarch and as a consequence from the state church became evident 
in public sermons as early as in the 1770's (Bregnsbo, 1997: 325).  
Even though these natural law ideas became more prevalent in the 
monarchy and church, the ideational secularization had not yet transpired in 
political institutions. The rigid constitution of the state was still one of an 
absolute monarch and everything else was subordinate to this, including all 
subjects and the church. As noted, the absolutist law was in effect until 1849, 
and according to the Danish historian Uffe Østergård the ideology of governance 
of the period was one of ‘enlightened absolutism ruled by “patriotic” consent’ 
                                               
 
 
40 It is important here to distinguish between dogmatic and social order 
obedience to the monarchy. While the dogmatic differed from orthodox 
Lutheranism, the pastors were generally representatives of the state system 
preaching loyalty and obedience to the king (Bregnsbo, 1997: 328).  
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(Østergård 2006: 67). We can therefore say that liberal ideas of separation at 
this time (e.g. religious freedom) were more of an ideational current than an 
actual doctrine with an institutional expression.  
However, it was not only the result of theological and political liberalism in 
the establishment which led to a constitution celebrating the principle of 
religious freedom. The literature has also pointed to a less obvious factor that 
contributed to a modernization of Danish political outlook, concerning the 
relationship between religion and politics in the first decades of the 19th century: 
revivalism.  
The beginning of this century culminated in a polarization between 
religious assemblies of common people (pietistic or herrnhut revivalists), and 
the dominating rationalism (Lindhardt, 1951: chapter II). As described above, 
the latter position had until then been dominating the top theological tiers. The 
institutional function of the state church of uniting and ensuring a social and 
religious homogeneous order had not changed. Instead, where an older 
orthodox strand of Lutheran Protestantism had dominated before as prescribed 
in laws and central official books of rituals and symbols, this enlightenment 
inspired rationalistic theology had overtaken the role as the uniting religious 
outlook.  
As in most other Western contemporary states, various forms of protestant 
and revivalist religious communities proliferated in opposition to the 
established religion of the absolute monarchs (Sanders, 1995: 23-24). Often they 
were regarded by the clerical and political establishment as ‘heretics, fanatics 
and blasphemers’, but some were tolerated as long as they were not considered 
a threat to social order. At this time, natural law and enlightened liberal ideas of 
power restraint, tolerance and liberty rights had started to curb the absolutist 
religious governance.  
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The Danish revivalist movements became louder and more public in their 
protests against what they considered as a dry and cold rationalistic theology of 
the state church. They were actively proselytizing and missionizing against the 
false doctrines of the rationalists, and the true piteous reading of the Holy 
Scriptures (Sanders, 1995: 264-268; Lindhardt, 1957: 25-37). As so-called pious 
gatherings (‘gudelige forsamlinger’), which were known and feared by the 
establishment and mostly based in rural areas, they consisted of gatherings 
reading the Bible piously predominantly without a pastor to lead or read for 
them. Because of this, the period has also called been called ‘the peasant revival’ 
(‘bondevækkelsen’). 
What is interesting about these layman-based and agrarian, conventicle 
movements belonging to the late 18th century and the first half of the 19th 
century is that they became part of a gradual political modernization of Danish 
political thinking (Bredsdorff, 2003: 94). By challenging the monopoly of the 
state church pastor to read the Bible, they also challenged the social imaginary 
of the time. Hanne Sanders has pointed out that these groupings in opposition to 
the state church were actually facilitating a development of secularization, not in 
the sense of dechristianization of society, but rather in the sense of a 
pluralization and de-monopolization of religious belief in a people. According to 
Sanders we saw a beginning secularization of Danish politics in that the state 
church and the official religion changed (not diminished), its function (Sanders, 
1995: 225). She points out that these movements contributed to a development 
in which the official religion no longer constituted a shared social imaginary or 
political identity, but that religion now was a matter for the individual (Sanders, 
1995: 256).  
 
 
  
126 
4.2.3. Conceptualizing Danish secularization inspired by Charles Taylor 
This notion of a change in the social imaginary from pre-modern to modern 
and perhaps beyond, which liberalism and revivalist groups helped facilitate, 
corresponds generally with what Charles Taylor has called the processes of 
secularization in A Secular Age from 2007. Taylor proposes two helpful ways of 
understanding the complexity and un-linear development often referred to as 
secularization. On the one hand he introduces a chronological categorization of 
historically varying conditions of belief. On the other, he introduces ideological 
perceptions of the political community. As we shall see the two are overlapping 
in time, and are in constant flux. Together, these two categorizations might help 
deepen our understanding of the early Danish secularism.  
First of all, Taylor operates with three periods in succession pointing up to 
today; what he calls narratives of secularization. The first period, the Ancient 
Regime, ‘interwove church and state, and presented us as living in a hierarchical 
order, which had divine endorsement… This earlier, “ancient régime” form was 
connected to what one might call an “enchanted world”… the kingdom existed 
not only in ordinary, secular time, in which a strong transitivity rule held, but 
also existed in higher times.’ (Taylor, 2007: 446). We find this perception quite 
clearly in the quotes from the constitutional act of the absolute king.  
Succeeding this we find the Age of Mobilization, which according to Taylor 
lasted roughly between 1800-1950 (Taylor, 2007: 471), from which a ‘modern 
moral order’ was gradually instigated. Significantly, what was introduced was 
that each individual had equal access to a communal order and was not 
organically embedded into a hierarchical order (in a Danish context the political 
historian, Tim Knudsen, has called this ‘the rational-legal unification’, see 
Knudsen 2009: 95). This meant that social order now was ensured by inducing 
citizens ‘through the actions of governments, church hierarchies, and/or other 
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élites, not only to adopt new structures, but also to some extent to alter their 
social imaginaries, and sense of legitimacy, as well as their sense of what is 
crucially important in their lives or society’ (Taylor, 2007: 445). Likewise, this 
was also raised by Sanders who emphasized the importance of the peasant 
revival being not only religious, but to a high degree also political (see also 
Glædesmark, 1948: chapter II, Lindhardt, 1957 and 1967; Rasmussen, 2009: 
chapter III). Together with the rationalist state church pastors, they acted 
politically as they helped change the old conception of public authorities 
towards one of a common social contract, and one of freedom rights (Schjørring, 
2012: 448-455). What was new, however, was not a demand for public authority 
to be bound by law and rational purpose (the absolute monarchy was already 
influenced by German cameralism based on science and natural law; see 
Bregnsbo, 1997: 248-250; Lindenfeld, 1997: 11-20), but what constituted 
authority and for whom. As Denmark has never seen a violent revolution 
towards a liberal order, such as the Second French Revolution of 1830, it may 
make sense to view the transformation to a more liberal order as building on top 
of already existing state structures. With the new free constitution, the state 
apparatus and its power symbols (including the king) remained, but its subjects 
became citizens and the source of power shifted from the monarch to ‘the 
people’ (Schjørring, 2012: 461). 
At times, the fairly aggressive proselytizing and organization of large parts 
of the population by early and later revivalist movements affected the social 
secular order. Taylor points to two stages in this period: an early moral order of 
a providential strand in which the natural order has been put in place by God. 
Here social and moral order needs to mirror the Divine. Thus, state institutions 
were designed to realize a religiously and morally just society in accordance to 
God's will. The other was an independent moral order, which did not need any 
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reference to God. This was truly a modern moral order since state power now 
had to be founded on ‘the will of a people which had no need of some pre-
existing law to act as a people, but could see itself as the source of law’ (Taylor, 
2007: 198). I would argue that the period from the introduction of Enlightened 
ideas in political and theological thinking, over the revivalist counter-
movements to the first free constitution in 1849 and onwards, reflects exactly 
this development which Taylor points to. It is commonly stated that between the 
time of 1840-50 the state now became ‘divorced’ from the church in favor of the 
people. The people were the legitimate source of power in accordance with 
liberal constitutional principles, and with the higher times or a notion of a God-
given natural order.  
In addition, Taylor operates with a less chronological and more ideational 
categorization; that of the development of social imaginaries, transitioning from 
a ‘paleo-Durkheimian’ over a ‘neo-Durkheimian’ to a ‘post-Durkheimian’ social 
order. With Durkheimian, Taylor designates a society in which ‘the Church is 
that of the whole society, to which everyone must belong’ and therefore meaning 
that if the Church is both ‘the guardian and articulator’, the ‘church and social 
sacred are one’ (Taylor, 2007: 442). His point is that in the first two pre-modern 
social orders, the state and its associated power is ontologically dependent on 
God and higher times (and thus both Durkheimian in a loose sense). Whereas 
this contrasts with the paleo-type which ‘interwove church and state, presented 
us as living in a hierarchical order, which had divine endorsement’ (Taylor, 
2007: 446), the neo-type ‘the senses of belonging to a group and confession are 
fused, and the moral issues of the group's history tend to be codes in religious 
categories’ (Taylor, 2007: 458).  
It seems that the ideal-type of the paleo-Durkheimian dispensation 
corresponds in many ways to the unified Lutheran culture, with no formal 
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distinction between the state-church and the state as Glædesmark (1948) would 
argue. The neo-Durkheimian dispensation in its invocation of providential 
modern moral order of mutual benefit could be seen as equivalent to the 
multilutheran culture. Here different and competing denominations within the 
same strand of religious theology are the prevalent organization of public 
religious communities, even adhering to the same overall church organization. 
In such a society, moral order is providential and social order should correspond 
to God's design of nature. We recognize this in a quote from D. G. Monrad, the 
most prominent liberal politician and lead author of the first free constitution, 
when he forged his vision of an emerging liberal political order, by reference to 
‘the great economic law embedded in human social order by God’ (from Nevers, 
2013: 108). Here we see the idea of allowing society to mirror the natural order, 
in the Danish case, by letting the state ensure this on behalf of Christianity. 
Post-Durkheimian designates a social dispensation in which the ever-
increasing individualism now becomes completely unhooked from religion as 
‘the “sacred”, either religious or “laïque”, that has become uncoupled from our 
political allegiance’ (Taylor, 2007: 487). On the one hand the spiritual as such is 
no longer intrinsically related to society, and on the other the modern self when 
placed in such a fully immanent frame detached from transcendence for the sake 
of instrumental rationality, becomes existentially ‘buffered’ from any kind of 
meaning outside the mind (Taylor, 2007: 37-42, 542). It is this development of 
new social imaginaries which paved the way for the last chronological category, 
Taylor calls the Age of Authenticity in which expressivist ‘self-orientation seems 
to have become a mass phenomenon’ (Taylor, 2007: 473). 
Now, Taylor's point is that these ideational formations of social imaginaries 
are not necessarily bound to time but will vary in strength spatially and 
temporally. I utilize these Taylorian concepts in order to position early Danish 
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secularism in a macro-sociological context. Taylor’s perspective makes explicit 
that large parts of the political logic residing in a strong, ethically based 
principled distance secularism seem to be caught between two forms. The first is 
a neo-Durkheimian religiously defined political identity-mobilization. The 
second is a post-Durkheimian independent ethics of an immanent frame. I would 
argue Danish society to a wide extent could be characterized by these two 
dispensations today, which will also be a theme in the following chapters. The 
point here is ‘…not that our present day is unambiguously post-Durkheimian… 
Rather there is a struggle going on between these two dispensations. But it is 
just this, the availability of a post-Durkheimian dispensation, which destabilizes 
us and provokes the conflict’ (Taylor, 2007: 488). It is in this direction Danish 
secularism is constantly developing, and the reason why it seems to have such 
an ambiguous expression in the public discourse today.  
 
4.2.4. Ambiguous relations between the ancient regime and the modern order 
It is in this sense of transitioning from a paleo to a neo-Durkheimian imaginary, 
and thus from an Ancient Regime to an early modern one, that society 
experienced the Weberian disenchantment. This states that political identity and 
social imaginary had to find something other than religion as its constituting 
principle. We track back this ambiguous relation between enlightened ideas, and 
a providential order of natural law from the perspective of the ‘enlightened’ 
state church clerics, king and his court and advisors. They found that tolerance 
and reason were important ideals and did indeed grant fairly extensive 
concessions to some revivalist movements.  
As an example during the influence of the liberals A. P. Bernstorff and his 
successor A. Struensee, and even after the Palace Revolution in 1784, 
denominations dissenting from the state church were allowed in the form of 
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‘colonies’ within the kingdom. A community of the Moravian Church 
(Herrnhuters), were permitted to build the colony Christiansfeld within which 
full religious, educational and business freedom was granted along with a range 
of other concessions in 1773 (Thyssen, 1967: 37-42). But at the same time, 
social and religious separatist sentiments were considered dangerous after 
seeing the result of the extremist French revolutionists. A series of persecutions 
and trials targeted these movements in Denmark. One example was a series of 
revivalist groups between the late 18th century up until 1840, grouped under the 
common name ‘the strong Jutlanders’ (‘de stærke jyder’). They were inspired by 
pietism and thus differed from the state church teaching. There were many 
disputes, scuffles, trials and conflicts between the established church, its pastors 
and political supporters on one side, and the revivalist groupings on the other. 
They accused each other of false teachings, immorality and acting aberrant, and 
from this the revivalists were denied access to the communion table, heavily 
fined or imprisoned (Hegnsvad, 1967: 179-252).  
Some of this tension and political ambiguity of religious rights drew to a 
close after the period of around 1840's (Sanders, 1995: 64; Rasmussen, 2011: 
15). I will point to two important aspects here.  
The first is that even though the revivalists in a way disputed the unity of 
the social imaginary, the institutional unity of the state church (thus the 
religious and social unity of the population), was far from challenged. 
Nevertheless tension was created, but was handled by making the state church 
more accommodating (‘rummelig’). This strategy was quite characteristic of 
Danish politics, and reflected a general move in policies related to public religion 
in the first half of the 19th century. In the cracks emerging in the absolute 
monarchy, enlightened ideas of religious tolerance seemed to be deposited.  
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As an example, the king decided in 1840 that revivalists would no longer be 
legally prosecuted in order to accommodate demands of freedom of (Lutheran) 
conscience. By royal decree in 1841, Catholic priests were legally permitted to 
stay in the territory. While the revivalists were in fact Lutheran and even 
members of the state church, other dissenting religious communities were not 
legal. Nevertheless, they could be tolerated by king (at this time these were only 
the Reformed, Catholics and Jews – 0,4 percent of the population) (Rasmussen, 
2011: 16-17). The increased level of Lutheran accommodation and tolerance 
partially helped absorb the tension stemming from especially revivalists in the 
1840’s.  
In historical studies, the Baptists is especially pointed out for having never 
being absorbed into the unified Lutheran state culture, and thus turning into an 
increasingly strong symbol of the obsolete principles of absolute monarchy in an 
Enlightened time (Glædesmark, 1948: 70, Rasmussen, 2011: 23). The trouble 
with the Baptists was that they did not accept the Lutheran state church rules of 
child baptism. One reason for the latter might be that not only did they challenge 
the state church pastors' monopoly on exegesis as other revivalists did, but also 
challenged the very liturgical form of the sacraments. The problem was that the 
Baptists demanded something which the political system could simply not give 
them without itself changing: legal religious freedom. In this sense they became 
intrinsically linked to the wider push for an actual separation of religion and 
politics, but in a different way than the other revivalists.41 
                                               
 
 
41 Thus, in relation to the majority narrative, it is interesting to note that it has 
not historically been driven solely by the majority's political leaders, but also by 
the struggles of the ‘dissenting’ religious communities in the 19th century. This 
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The second aspect of the shift of importance in the period of 1840 was that 
the agrarian, layman revivalist movement lost momentum and slowly 
disappeared. Sanders argues that another kind of religious movement took over, 
which in large part shared a rejection of the rationalist theology and demand for 
increased freedom of preaching and dogmatic. Instead, they had a different 
outlook when it came to the relation between the state church and the state 
(Sanders, 1995). This movement primarily consisted of two main groups both 
insistent on reforming the established religion form within and not by 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
 
important aspect cannot be given as much attention as it may deserves in these 
limited pages, as I have chosen to focus primarily on the majority story. Of the 
most important instances of political struggles connected to the relation 
between the majority and religious minorities were the Jewish communities, the 
Catholic Church, the Methodist and the Baptist communities (see e.g. Møller, 
2012; Lausten, 2005; Rasmussen, 2009: 62-83, 169-194). Their cry for state 
recognition sparked debates between key political figures like A. S. Ørsted, D. G. 
Monrad, J. P. Mynster and N. F. S. Grundtvig on religious freedom, and whether 
the parliament or the government should deal with such matters. Could public 
social order be maintained with these new sects roaming the streets? Would 
Jews be allowed to take positions as judges? Could these communities refuse to 
baptize and confirm children? Could they build temples, churches and 
synagogues wherever they so wished? Such questions led to emotional and 
heated debates on freedom rights, state duties and public morality.  
However, suffice it to note at this point the gradual increase of religious 
tolerance and granting of freedom rights to religious minorities was a crucial 
part of the formative elements which led to the introduction of real religious 
freedom for all Danish citizens in 1849 (see also Rasmussen, 2009: 39-40) – a 
constitutive component of Danish secularism. But the strong repression, 
intolerance and violence these religious communities experienced in this 
century (and later) is also a tragic part of history. Thus, the increased presence 
of religious minorities and their struggle for recognition in the 19th century was 
a relevant historical context and instrumental for the development of the early 
Danish separation doctrine.  
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separating. One led by the hugely influential pastor, N. F. S. Grundtvig from 
around 1840 and another group, the Inner Mission from around 1860. What 
they shared was a theological concern of exploring the true form of Christian 
teaching and life not based on rationality. The Grundtvigians were especially 
concerned with the cultural and political cohesion of the people as well. These 
new movements continued the demand for greater religious tolerance and 
freedom of conscience, and from this perspective freedom of religion and 
consciousness was as important inside as outside the established church. 
However what is curious about this development of secularization is 
emphasized by the Danish bishop and scholar P. G. Lindthardt, who has pointed 
out how the early agrarian conventicles (later in addition the urban bourgeois 
class) were to a wide extent Lutheran Orthodox religiously, but politically 
liberal. In contrast, the official state clerics at the time were theologically liberal, 
but politically conservative (Lindhardt, 1967: 108-122). As he stated ‘in the time 
of pious gatherings pastors and peasants stood on opposite sides as different 
estates of the realm, each fighting for class interests in which economic, political, 
social and religious motives merges into one struggle’ (Lindhardt, 1951: 26). 
From a general perspective this development was driven by the gradual 
breakdown of a Lutheran conception of political power. This conception of the 
established power base was founded on the three estates of the realm: the 
clergy, the nobility and the commoners (see Bregnsbo, 1997: part II; Bayer, 
2008: 122).  
In this way the revivalist movements contributed to increasing the pressure 
of changing the political system toward a dawning representative government. 
This presented a struggle that the new nationalistic revivalist movements 
inherited and contributed to, even stronger both before and after the free 
constitution. The gradual transformation of a legally incompetent peasant 
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population, to the formation of an independent people made up of an increasing 
number of voting citizens (and the corresponding gradual dismantling of the 
powerbase of the absolute monarchy and the nobility system), was partly 
expedited by the pressure stemming from international developments in Europe 
and North America. Another influence was the agrarian reforms around the 
period of 1780, and the founding of a coherent national educational system (the 
Education Act of 1814). In interaction with these developments, the struggle by 
both the early agrarian and the later nationalistic revivalists played an 
important role in this process.  
Though the two new revivalist movements grew into the most important 
and dominating religious outlooks in the 19th century in Denmark, and thus 
contained the religious sentiments and potential conflicts within the national 
church, the liberal demands of religious freedom and some sort of distance 
between the church and the state had not been silenced. Through liberal 
theology, the reason-based distinction between the spiritual and the political 
realm had been introduced. Through the early revivalists, the individualistic 
faith and the demand for religious freedom had been pronounced, and through 
the later revivalists the agenda had been taken back to the established church. 
This was along with a concern for the production and reproduction of a coherent 
and self-conscious Danish people. 
When this free constitution was passed and the new system put into place, 
the new church-state regime was established. The paramount institutional 
expression of this regime was the new Folkekirke. With later modifications, the 
fundamental principles of church governance have been largely maintained up 
until today. As will be developed further in the following chapters, the political 
doctrine supporting this regime roughly builds on liberal notions of religious 
freedom and equality. This extended to any religious community, and a certain 
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distance between the state and the Folkekirke began to merge with a strong 
notion of an ethical political community.  
This separation doctrine constitutes a compromise between several 
political positions which were present in the political struggle in the decades up 
until 1849. In section 4.3. I will sketch out the components of three positions, 
which helps to deepen our understanding of the present-day secularism and 
further explain how it came about.  
However, in order to understand the principles of the Danish separation 
doctrine, we will need to take into account another child of the enlightenment – 
modern romanticism. I will therefore briefly discuss the role of the romantic 
notion of political community, since to great extent this was the cultural and 
philosophical horizon of much political thought in the beginning of the 19th 
century.  
 
4.2.5. Religion and the romantic people  
From former theoretical discussions of secularism, I found that secularism and 
political liberalism broadly conceived seem to overlap rather strongly in the 
academic literature. As pointed out above liberal ideas of freedom (for the press, 
religious groups, civil society, and personal freedom) were introduced in Danish 
politics around the middle of the 18th century (Korsgaard, 2008: 33). However 
due to the particular historical tradition, these ideas were introduced only 
partially and far slower than in some other countries. From around the period 
roughly from 1780-1850 this was not one of secularization in the sense of the 
disappearance of religion but of transformation of religion. Instead, religion was 
along the lines of a Lutheran social imaginary as an organizing principle, 
together with the absolutist monarch. Yet as early modernization began, religion 
related to societal order very differently.  
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From then, the nation or people took over as the organizing principle of 
society. From referring to only the absolute monarchs with their institutions and 
territories, the mid-18th century saw ‘nation’ and ‘people’ beginning to designate 
the broad population of the territory. This included peasant emancipation, mass 
mobilization and not to mention a shift from elite to folk culture (Breuilly, 2011: 
78-89). Thus many European countries in the mid-19th century saw nationality 
being put explicitly and centrally on the political agenda, particuarly in 
connection to notions like the nation and the people (Breuilly, 2011: 97; 
Korsgaard, 2008: 37).  
As Ove Korsgaard suggests this era of the nation saw at least two influential 
ideal-typical ways of connection the people and the state relevant to a Danish 
context. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) promoted a republican kind of 
nationalism connecting the French people with the state, separating the 
formation of the citizen from the formation of society. With Rousseau, the idea 
was introduced that it was the sovereign people who held the power qua the 
social contract (Korsgaard, 2008: 42). Also, Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-
1803) who influenced much of the German-speaking parts of Europe did not 
only believe that the people held the power of the state but in addition held an 
independent cultural identity, most identifiable through shared language 
(Østergård, 2006: 77-78). Here, the formation of the individual and society was 
deeply interwoven and became an organic product of history (Berlin, 1973: 12; 
Korsgaard, 2008: 30-31). With both Rousseau and Herder, this meant that ‘the 
people’ took the place of the church as the organizing principle for the secular 
state and in that respect, religion became opposite to the secular.  
I consider the part of secularization related to the people as absolutely 
critical to our understanding of what secularism actually is. Doctrines of 
secularism emerged to maintain social order by giving privilege to the civil 
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people to hold secular power and not religion. From this perspective, secularism 
is the ideological doctrine which corresponds to the sociological process of 
secularization. However, we should not forget that secularism does not merely 
separate religion from politics, but in fact produces the very perception of 
religion and the secular. Allow me briefly to expand upon this point.  
As discussed above, early secularization in Denmark was not so much a 
matter of a decline in religious activity and importance (on the contrary, church 
attendance grew during the second wave of the revivalists in end of the 19th 
century; Iversen, 2008: chapter 11). Secularization is more accurately 
understood as associated with a change in our social imaginary and pluralization 
of religious outlooks. As José Casanova established when discussing the different 
ideal-type distinctions of secularization as religious decline, privatization and 
differentiation, it is only the latter one that seemed to draw upon an empirically 
sound conclusion (Casanova, 1994). But at the same time, Casanova also raised 
the question of the very concept of religion. When we begin to question whether 
religion and religious practice in modern societies has risen or is in decline, we 
assume a certain meaning of religion. With Casanova I will let the definitional 
discussion rest here, but it is safe to say that ‘religion as a discursive reality, 
indeed as an abstract category and as a system of classification of reality, has 
become an undisputable global social fact’. Therefore for the purposes of my 
discussion, most importantly this fact ‘testifies to the global expansion of the 
modern secular, religious system of classification of reality the first emerged in 
the West’ (Casanova, 2012: 27). I wish to stress the latter part in particular, 
focusing on the modern secular-religious system, since it points to a 
development of the dichotomy religion-secular.  
As Colin Jager has argued, religion is not to be understood as a natural thing 
‘out there’, but instead should be understood in connection to the various crises 
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of authority which the transformation of early modernity produced (on such a 
‘radically social theory of religion’ Jager is not alone; see e.g. Asad, 2003: 25). 
The concept of religion ‘was invented to answer particular needs at a particular 
historical moment’, in post-reformation Europe where notions of ‘true religion’ 
and the ‘religion of others’ were needed in order to designate social identities 
(Jager, 2008: 797).42 The systematic, political response to this was secularism as 
developed in its different forms, see chapter 2.  
In other words, the invention of distinguishing the transcendent from the 
immanent order, religion from the secular, was the creation of Western, 
Christian inspired secularism (Taylor, 2009: 1146). It was this Neo-Durkheimian 
secularism which according to Taylor, later transformed into an immanent 
frame. Here, ‘”secular” refers to the institutions we really require to life in “this 
world” and “religious” or “ecclesial”, to optional extras that often disturb the 
course of this-worldly life… The goal of policy is often to abolish one while 
conserving the other.' (Taylor, 2009: 1147). As an important part of this 
argument, Taylor states that the concepts of religion, the secular and secularism 
were not only influenced by Enlightenment natural law and later liberalism and 
republicanism, but also influenced by romanticism. In particular, Taylor points to 
the Romantic protest against the human as separated from its inner nature (the 
post-Durkheimian expressionist turn is derived from this romantic critique, 
Taylor, 2007: 489-90), from its relation to nature, and most interestingly from 
human community (e.g. see Taylor, 2007: 315).  
                                               
 
 
42 The analytical point of ‘religion’ as an invention in a dialectic relation to ‘the 
secular’, is however silent on the question the ontological nature of the 
phenomena. It is merely intended as a conceptual historical claim. 
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Building on the above considerations, I wish to emphasize three main 
drivers of the development of a secular political sphere, distinguished from a 
religious one (i.e. secularization) which allowed for a doctrine of Danish 
secularism to emerge:  
 
1) The emergence of enlightenment-inspired liberal ideas. Theologically, in 
the form of rationalism in the state church, this instigated a conceptual 
difference between the church and the state and differed from the 
absolutist order. Politically, in the form of the demand for a constitution 
containing freedom rights, especially the freedom to depart from 
established religion.  
2) Revivalist groups while religiously orthodox had a politically liberal 
outlook, as they demanded religious liberties and pluralism in society. 
Here I should also mention the ‘dissenting’ religious communities and 
their struggle for recognition in Danish society. 
3) Ideas from romanticism, especially the emergence of romantic 
nationalism, or peoplehood replacing a "paleo-Durkheimian social 
order".  
 
I will elaborate briefly on the third point. To be sure, it was a Herderian romantic 
notion of the people which came to dominate the political discourse on 
nationality in Denmark (Korsgaard, 2008; Østergård, 2006; Vind, 1999: chapter 
2). In the time around the passing of the first free constitution of 1849, liberal 
rights were not dominating but only partially arriving on the scene (Østergård, 
2006: 76-91). There was also a strong influence of romanticism which affected 
science, theology, literature, philosophy and therefore developing a romantic 
notion of the individual and importantly had a spirited sense of community. 
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Romanticism claimed that religious and moral potentialities could not be fully 
captured by rationality and naturalist science, but instead should be discovered 
and cultivated through 'organic communities, that is, historically anchored, 
complex social groupings…' (Morrow, 2011: 39).  
Without going into further depth with the complex story of romantic idea's 
influence on the political thinking within this period in Denmark, I will limit 
myself to note that core ideas of religion, the individual and political community 
were not monopolized by liberalism. Rather, they were heavily influenced by 
romanticism as well. We should acknowledge that romanticism was not 
necessarily a tradition of thought in opposition to liberalism and republicanism. 
Often, it was the case that it influenced more than it functioned as an alternative 
political vision. Borrowing a formulation from Colin Jager, one could say that 
romanticism can be understood as either a nostalgic resistance to 
Enlightenment or rather as a critique of critique (2010). It is the latter which is 
the relevant notion of romanticism in this discussion.  
In this understanding, romanticism is a reaction to the intellectual 
dominance of enlightenment critique of the Ancient Regime in religious, legal, 
philosophical and political matters, but at the same time made concessions to 
the former. A good example pertaining to Denmark is the influential Prussian 
theologian Frederick Schleiermacher, who was not entirely in opposition to 
Enlightenment and scientism, but in dialogue with both liberalism and 
romanticism. Schleiermacher's project was to accommodate Protestant 
Christianity along with the critique of Enlightenment, and on the way his 
concepts of church and church politics became very influential on the political 
thinking in Denmark (Iversen, 2008, Lindthardt, 1967; Rasmussen, 2009; 
Friisberg, 2003). The revivalist movements were influenced by such German 
idealistic counter enlightenment in their theology, where it was the salvation of 
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the individual which was central and later spilled over into claims of individual 
right of religion. Of such romantic-influenced critique, one could mention the 
leading figure of the later nationalistic revivalists Grundtvig. He initiated the so-
called struggle of the church ('Kirkekampen') from the period around 1820 which 
had as a main target the liberal theology's critique of pietism and dogmatism by 
reference to reason and morality, see Grundtvig' protest publication called 
Retort of the Church Against Professor Theologiæ Dr. H. N. Clausen from 1825 
('Kirkens Gienmæle imod Professor Theologiæ Dr. H. N. Clausen', Grundtvig, 1904-
1909 [1825]). He believed these men of enlightenment in the state church were 
in danger of creating a new papal regime built on rationalism, with too great a 
distance to the living congregation (Schwarts Lausten, 2004: 221).  
To be sure, romanticism not only had an influential impact on the 
individual, but also an important relation to peoplehood. This notion was both in 
opposition to the Ancient Regime of paleo-Durkheimian subjects to the king, and 
partially in opposition to the citizenship of republicanism ignoring the 
importance of language, history, blood and soil (Breuilly, 2011: 88-97; Wilson, 
2011: 29). According to Jeppe Nevers, when the notion of a people as a political 
concept in Denmark went from being conceptually associated with Lutheran 
estates of the realm, to be associated with the romantic idea of the people as an 
organism, the romantic interpretation went in two directions (Nevers, 2011: 
120-7). The first was a notion in which the people did not hold any autonomy, 
but instead held a will that its father figure, the absolute monarch, could consult. 
This is what Friisberg has identified as romanticism understood as the assertive 
harmonization of the Biedermeier culture, which connoted conservative ideas of 
legitimizing the absolute regime (Friisberg, 2003: 100).  
But the other notion tradition of romanticism went with the direction of a 
Herdian notion of the Volk, and society as an organism. This was seen more as a 
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corrective or critique of the liberal critique of absolutism, rather than simple 
nostalgia or refusal of enlightened republicanism. What we might call Herdian 
republicanism would perhaps better today be recognized as romantic 
nationalism or even national-liberalism (see Friisberg, 2003). National-
liberalism was one way of conveying a romantic critique, trying to maintain 
certain liberal principles of freedom (see also Nevers, 2013: 103). Important 
founding fathers to the new state system of 1849 such as N.F.S: Grundtvig, D.G. 
Monrad, Orla Lehmann A.S. Ørsted and H.N. Clausen were all influenced by the 
new current of liberal ideas, but at the same time persuaded by romantic notions 
of the people, the church and the individual (Friisberg, 2003: chapter 8 and 12; 
Vind, 1999: chapter 2). According to Friisberg, romanticism functioned for many 
artists, politicians and intellectuals as some kind of ideational curtailment of the 
violent and abrupt societal changes, which Rosseausian republican ideals 
potentially could result in (Friisberg, 2003: 68-69).  
Romanticism was a way to mobilize people to become a free liberal people, 
and thus can be seen a prism through which liberal ideas shone. In particular, 
the idea of the organic continuation (from the Ancient Regime to an increasingly 
individualized and immanent frame) of a unique and intrinsically valuable 
national character, language and religion which Herder and other German 
romantics like Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) and Friedrich Wilhelm 
Joseph Schelling (1775-1854) conveyed. This was important in the articulation 
of a correction of both the Rousseauean people, and the absolutist subjects 
(Friisberg, 2003: 86; Morrow, 2011; Jager, 2008 and 2010; Berlin,1973). 
According to Friisberg, this organic idea of the people was related to the 
romantic notion of what he calls ‘the optimistic dualism’ (Friisberg, 2003: 102). 
It was a Hegelian idea of the Godly Supreme's appearance in the 
phenomenological world and the dialectical movement from subjective 
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realization in the human, to the objective realization in the state towards higher 
stages of the world soul. Not only do human beings have access to this Godly 
Supreme through its representation in worldly phenomena, but this world is 
valuable because it has part in the Godly Supreme not unlike Taylor's 
providential neo-Durkheimian order (Hegel and romanticism, see Taylor, 2007: 
e.g. 315 or 541).  
For example the Danish scientist and romantic Hans Christian Ørsted 
(1777-1851) believed that it was the purpose of scientists to refine and 
enlighten the common people through reason and Godly Truth, in order to 
realize the true soul of the people ('folkeånden'). Only then could the common 
people be granted political rights like the intellectual elite (Friisberg, 2003: 99). 
As was common at the time, Ørsted evoked a nationalistic Herderian notion of 
the Danish people in combination with a Hegelian idealistic belief that we can 
build society to mirror a Godly Supreme design. Or in other words, promoting 
individualism in opposition to the Ancient Regime, but refuted the opposition 
between the individual and the community or people, which radical 
republicanism would have.  
What might be called ‘political romanticism’ back then, was characterized 
by being critical towards potentially revolutionary Enlightenment ideas as 
witnessed in revolutionary France. Yet at the same time, being susceptible to 
certain liberal principles and opposing the absolutist regime of status quo. I thus 
wish to propose that Danish secularism sprang from not only traditional 
absolutist Lutheranism and liberal principles of liberty from the enlightenment, 
but in addition from a romantic notion of political community. The Folkekirke 
which was established with the 1849 constitution seemed to combine these 
three influences, and the following will explain how such a doctrine might have 
been configured.  
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4.3. Outlining three major positions on religion and politics 
In the research of this period, I have not found reason to believe that the 
fundamental question of the relation of religion and politics concerned the 
Danish political public for extended stretches of time. As an example, the 
question of a church constitution granting the church a certain amount of formal 
autonomy and freedom from the state, which originated at least since Pufendorf 
started to be read in late 17th century Denmark, never really surfaced to the 
political agenda before this time, which was around the system change of March 
1848 (Glædesmark, 1948: 130). 
The conclusion seemed to be that the realization of religious freedom, with 
an actual institutional expression in a church constitution was not conceivable 
before political freedom was introduced, i.e. the abolishment of the absolute 
monarchy in favor of a representative, constitutional monarchy. As Rasmussen 
writes, ‘Religious freedom belonged to the personal freedoms and was not as 
salient in the debate as the political freedoms in the period around 1840. It was 
in the air that religious freedom was a part of the general freedom rights, which 
would follow from a free constitution’ (Rasmussen, 2011: 21). By the same 
token, after the free constitution of 1849 the organic social order of church and 
state had to be dissolved. In the interpretive report from the constitutional 
committee, it was established that the state church of the absolute monarchy 
‘has to be abandoned in a constitution which acknowledge the principle of 
religious freedom’ (Grundlovscomiteen, 1848: book II: 1481). 
But as 99.9 percent of the Danish population were members of the Lutheran 
state church (now the Folkekirke), the founding constitutional assembly did not 
spend time defining the new church institution (Rasmussen, 2011: 11). There 
were more pressing political problems to be solved. The details of church 
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governance and the general relation between public religion and the state had to 
be settled in parliament by law, and not in the constitution. As is clearly stated 
by the constitutional committee of 1848-49, the intentions of the promissory 
clauses for a constitution of the Folkekirke and special acts for dissenting 
religious bodies (article 66 and 69 in the current constitution, respectively) was 
not to revolutionize but to develop the national church in accordance with the 
newfound freedom rights. ‘…further arrangement has to be solved by future 
state legislation. There has been a transitional framework in mind, which would 
not pose any drastic breach [with the state church], while still allowing free 
development’ (Grundlovscomiteen, 1848: book II: 1481). 
A coherent discussion of the principle relationship between the state and 
the church (represented in the question of a church constitution), except the 
relation between religion and politics as was intended by the founding assembly, 
was never really explored in depth by public debate or in the parliament 
(Glædesmark, 1948: chapter VIII). The discussion lingered in the background. 
Although heated debates emerged especially between theologians on how to 
reform the state church from 1820 and how this influenced the general debate, 
political considerations in the two parliamentary chambers were removed from 
the agenda in the form of two failed church commissions in 1853 and 1868 
(Rasmussen, 2011: 229-231). Instead, the basic state church structure was 
extended until a church constitution was passed (which never happened), and 
different governments tried to satisfy varying demands of religious freedom 
within the old institution by sporadic ad hoc amendments. For example release 
from the obligation to avail oneself exclusively of the services of the incumbent 
of the parish (1855), or the democratization of the parishes (1903) which was 
the first place where women were given full franchise in Danish society 
(Glædesmark, 1948: 518). As such, the gradual effort to widen religious 
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tolerance and accommodation within the old regime continued in the new 
regime. It has even been argued that these liberal ad hoc amendments through 
the end of the 19th century and into the 20th, in effect removed the pressure to 
bring about the constitution (Glædesmark, 1948: 518).  
However, because we never witnessed a principled political debate on the 
formal settlement of church governance in particular, we saw only few explicit 
considerations from the parliamentary debates on this liberal neo-Durkheimian 
social order. Inspired by two church historians half a century a part, 
Glædesmark (1948) and Rasmussen (2009 and 2011) I would thus argue that 
we might get the best idea of the dominant positions on the political thinking of 
separation by paying attention to three major positions. These are represented 
by three major political figures in the public debates in the first half of the 19th 
century; not political ideologies, but compounded views bringing several 
political principles together from monarchism, romanticism, liberalism and 
natural law.  
These ideal-typical positions all related to the inevitable passing of the first 
free constitution in 1849, where minimalistic legal scaffolding was created to 
define the established church. Before we turn to the church models however, let 
us therefore briefly stress some features of the new Folkekirke, which the 
founding constitutional gathering created (Based on Grundlovscomiteen, 1948, 
see also Glædesmark, 1948: chapter VII): 
 It was considered a vital institution in Denmark with a special bond to the 
people and the state. As such, it was established and supported by the 
state. 
 Following the status of establishment, it was considered an independent 
entity from the state which should have its own constitution. 
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 It was a church for the majority of the people (as it was stated in article 2 
in the draft of the constitution, but taken out because the committee found 
such a formulation too obvious, see Grundlovscomiteen, 1948: book II: 
1533; Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2006: 137). 
 It was a church different from the absolute monarchy's state church, 
especially because the principle of religious freedom now had priority. 
Still, it would continue most of the old traditions. 
 It was a church defined as Evangelical Lutheran.  
 
Thus, the constitution took the first steps towards formalizing the relationship 
between public religion in general, and the state.  
Putting this minimalistic definition aside, it was clear that further definition 
of this general relationship was needed if a church constitution was to be 
passed. Many central questions were left to be decided: should the Folkekirke be 
able to decide for itself, and based on what issues? Only theology or also 
economy? How should it be organized? Does the church hold its own property, 
or does it belong to the state? How should the inner affairs of the church be 
defined and should the state have the right to interfere here as well?  
These questions were the concern of the time around 1849, and as we will 
see in chapter 6 they are very much alive and unsettled today. 
It is interesting and quite characteristic for the Danish separation doctrine, 
that in spite of universal principles like religious freedom and tolerance, 
secularity in politics has a fairly strong presence. Importantly, the question of 
settling the relationship between the Folkekirke and the state is often 
considered independent of the same question pertaining to the rest of society. 
When reading the constitutional discussions, there can be no doubt that a 
dominating view amongst the founding fathers was that the Evangelical 
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Lutheran church was more important than other religions and should be treated 
in the constitution accordingly.43 And it is in this light, that the three dominating 
church models are to be seen. With Freeden's terminology we could say, that it is 
a cultural limitation to an ideological concept's logical structure.  
The argument for overriding the principle of religious equality does not 
seem to be that it is more true or morally proper (at least not in the political 
sphere), but instead that it is the will of the people. Even though much of the 
discussions were strongly influenced by natural law ideas, this was exactly what 
Pufendorf was against. ‘It cannot be deny’d, but that some have cunningly 
abused Religion, for obtaining their Ends in the State. But, Religion in it self 
considered, Is not made subordinate to the State, or to be deem’d a proper 
Instrument to serve a States Turn, and to keep the People in Obedience. And, 
when Religion is called, Vinculum Societatis Civilis, The Cement of Civil 
Society, it must be taken in this Sense; That if all Religion and Regard, which 
ought to be had to God’s displeasure, were abolished, there would be no Tie left, 
strong enough to oblige Mankind to a compliance with those Laws and 
fundamental Constitutions’ (Pufendorf, 2002: §5).  
However, in Danish politics in the middle of the 19th century the cohesion 
(and survival) of the Danish people was a very real and vital concern. In the 
beginning of this century, Denmark went from being a multinational mid-sized 
power in Northern Europe to a single-nation-state hardly surviving, but with 
sovereignty maintained due to other great power's strategic interests 
                                               
 
 
43 This also appear to be the case for discussion within the influential 
Constitutional Committee appointed by the Constitutional Assembly 1848-1849, 
who prepared the draft Constitution (see Rasmussen, 2013).  
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(Østergård, 2006: 70). Because of this, the ideas of international liberalism from 
the 18th century became instead strongly associated with nationalism 
(Østergård, 2006: 69). Significantly, the constitution of 1849 was in the middle 
of this painful territorial and power reduction.  
During these years there was a strong sense that if they were to remove the 
cement of the fragile house in the name of blind ideals, it would all fall apart. 
Rather, the liberal principles of freedom and natural law-principles of separation 
were not neutral principles pertaining to all citizens, but to the Danish people. 
And the Danish people were Evangelical Lutheran.  
Even though state and church became two different institutions with the 
new constitution of 1849, the people and the church were not separated on the 
level of political identity. Rather, when the national-liberal movement started to 
dominate the political landscape, we saw that the national question (in German 
Volk, in Danish folk) became coupled with a range of state institutions: the 
national parliament (‘Folketinget’, 1849), the national school system 
(‘Folkeskolen’, 1814), the folk high schools (‘folkehøjskolerne’, 1844) and the 
national church (‘Folkekirken’, 1842) (Korsgaard, 2004: 2010; Nevers, 2011: 
120; Glædesmark, 1948: 245). All these institutions are strong and alive to this 
day.  
From the soil of national romanticism, a particular Danish separation 
doctrine took nourishment from Enlightenment liberal ideas of individualized 
freedom rights, and natural law ideas of separation of church and state. 
Embedded in Danish secularism, we find a repertoire of ideas which have 
influenced Danish political thinking and which are still in play today.  
In the forthcoming final section in this chapter, I will present three ideal-
typical positions of church models. I will argue that current discourses of Danish 
secularism are influenced by a political tradition, merging the three in different 
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degrees in different periods. At the same time, it is important to stress that none 
of the church models I present below were ever realized, and as such should 
rather be considered ideal-typical. The governments after 1849 never seriously 
proposed a constitution to formally establish the relationship between the state 
and the church, partly because there was a lack of strong public demand for it 
and partly because of polarization between the clerics of the Folkekirke 
(Rasmussen, 2011). The incompatibility of these ecclesiastical polarizations (or 
church models), was threatening the one thing the parliament did not want in a 
time of revolutions and wars in Europe: to create divisions in the Evangelical 
Lutheran church, and as a consequence in the people.  
 
4.3.1. Three ideal-typical positions of church models 
 
The three models can be summarized in figure 4 below inspired by Glædesmark 
and Rasmussen:44 
 
                                               
 
 
44 The church historian Anders Holm published short article in 2012, in which he 
similarly identified three church models based on the works of Glædesmark and 
Rasmussen (see Holm, 2012). For a more detailed comparison between 
Grundtvig, Mynster and Clausen's different theological justifications for church 
models, see Andersen, 2012.  
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The point is to illustrate how the Danish doctrine can be considered a product of 
all three positions, and to stress their similarities and differences. I will consider 
them one at a time, paying special attention to their view on what the Folkekirke 
is, on church governance by the state, and on self-governance in the church.  
The first position I call the State Church Model and is represented by the 
theologian and politician Jacob Peter Mynster (1775-1854), who together with 
the influential bishop Hans Lassen Martensen (1808-1884) constituted a wing in 
these debates. As one of the leading figures in both politics and not least in the 
church, Mynster was one of the most influential individuals of his time on the 
matter of religion and politics. He was the absolute monarch's personal 
confessor and advisor, bishop and royal deputy in the constitutional assembly. 
Supporters of the old regime of the state church saw Mynster as a central 
supporter, and as such he was considered a political conservative supporting the 
king's regime. He did not appreciate anything that could threaten this order (in 
casu Clausen's liberalism or Grundtvig's revivalism). In a way he took a middle-
position, and wanted to maintain the church intact through the transition phase 
from the ancient regime to the new one. According to Rasmussen, Mynster's 
project was to ensure the survival of the unity of the state church passing into 
State Church Model 
(represented by J. P. 
Mynster) 
 
Independent Church Model 
(represented by H. N. 
Clausen) 
 
Civil Church Model 
(represented by F. S. N. 
Grundtvig) 
THE DANISH SEPARATION 
Figure 4. Three ideal-typical positions of church models 
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the new regime (Rasmussen, 1999: 27-29). In many respects it was Mynster's 
church model which continued its existence after the 1849 constitution 
(Rasmussen, 1999: 120). He essentially represents the model of the state church.  
First, from the perspective of this model the Folkekirke is considered a state 
institution (‘anstalt’), similar to the ancient regime's state church, and thus not 
independent from state power (Glædesmark, 1948: 252-259, Rasmussen, 2011: 
81-85). This concept is taken from Prussian ecclesiastical law where it signifies a 
natural law-based distinction between the internal and external affairs of the 
church, inspired by Pufendorf. As natural law makes a distinction between 
church and state, it is the latter which holds the supreme power in all worldly 
affairs, including the church institution. This view is to be understood in contrast 
to the church as an autonomous corporation (‘korporation’), independent from 
the state (see the Independent Church Model below).  
Mynster regarded the state, the people and the country as a whole as 
Christian, and the church tradition is what guarantees this. Because the welfare 
and cohesion of the people is of vital importance, it is considered a state 
responsibility. Mynster's points out in his speech in the constitutional committee 
in 1848: ‘…the people has been united in one religion; we can say “the people” 
because we mean those belonging to the majority of the population… who 
profess this religion, the Evangelical Lutheran religion, which is rooted in the 
foundation of the people, which has taken root over centuries; It is this religion 
which has the right to demand further upkeep; Therefore it shall not be 
equalized with other religions’ (Mynster, 1848: 1568). In this quote, we clearly 
see the state church logic of the uniform Lutheran culture.  
Secondly the intimate link between God, King and Country (the state 
church, state power and the people) point towards that it should not be the 
parliament who governs the church, but the king or his representative in the 
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Rigsdag (Koch, 1944:135-136).45 This is also related to Mynster, and the State 
Church Model's view on freedom of religion which was only reluctantly accepted 
in the new regime. The Reformed, the Jews and especially the Catholic's public 
behavior and influence could not be trusted with full civil and political rights. As 
Mynster argued ‘We cannot deny that it would be inadvisable to grant all foreign 
followers of religion the same rights such as interfering in the governance of the 
state, since those taking part of the executive and legislative power should be 
entirely merged with the people.’ (Mynster, 1848: 2544). This is also the reason 
why the King must belong to the religion of the people. The greatest fear would 
be to have a Monarch, a head of state, a Catholic and thus not answering to the 
Danish people but instead to the Catholic Church. The State Church Model sees 
the obligation of the head of state to be member of the Folkekirke (i.e. 
Evangelical Lutheran Protestantism), as critical to the preservation of the very 
foundation of the Danish state (Rasmussen, 2009: 221-222).  
Finally, the State Church Model is clearly against any arrangements giving 
the church institution the ability to self-govern. The reason here is on the one 
hand because of the model's strong emphasis on being able to accommodate all 
Evangelical Lutheran fractions within one institution (‘rummelighed’). If all 
denominations in this multilutheran church were to fight over the inner affairs 
of the church, it could lead to the breakup of the unified Lutheran culture so 
important for the Danish people (Rasmussen, 1999: 117). On the other hand 
                                               
 
 
45 The old bicameral parliament called Rigsdagen, which after the 1849 
constitution consisted of a lower house, Folketinget, and a upper house, 
Landstinget. With the newest and still existing constitution of 1953, Rigsdagen 
became replaced with a unified national parliament, Folketinget (see Thorsøe, 
1919; Knudsen, 2009: 185-187).  
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however, self-governance could endanger the freedom of conscience which the 
state church could guarantee. Since the church and the state are under one 
order, and they condition the existence of the people, it does not make sense to 
excommunicate members or use force within the church (Rasmussen, 1999: 
119). Instead for Mynster, religious tolerance means that all individuals (not 
groups or sects) should have an equal place in the accommodative state church, 
just as they should have an equal place in the state.  
The second model can be identified as the Independent Church Model, and 
was centered around the liberal theologian and politician Henrik Nicolai Clausen 
(1793-1877), along with Ditlev Gothard Monrad (1811-1887) and Johan Nicolai 
Madvig (1804-1886). Clausen was associated with rationalist and liberal 
theology, as well as being one of the central figures in the early national-liberal 
political movement. As mentioned above, the rationalist theology was influenced 
by Enlightenment ideals and dominated the church from the middle of the 17th 
century, right up until around 1820 after which it slowly abated. However, the 
liberal idea of a church model granting a great degree of independence to the 
church was an important perspective in the decades to come. In general, Clausen 
and this model represented a protest against the absolute monarch and the 
governance of religiosity.  
The first aspect of this model is that it differs from the former by regarding 
the Folkekirke not as a state institution, but as a corporation. In the polemical 
and much discussed book published in 1825, The Church Constitution, Rites and 
Dogma of Catholicism and Protestantism (‘Protestantismens og Catholicismens 
Kirkeforfatning, Lære og Ritus’), Clausen argued that one of the defining 
characteristics of a Protestant understanding of the church was it should be 
against ‘the clerical monarchy in which the leading head of the church is 
celebrated as Christi Vicarius’ (Clausen, 1825: 239; Rasmussen, 2009: 112). This 
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was of course not only targeting the Catholics, but also the order of the Danish 
monarchical ancient regime. The book itself was inspired by Prussian 
reformism, and also including Frederick Schleiermacher's Dogmatics and On 
Religion (Rasmussen, 2009: 104-06). In these works the organic church notion is 
introduced, where the church is arranged by a Presbyterian synodal 
constitution. Here, the church and state are seen as two completely separate 
organisms in the so-called Presbyterian-Synod system. In this sense it promoted 
a fairly strong notion of religious freedom, even for an established church. While 
Clausen explicitly drew on Schleiermacher's works, he did not go all the way 
with institutional and legal separation but saw instead the need to write a 
church constitution defining it as an independent corporation within a Christian 
state (Holm, 2012: 17). Therefore Rasmussen has argued that Clausen to a 
higher degree depended on ideas taken from natural law (Rasmussen, 2009: 
115). Nonetheless, there can be no doubt that this church model puts a clear 
emphasis on the church as something functioning independently from the state, 
and should therefore be protected by a church constitution. This at least goes 
further than what Pufendorf imagined with the two spheres of jus circa sacra 
(external affairs), and jus sacrorum (internal affairs). I would argue that the 
Independent Church Model has more to do with protecting a liberal (and 
reformed) principle of religious freedom (from the state), rather than the model 
adhering to natural law. 
Of course, this spills over into the second aspect of the model regarding the 
governance of the church by the state. Even though Clausen did not imagine a 
complete separation of church and state, he did imagine that the state only had 
the responsibility to manage and supervise the church's property, capital and 
that the clerics complied with the church constitution (Rasmussen, 2011: 83). 
According to Clausen, this hands-off approach to Prussian inspired church 
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governance by the state should be obvious: ‘The state will learn to understand 
itself, its own interest and its relation to the church and it will know that to 
injure the church is to insult the Divine, and it will work against itself’ (Clausen, 
1825: 280).  
The final aspect pertains to the self-governance of the church, in which this 
model has a clear difference between the two others. According to the 
Presbyterian-synod system, each church would have a local consistory with 
several levels of representative organs all the way up to a national synod 
(Clausen, 1825: 254, 275; Rasmussen, 1999: 191-192). Contrasting with the 
State Church Model, for Clausen and similar likeminded individuals the 
foundation of the church was the parish or local councils and the clerics, not the 
state. The purpose of such a representative form of church self-governance was 
to create an active religious society protected from the secular, political state 
power. The idea of a church synod was introduced by Clausen in 1825 and 
represented at the constitutional assembly through the national-liberal Monrad 
(who wrote the draft of the constitution and thus exercised a major influence of 
the wording and intentions). This had a fairly strong presence in the time 
around 1849, and Glædesmark even suggests that it was the dominating view of 
the first assembly (Glædesmark, 1948: 259)  
The third model is what I call the Civil Church Model, and can be identified 
with the romantic conservatism around the cultural trailblazer in Danish 
history, the poet, theologian and politician, Nikolaj Frederik Severin Grundtvig 
(1783-1872). As is the case for both Mynster and Clausen, their political 
statements and views changed somewhat and refined from the beginning of the 
century until after the system's change. But the church models reconstruction 
here represents ideal-types, and the same can be said about Grundtvig. Though 
he is generally best known for his cultural, literate and Christian-theological 
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constitutions, he and his followers (known as the Grundtvigians) in fact 
represent an interesting third church model which had significant influence as 
well. Grundtvig's vision contains elements of the two other models, with 
Clausen's strong emphasis on freedom of conscience and religion, and Mynster's 
emphasis on the accommodative Folkekirke. At the same time the civil church 
model is radically different from the two others, as he envisions a non-
denominational civil church, what he himself calls a ‘free state church’ 
(Grundtvig, 1834: pp. 336).  
The first aspect of the civil church model is that Grundtvig did not see the 
Folkekirke as a state institution, but as a neutral framework for religion without 
state restrictions on marriage, which parish to belong to, as well as freedom to 
preach and other freedom rights. Grundtvig was not necessarily against the 
monarchy (Rasmussen, 1999: 204), but he had an ambivalent relationship to the 
state church as it could not provide him with the degrees of dogmatic freedom 
he longed for (Rasmussen, 2009: 160-161). As such Grundtvig preferred the 
continuation of the historical church as part of the state, based on the two 
kingdoms doctrine as theorized in natural law – a state church. However, it 
should only exist in the form of an undenominational and free arrangement.  
The second aspect concerns Grundtvig's view on state governance of the 
church. He strongly criticized Clausen's ideas of a synod and a constitution, 
which he believed would result in hierocracy and no freedom of religion within 
the church. Grundtvig, who was one of the strongest advocates of religious 
freedom (and possibly one of the first in a Danish political context, see 
Rasmussen, 2009: 160), believed that what needed to be guaranteed (and 
protected) was release from the obligation to avail oneself exclusively of the 
services of the incumbent of the parish (‘sognebåndsløsning’). This also included 
the possibility to form a congregation by the voluntary union of a certain 
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number of members of the Folkekirke (‘valgmeninghed’), and dogmatic freedom 
for the pastors (Iversen, 2008: 127-128). He generally believed that the state 
church arrangement could guarantee these religious freedoms as he had 
observed citizens enjoy in England and ‘North-America’ (whilst he several times 
threatened to leave the established church if these freedoms were not actively 
put in place by the state) (see e.g. Grundtvig, 1834: 345).  
Nevertheless, what makes the Civil Church Model particularly interesting is 
the third aspect on self-governance in the church. Though Grundtvig celebrated 
the principle of an accommodative church as Mynster did, he did not support the 
dogmatic uniformity of the Evangelical Lutheran state church (they were not 
compatible with the above religious freedoms he wanted). Instead, he 
prioritized freedom with its connection to diversity. In practice, this meant to 
construct a religiously neutral state church institution (non-denominational) as 
a legal framework to contain all religious communities within. Grundtvig 
believed that only an arrangement like a state church without a self-governing 
body combined with the state (i.e. the King) as the head of the church, would 
make possible the intended degree of religious accommodation in civil church. 
He imagined religious communities such as Evangelical Lutherans, Calvinists, 
Catholics, Jews and Quakers all to be included in the free state church 
(Grundtvig, 1834). In the Speech to the People's Council on Danish Church 
Freedom from 1839, he even imagined this vision of an undenominational state 
church to contain any denomination be they ‘Christian, Jewish, Turkish or 
Heathen.’ (Grundvig as quoted in Rasmussen, 2009: 163).  
This rather unusual church model is most clearly described in the polemic 
pamphlet The Danish State Church Impartially Considered (Grundtvig, 1834), and 
is even radicalized after 1855 (Rasmussen, 2009: 28). In this pamphlet he 
proposes a state church functioning simply as a neutral civil legal framework, 
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where he imagined all sorts of confessions to practice within with considerable 
freedom and independence. 
Grundtvig used the expression Ancestral Belief (‘Fædrene-Troen’, e.g. 
Grundtvig, 1834: 321), which sounds similar to a Hegelian notion of the soul of 
the people which was a popular idea amongst the national-liberals (Friisberg, 
2003; Ole Vind even terms it Grundvig's biblical nationalism, see Vind 1999: 
461-474, or Lindhardt who argued that Grundtvig saw the church as a worldly 
or even state governed entity, but that he saw the Danish people in a religious 
perspective under the a new covenant, as a historical parallel to Israel under the 
old covenant, 1967: 112). He sees this as a spiritual and original source of the 
people, and something which should be cultivated. It is a bit unclear how this 
idea relates to Grundtvig's idea of the civil church and Christian church.  
Like Mynster he believed in the necessity of the State Church-like 
institution within society. What it does tell us, however, is that Grundtvig and his 
followers distinguished between a civic and a Christian identity, or even 
between Danish peoplehood and Danish Christians. When Grundtvig and his 
followers used a famous but ambiguous catchphrase from one of his psalms ‘first 
a human, then a Christian/this is but the order of life…’ (‘Menneske først og 
Christen saa/ Kun det er Livets Orden…’; Grundtvig , 1944-1956 [1837]), it can be 
argued that he not only distinguished between the rights and duties of secular 
human beings on the one hand, and the spiritual call for the Christian believer on 
the other. Also, Grundtvig connected the two spheres of human duties. The 
political agenda of this catchphrase could, perhaps, be reformulated into ‘first a 
people, then a Christian’. The reason for this is Grundtvig's strong sense that the 
human being procures its potential in connection with its involvement in the 
people. Where the people are, there the church shall be. Where the nation is, 
there the state shall be.  
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The realization Grundtvig envisioned for Civil Church Model of course 
never came. But it did inspire reforms within the existing institutional regime, as 
mentioned above.46 As an example, in the literature he is generally accredited for 
pushing through a law allowing for congregations formed by the voluntary 
union of a certain number of members of the Established Church.47 
 
4.4. Concluding remarks 
With figure 4 and the following brief reconstruction of the church models, I 
propose that the early roots of Danish secularism can be understood as a 
doctrine whose historical source emanates from at least these three positions. 
Each represents slightly different ideas of how the proper relationship between 
the church and the state should be, and all have a corresponding vision of which 
kind of social imaginary should constitute the political order.  
                                               
 
 
46 Nevertheless, Grundvig and the Grundvigians' notion of the civil church and 
the Folkekirke's close relation to civil society did survive. For example the 
influential pastor and author, Morten Pontoppidan, who in many senses was a 
heir to the civil church idea, worked to promote an as accommodative and open 
established church as possible, calling it ‘Christianity of the parishes’ 
(‘sognekristendom’), See for example his article The Folkekirke as a ‘civil 
arrangement’ from 1901 (in Pontoppidan, 1914: 60-65).  
47 In fact, he is accredited for much in Danish political discourse, and often 
functions as a mythical founding figure for the Folkekirke, the Welfare state, 
large parts of the Danish education system, the protection of Danish culture etc. 
For a recent English language introduction to Grundtvig as a political thinker, 
see Korsgaard, 2014: especially chapter 7; the PhD thesis on the usage of 
Grundtvig in today's political discourse, Larsen, 2012: chapter 3 and 9, and the 
recent anthology about the social theory of Grundtvig (Korsgaard and Schelde 
(eds.), 2013). 
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In addition this historical analysis of the early ideas of separation shows 
that the majority story of Danish secularism and peoplehood is far from singular 
in meaning and interpretations, even in a time when the tiny nation-state of 
Denmark at the end of the 19th century had 99 percent of its citizens within the 
same church.48  
The question of formalizing the relationship between the state and religion 
have only seriously been discussed in the period around 1820, up until the last 
church commission in 1868, from which I have drawn my material. Danish 
secularism developed in response to the need for formalization of the new 
regime, and the accommodation of revivalist churches both from the inside (e.g. 
the Grundtvigian movement) and outside (e.g. the Baptists) the established 
church. The resulting doctrine has been one of relative consensus on the formal 
relationship, and one of further democratization.  
In that connection I found that it was the increasing demand of religious 
freedom which ultimately caused cracks in the old construction of the state 
                                               
 
 
48 This multiple perspectives approach finds an interesting parallel in the legal 
debates surrounding ecclesiastical law in Denmark. As Lisbet Christoffersen has 
argued the Folkekirke as a legal institution cannot be described only as a state 
institution subjected to public law (Christoffersen, 1998: 42-47). She argued that 
we must also legally describe the Folkekirke from a civil society approach 
(stressing autonomy from the state and voluntariness as a religious community) 
and a marked-oriented approach (based on a contract of supply of services and 
state demands and quality evaluation). She argues we must consider the legal 
perspectives on the Folkekirke of the state, marked and civil society together. 
This theoretical legal model pertaining to the current description is interesting 
as it hold obvious similarities with my reconstructed historical and ideal-typical 
church models, as well as the reconstructed Danish secularism developed in the 
following chapters. 
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church. This demand had Grundtvig as one of the most important 
spokespersons, but also the revivalist movements and the dissenting religious 
communities. Thus, the rebellion against the old system was indeed a religious 
rebellion. In that sense, it was a rebellion not against religion but against the 
state church.  
What will be evident in Chapters 5 and 6 is that we can recognize the logics 
of the old church models in political rhetoric today. For example the need for the 
church to be better aligned with the people (‘folkelighed’), or to be more 
accommodating (‘rummelig’). In the time after the free constitution of 1849, 
these three positions gradually stabilized into one ideological doctrine 
decontesting the premise for or against the established church (that is, formal 
separation). Instead, the doctrine allowed for varied ways on how to arrange the 
church (and indirectly, the dissenting religious communities).  
While the historical reconstruction of major influences of Danish secularism 
can lend colors to a clearer picture of the political ideas, we should remember 
that as unreasonable it would be to equate the first free constitution with actual 
democracy, just as unreasonable it would be to equate the ideas of 
distinguishing religion and politics in the mid-19th century with secularism 
compliant with modern-day democratic principles. Institutional practices 
gradually evolved to correspond to newer, more liberal ideas of rights and 
citizenship.  
Let us now return to the present to see how the Danish tradition of 
secularism continues to tread many of the same paths established many years 
ago in the next two chapters. Chapter 7 will conclude my analysis by a 
reconstruction of Danish secularism.  
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Chapter 5 “…the two flags suit one 
another!” – On establishment 
and same-sex marriage  
 
 
5.1. Introduction  
he very first same-sex marriage in a church took place in Copenhagen on 
a symbolically charged national flag day, Valdemarsdag. The date is the 
15th June 2012 and marks the legend of the Danish flag, Dannebrog, 
which allegedly fell from the sky during the Battle of Lyndanisse in Estonia on 
the 15th June 1219. According to legend it was taken as a sign from God to King 
Valdemar that their national cause was indeed divine, since the Danes left the 
battlefield victorious that day. In addition, to celebrate that Dannebrog was 
granted to the Danes, this day also commemorates the reunion of the North 
Slesvig territory with Denmark on the 15th June 1920, which was lost to Prussia 
in the crushing defeat of 1864 (Adriansen, 2003: 127-148). 
T 
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Standing in front of the church on the 15th June with the newlyweds surrounded 
by the press (see figure 5), pastor Michael Hemmingsen stated ‘It was very 
touching to be part of. Today we celebrate Valdemarsdag, where Dannebrog fell 
from the sky. Similarly today a big spectacular rainbow colored flag fell from the 
sky, and let me say, the two flags suit one another!’ (Østergård, 2012).  
Besides the pastor’s obvious thrill that something utterly Danish (the flag, 
the church, the day) could be welcoming to homosexuality, the connection 
between the legend of Dannebrog and religious acts also appeared in this 
situation. It seemed natural for the pastor to proclaim that this new ceremony in 
the Folkekirke was of relevance to the whole nation.  
The very act of marrying the first homosexual couple on the 15th June 2012 
was not a trivial execution of a new legal right, but a symbolic act in relation to 
the definition of marriage and not least that of the established church. The 
Figure 5. Frederiksberg Church 15th June 2012, where pastor Michael 
Hemmingsen married Stig Elling and Steen Andersen. 
Reference: Liselotte Sabroe/Scanpix 2012 
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strong presence of the press in front of the church serves as an indication of this. 
Thus, the passing of the new legislation making same-sex marriage legal carried 
symbolic meaning in relation to the state, the Folkekirke and perhaps also to 
Danish peoplehood as we shall later see.  
If we for a moment bring an international perspective to the scene however, 
state recognition of marriage beyond traditional heterosexual living 
arrangements is not only a fairly recent phenomenon, but also a relatively rare 
occurrence. In June 2012, when the Danish parliament passed two amended 
marriage acts after heated debates to allow for homosexual marriage on equal 
terms with heterosexual couples, Denmark joined a relatively small but growing 
club of countries where same-sex marriage is legal. This included Argentina, 
Belgium, Canada, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain 
and Sweden, in addition to some states in the United States from 2004 and some 
in Mexico from 2009.49 All of the mentioned countries passed such legislation 
only within the last decade.  
However, the Danish amended marriage act not only concerned civil 
marriage, as was the case in most of the recent cases during 2013 and 2014 in 
Brazil, England and Wales, New Zealand, Uruguay, Scotland, along with 
Luxembourg expected in ultimo 2015. Compared to these other countries, the 
                                               
 
 
49 In June 2013 United Stated came closer to a nation-wide recognition of same-
sex marriages when the Supreme Court of the United States in United States v. 
Windsor decided that homosexual couples married in one of the then 13 out of 
the 51 states and five Native American tribes will now be formally recognized by 
the federal government (giving homosexual couples the same right in federal 
administrative procedures such as federal estate tax exemptions etc.). Since then 
7 additional states have followed, with Massachusetts as the first in 2004.  
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2012 amendment redefining marriage does not stand out in particular. Instead, 
the acts applied not only to civil marriage but also to all religious communities 
with delegated authority to preform marriages with legality.50  
What was controversial in this policy was the special relationship between 
the church and the state, along with the fact that those responsible for 
composing new rituals on behalf of the Folkekirke (the bishops), saw themselves 
obliged to introduce the new ritual for same-sex marriage, as we shall see below. 
Thus, the following pages will not be an analysis of legal competences in 
this policy area, but of what the policy means in political terms. Specifically, the 
chapter will analyze the special relationship between the state and the church as 
it was expressed in this state policy on same-sex marriage legislation passed on 
the 15th of June 2012. The policy issue concerned the legalization of marrying 
same-sex couples both by civil authority and in the Folkekirke, thus replacing 
the former distinction between heterosexual marriage and registered 
partnerships of homosexuals.  
                                               
 
 
50 The authority of a person to perform a marriage with legality in Denmark is 
delegated from the law to registrars of the city council (typically local 
government politicians), to religious leaders of recognized or approved religious 
communities, and to pastors of the Folkekirke. Currently it is the Minister of 
Children, Gender Equality, Integration and Social Affairs who decides whether a 
religious community can get approved, but the minister in general follows the 
advice from The Advisory Committee for Religious Communities. While the 
authorization to marry for leaders of approved religious communities is a 
separate application process decided by the Ministry of Children, Gender 
Equality, Integration and Social Affairs (2014), the Marriage Act delegates 
marriage authorization to Folkekirke pastors in general (LBK 1052: article 16, 
subsection 1, no 1).  
  
168 
The new policy resulted in heated political debates before, during and after 
the passing of the law. In order to access the conflicting meanings expressed in 
relation to the policy issue (same-sex marriage) in this chapter, I will pay 
specific attention to the formal basis of this policy. Therefore, I focus on the most 
important documents which are the two pieces of legislation amending the old 
marriage institution and their explanatory memoranda (‘L105’ and ‘L106’ from 
2012). Here, related parliamentary debates and statements from central policy 
actors such as legislators, pastors and bishops and politicians all debate on the 
issue. 
As chapter 3 established, my methodological point of departure is a realist 
concern with actual obtainable meaning in the political language. This is why 
interpretation of central documents and political debates is essential to inform 
our understanding of the architecture (or with Freeden, the morphological 
structure) of the relevant concepts in question in this thesis: secularism and 
peoplehood, and how they are actually animated.  
The purpose of this analysis is to identify the discourses being 
communicated through political language. I argue that these different 
communities of meaning regarding marriage and the Folkekirke can be divided 
into two dominating discourses. Together with the empirical analysis in 
chapters 4 and 6, the contours of the conceptual sources of Danish peoplehood 
and secularism, both contemporary and historical, are drawn upon. In the case 
of the policy in this chapter, it becomes apparent that while most of the political 
landscape represented in parliament shares a sense of Danish peoplehood 
(including the privileged status of the Folkekirke as an important site of national 
belonging), they differ in their view on the relation between the state and the 
church. In chapter 7, I will reconstruct these two discourses into distinguishable 
positions on secularism in the Danish political landscape. 
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The next section 2 will sketch the recent historical context of the policy, 
while section 3 will analyze the policy itself. Before the concluding remarks in 
section 5, section 4 will discuss the political tensions in the discourses identified 
in the policy.  
 
5.2. The context of the policy 
De facto, Denmark already had rights in place similar to same-sex marriage as it 
was the first country in the world to legally recognize registered same-sex 
partnerships in 1989 (Bech, 1992). Law on Registered Partnership which is now 
nullified by the new marriage act stated: ‘Provisions in Danish law concerning 
marriage and spouses shall be equally applied to registered partnerships and 
registered partner’ (Lov nr. 372, 1989: art. 3, subsection 2). Some restrictions 
did apply from the start, such as adoption rights and general recognition in 
international treaties which were gradually relaxed in the following years. Since 
then there has been a general development towards recognizing alternative 
forms of family living arrangements, besides the traditional heterosexual 
nuclear family, along with a equalization of rights for same-sex couples 
compared to heterosexuals, see appendix II.  
Ten years after the law of registered partnerships passed (1989), it became 
legally possible for a child to have two parents of identical gender (1999). An 
additional ten years later, the parliament decided to put same-sex couples in 
registered partnerships on equal footing with heterosexual couples and singles 
when it comes to adoption rights (2009). Finally, as a follow-up to the new 
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marriage act in 2012 the Children’s Act was also amended to make legal three 
new forms of parenthood, popularly called ‘rainbow families’ (Lov nr. 652, 
2013).51 Let me briefly sketch some of the most important events following the 
registered partnership law, which I consider important to understand the 
context to the political thinking in this area.  
 
5.2.1. Same-sex living arrangements getting closer to the church  
In March 2010 a pastor, Henning Nielsen, conducted a marriage ceremony for a 
lesbian couple live on DR (Denmark's national TV channel), causing fierce 
debate as it was not yet legal for a pastor to do so. Many groupings within the 
Folkekirke considered homosexuality to be incompatible with a Christian 
understanding of marriage (Malacinski and Kjersgaard, 2010). It clearly echoed 
a similar televised happening in 1973 in which the public provocateur and 
pastor, Harald Søbye, conducted a Christian wedding ceremony also of a lesbian 
couple (in the following years is was an open secret that he and like-minded 
conducted many such ceremonies in private, Steens, 2002; Anarchos, 2008). Of 
course, both televised ceremonies were without legal effect, but Søbye's fake 
                                               
 
 
51 For references to the relevant laws, see appendix II. ‘Rainbow families’ now 
legal are: 1) lesbian couples with an anonymous sperm donor will automatically 
grant both women parenthood, 2) lesbian couples with a known sperm donor 
can agree to grant legal parenthood to the mother's partner, 3) A man having a 
baby with a woman living in a lesbian relationship can agree with them to be 
legal parent (Lov nr. 652, 2013). 
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ceremony sparked a debate in public media, amongst pastors in the Folkekirke 
and the parliament, once started is yet to end.52 
The question of recognition of homosexual family arrangements in the 
Folkekirke arguably culminated a few years after registered partnership, which 
was made legal in 1989. In 1993 The Danish National Organization for Gay Men, 
Lesbians, Bisexuals and Transgender persons (LGBT Denmark), made an inquiry 
to Bishop Vincent Lind insisting that ‘the time has come to include the church 
aspect of registered partnership’ (Biskoppernes udtalelse, 1997). This in turn 
resulted in the appointment of the Thomsen committee (named after the 
chairman, Niels Thomsen) by the bishops, whose rapport investigated the 
possibilities for constructing a ritual for blessing registered partnerships in 
church. The committee concluded that as long as the basic assumption in Danish 
marriage law is gender based, same-sex marriage is not a realistic ambition. At 
the same time the committee could find no principled reason in Lutheran 
theology (besides tradition and customs) to deny blessings of same-sex couples 
in the Folkekirke (Biskopperne, 1997: chapter 2 and 5). The bishops also took 
this view in a public statement but in the light of divided opinions within the 
church, they did not recommend that blessing registered partnerships was to be 
                                               
 
 
52 For an overview on the internal debates since the 1970's in the Folkekirke, see 
the literature overviews in the introductions in the rapport from the Thomsen 
committee Registreret partnerskab, samliv og velsignelse [‘Registered partnership, 
co-living and blessing’] (Biskopperne, 1997) and the rapport from the 
alternative, conservative committee Kærligheden glæder sig ikke over uretten! 
[‘Love does not enjoy injustice!’] (Petersen et al, 1996). 
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institutionalized. They grounded their reluctance in a concern to safeguard unity 
and community of the Folkekirke (Biskoppernes udtalelse, 1997).53  
In 2004 former Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen (V) quite unusually 
made a comment to a newspaper on church weddings for same-sex couples, 
which differed from the official party and government stance: ‘I have a difficult 
time believing that our Lord should have a more strained relationship to gays 
and lesbians than to any other… We politicians must not interfere in the internal 
affairs of the Church. We will have to leave it up to the pastors in collaboration 
with the parishes. But as a member of the Folkekirke, I hold the view that it 
would be the right thing to do… I am not sure the Minister of Ecclesiastical 
Affairs would agree with me. Possibly not, but that is not the issue here, because 
it is a matter neither for her nor for me to intervene in’ (as quoted in Andersen, 
2004). This example is interesting because while he personally and arguably 
indirectly helped push the agenda for further equalization of homosexuals in 
religious communities, he made it completely clear that as a politician and Prime 
Minister, he did not support any political initiatives. 
Rather, Rasmussen's aim was to preserve a secular political sphere and a 
united Christian people by defending status quo. These two priorities 
Rasmussen stressed on a later occasion: ‘The strong cohesion of the Danish 
society is among other things based on a massive majority of Danes being part of 
                                               
 
 
53 To be sure, the alternative and conservative committee representing right-
wing organizations of the theological spectrum in the Folkekirke strongly 
criticized the Thomsen-report (Biskopperne, 1997). As a compromise, the 
bishops drew up an unauthorized and thus non-binding guideline to celebrate 
registered partnerships during church service (Biskopperne, 1997: sec. 4.5.1). 
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a shared Christian cultural foundation… Therefore it is deep-rooted that the 
individual Christian draws his own conclusions of his faith. Thus religion has not 
played a dominating role in the public sphere’ (Rasmussen, 2006). Here, the 
arrangement of the decentralized and state-dependent Folkekirke becomes ‘a 
Danish tradition’ which ensures ‘freedom and tolerance’ (‘frihed og 
rummelighed’, Rasmussen, 2006). His vision of such a separation doctrine in 
connection with the question of same-sex marriages was specified in a 
consultation in the legal affairs committee of the parliament. ‘I support an 
arrangement of the Folkekirke without any synod or council, and where nobody 
can pursue a policy on behalf of the Folkekirke, but when the bishops have 
discussed it, then we must listen to them’ (Nilsson, 2009).  
Some years later still within Rasmussen's government period, a 2010-
report on roughly the same question as the 1997-report affirmed the latter's 
theological interpretations. The report was written by a new committee 
appointed by the then Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs, Birthe Rønn Hornbech 
(V). However, at this time a majority in the report did not believe a ritual for 
entering into registered partnership in the church would threaten the 
community of the church, even under conditions of deep theological 
disagreement. This remained as long as the individual pastor maintained the 
right not to perform such a service due to questions of conscience. Nevertheless, 
the committee was also split on whether such a ritual should be implemented at 
all (Kirkeministeriet, 2010a). 
In 2011 the succeeding Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs, Per Stig Møller 
(KF), was known to be working on a legislative proposal supposedly broadly 
based on the 2010-report’s majority proposal. This proposal focused on making 
some sort of legal recognition of same-sex living arrangements possible in 
church, though not calling both arrangements marriage (e.g. see bishop Peter 
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Fischer-Møller's retelling of the process in Fischer-Møller, 2012). In an address 
to the National Association of Parishes on the 27th of May 2011, Møller stated 
that on the question of whether homosexuals can get married or blessed in 
church through an authorized ritual ‘…I have been sounding out both the 
Folkekirke and the parliament in order to close this case during next 
parliamentary session achieving as broad a majority as possible’ 
(Kirkeministeriet, 2011a). In a national newspaper he also stated that ‘Marriage 
is between a man and a woman. Certainly, there can be love between persons of 
same sex, and there can be church blessings of those, but we should use another 
term’ (Møller in Klingsey, 2011). However, at the time of this statement, Møller 
and Rasmussen's government had already lost the parliamentary elections, and 
thus the legislative proposal Møller intended was never put forward. But as the 
new center-left government took office in 2011, they immediately met obstacles. 
 
5.2.2. A struggling minority government 
The winning parties had a narrow majority of seats in parliament to form a new 
coalition government, and due to the composition of coalition parties there was 
not a majority to establish a clear left-wing economic agenda.54 This 
parliamentary situation was to a large degree a result of a hard struggle over the 
median voter. As a result, political statements from either side often struggled to 
                                               
 
 
54 One of three political parties in the coalition, Radikale Venstre, is traditionally 
right-wing in economic issues, but operates as a pragmatic centre-party with a 
fairly left-leaning agenda on issues of toleration, ethics and immigration - a 
tolerable match for a social democratic lead government (see Stubager, 2010 on 
the economic versus value-based cleavage in Danish voting behavior).  
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provide clear reference points for the voter to navigate the political multiparty 
spectrum.  
Since the center-left coalition found itself partially incapacitated on 
traditional social democratic issues from the start, they struggled to distance 
themselves from the effective center-right government preceding them.55 Apart 
from planned long-term infrastructural investments, and unpopular welfare 
reforms to slim down the budget of educational institutions and public labor 
market insurance, the next four years in office held few available winning items 
on the agenda. 
In a coalition statement called A Denmark That Stands Together from 2011, 
the new center-left government listed a range of more liberal reforms (reduction 
of greenhouse gasses, more generous social benefits for poor immigrants, better 
services to mentally ill, fewer chemicals in foods, laxer immigration policies etc.). 
These issues related as much to identity politics as to economic goals to foster 
development and growth (see Prime Minister's Office, 2011).56  
It was in the context of this political climate that a new kind of ministry was 
introduced. Merging the former Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs (the 
government’s office for the Folkekirke) with parts of social policy areas the 
                                               
 
 
55 Predominantly led by Anders Fogh Rasmussen, then leader of the center-right 
party Venstre and former secretary general of NATO. The center-left government 
currently in office is led by the Social Democrat leader Helle Thorning-Schmidt. 
56 The coalition statement did contain economic resolutions, but at the time of 
the same-sex marriage policy these were soon withdrawn due to political 
opposition and bad reception in the media. Later, a range of economic reforms 
followed, which raised discussion of social equality (see e.g. Information, 2013; 
Vrangkilde and Borre, 2014). 
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government introduced the perhaps surprising new composition, the Ministry 
for Gender Equality and Ecclesiastical Affairs.  
A few weeks after coming to office the newly appointed minister for Gender 
Equality and Ecclesiastical Affairs, Manu Sareen (RV), announced: ‘It is with 
great pride that I today have been able to declare a historical progress both for 
the Danish Folkekirke and for the rights of homosexuals’ (Sareen, 2011b). 
Sareen was referring to a forthcoming draft amendment that would give same-
sex couples the same legal status as heterosexual ones in the Folkekirke 
(Kirkeministeriet, 2011b).  
From the days of Harald Søbye's televised fake ceremony up until the new 
marriage act of 2012, we can thus observe a gradual shift towards a wider 
recognition of homosexuality be it theologically, politically or legally.57 In the 
following, we will see how the 2012 laws challenged the principles of state-
church relations.  
 
5.3. Analysis of new same-sex marriage policy  
The policy in question consisted of the introduction of same-sex marriage with 
the same legality as heterosexual couples being married. This expansion of the 
                                               
 
 
57 For good measure, I should note here that the general development the last 4 
decades towards recognizing alternative sexualities in Danish society does not 
mean that resistance to homosexuality was absent from the political and civil 
sphere. For example, as Henning Bech documented in relation to the debate 
surrounding the law of registered partnerships passed from 1989, there was 
substantial protests against recognition of registered partnership which were 
based on themes such as countering God, nature, family structures and societal 
coherence (Bech, 1992: 135-138).  
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marriage institution was made possible by two pieces of legislation or legal acts 
both introduced to parliament on the 14th of March 2012, finally passed on the 
7th of June 2012 in order to come into force the 15th of June 2012. The two acts 
were promoted by the government in office, specifically by the Minister of 
Gender Equality and Ecclesiastical Affairs, Manu Sareen (RV) and by the then 
Minister of Social Affairs and Integration, Karen Hækkerup (S).  
The policy was a realization of one of the political aims expressed in the 
coalition statement from 2011: ‘The government intends to give all members of 
the Danish Folkekirke the option to get married in the church, irrespective of 
their sexual orientation. Therefore the government will remove the ban on 
marriages of homosexuals in the Folkekirke and furthermore explore additional 
initiatives in the direction of a gender-neutral marriage legislation’ (Regeringen, 
2011: 66). As mentioned in the beginning and as evident in the coalition 
statement, the policy not only concerned sexual equality in civil marriage, but 
had an emphasis on church marriages. Let us briefly sketch out the content of 
the policy as it was expressed in the legal draft documents.  
The first act, L106, had two important effects: It repealed the old law on 
registered partnership and it amended the existing Marriage Act so it did not 
distinguish between marriage and registered partnership, therefore the law 
‘applies to marriage between two persons of different and between two persons 
of the same sex’ (L106, 2012: 1). Its explanatory memorandum further stressed 
that religious communities with marriage authorization had the right to decide 
whether they wished to take advantage of the new option for same-sex couples, 
be they approved or recognized.  
The other act, L105, amended the law regulating membership, church 
service and parish-member relations of the Folkekirke (called the Membership 
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Law) to include the option for pastors not to marry and/or bless the marriage of 
a couple of same sex (L105, 2012). If the latter amendment had not been passed, 
L106 would in effect have instructed Folkekirke pastors to marry same-sex 
couples even if this would potentially go against personal, religious convictions. 
The reason is first, that marriage within the Folkekirke in order to be legal must 
follow the form and definition in force in the Marriage act (now amended by 
L106). Second, the Membership law legally requires a pastor of a given parish to 
perform church services, such as marriage to its members (see the LBK nr. 622, 
art. 6, subs. 1). If only L106 was passed the pastor would have to marry all 
couples, including same-sex couples. 
In order to better understand the discussion in parliament surrounding the 
policy it is important briefly to pay attention to how the government 
(represented by the Minister of Gender Equality and Ecclesiastical Affairs, Manu 
Sareen) justified its intentions to regulate a religious ceremony in the 
Folkekirke, such as marriage. We find the argumentation in the explanatory 
memorandum to L105 authored by Sareen's ministry.  
It began by establishing that it is a ‘constitutional custom that the relevant 
minister have been regulating the internal affairs of the Folkekirke to such an 
extent considered necessary to regulate them’ (L105, 2012: 3).58 Also, that the 
                                               
 
 
58 The internal or inner affairs of the church is defined by a recent church 
committee as ‘…rituals, church service scheme, Bible translation, and the hymn 
book… but also the supervisory authority specifically of the clerical component 
of the pastors' official capacity in the form of preaching and management of the 
sacraments.’ (Ministeriet for Ligestilling og Kirke, 2013a: 15). It has been a fairly 
established view that there legally is no difference between the internal and 
  
179 
regulation of internal affairs traditionally is executed with great caution and 
restraint. As marriage is considered part of the internal affairs the minister can 
regulate this service in accordance to existing law, but the ministry also noted 
that ‘amongst the pastors of the Folkekirke there are different understandings of 
whether married life between two persons of same sex is acceptable, with the 
boundaries set out by the Bible and the confessional basis of the Folkekirke’ 
(L105, 2012: 4). And since article 4 in the constitution requires the legislative 
power to respect the Evangelical Lutheran confessional basis in relation to the 
Folkekirke (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2006: 137), the ministry asked the bishop of 
Copenhagen, Peter Skov-Jakobsen, to evaluate whether the policy conflicted with 
the constitution. In the memorandum Jacobsen is quoted for stating that while 
traditional Lutheran theology has considered marriage to be between a man and 
a woman, and same-sex marriage thus would be new in the context of the 
Folkekirke, ‘…the confessional basis has a historical character which entails an 
interpretation…’ considering both contemporary and historical knowledge 
(L105, 2012: 4-5). Based on this, the ministry noted that they do not violate 
article 4 in the constitution by including same-sex marriage as an option for the 
church as a whole, as long as individual pastors are free not to marry same-sex 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
 
external affairs of the Folkekirke (see e.g. Ministeriet for Ligestilling og Kirke, 
2012a: 40). However, in the most recent official document on this matter, it was 
established that while existing law has traditionally not distinguished between 
the internal and external affairs of the Folkekirke, regulation of the internal 
affairs is limited by article 4 in the constitution (must be in in defiance of the 
Articles of Faith), article 67 (general freedom of religion and religious 
association) and the European Convention on Human Rights, article 9 on 
religious freedom (Folketinget, 1999; Folketinget 2014; Kirkeministeriet 2014a: 
219-221). 
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couples. Finally, the memorandum pointed out that ‘the proposed amendments 
in the Marriage Law… presuppose that a ritual for marriage of two persons of 
same sex will be produced’ (L105, 2012: 5), and that the majority of bishops 
declared that they are willing to collaborate in the composition of the rituals.59 
Both acts were publically consulted before parliamentary negotiations took 
place with some organizations and associations officially consulted, and others 
responding on their own initiative. The two acts had different lists of officially 
consulted organizations. These circumstances most likely occurred as L105 was 
proposed by the Ministry of Gender Equality and Ecclesiastical Affairs, who is 
accustomed to inviting all standard Folkekirke organizations in such matters 
(which they were). While L106 was proposed by the Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Integration who only consulted the top-tier of the Folkekirke in L106 
consultation (bishops, deans and pastors), along with judiciary and legal 
organizations and recognized/approved religious communities.60 Folkekirke 
associations were not officially invited to the consultation of L106, which made 
e.g. the National Association of Parish Councils complain (see Kirkeudvalget, 
2012c). 
However, the most views that were officially consulted as well as by use of 
their own initiative did not support the policy. While L105 saw almost 
unanimous support for the freedom of pastors to choose to marry same-sex 
                                               
 
 
59 According to custom, the relevant minister does regulation of the Folkekirke’s 
internal affairs by royal decree, while the bishops compose rituals.  
60 The latter group was included after complaints from the multidenominational 
Christian association, National Council of Churches in Denmark ‘Danske kirkers 
råd’. 
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couples, at the same time 1646 out of 1672 views in this consultation rejected 
the part of the policy regarding same-sex marriage in the church, which was 
formally part of L106 (Kirkeudvalget, 2012a: 1-2). As we saw before, the reason 
for this could be that many church organizations were not officially consulted in 
L106. Whilst highlighting L106, it is noted only four official consultation parties 
supported the policy.61 All the judiciary and legal organizations made no 
comments on the policy, while the rest of the views were against it (see 
Socialudvalget, 2012). Amongst the views, 4 out of 8 bishops sending in their 
view had no comments (with one being concerned with the lack of the 
Folkekirke's self-determination in the matter), and 4 bishops could not support 
the policy pertaining to the church (I will return to the role of the bishops 
below).62 
In parliament, L105 was unanimously passed 105 to 0 (see 'Afstemning' at 
Folketinget, 2014a), and saw little parliamentary discussion or disagreement 
over granting freedom to individual Folkekirke pastors not to marry same-sex 
couples. However, while L106 was finally passed 85 to 24 with 2 undecided MPs 
(see Afstemning at Folketinget, 2014b), the debates surrounding the policy was 
                                               
 
 
61 A pagan community (based on Norse mythology), a community of progressive 
Judaism, a Christian independent congregation and the association of deans in 
the Folkekirke. 
62 There are 10 bishops in total, but two of them did not send in their view for 
the consultations.  
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characterized by substantial disagreement and struggles over its meaning.63 For 
this reason, I will focus on the debate of L106 in the following. 
Throughout the almost 7 hours of parliamentary debate on L106 
distributed over three separate negotiations containing more than 370 MP 
contributions, four themes in the debate emerge. First, the quality of the 
legislative work was discussed, as all opposition parties criticized it for its 
limited time of preparation and discussion over the substance provided in the 
process, along with the uncertainty connected to the consequences of other legal 
complexes such as child laws. As the spokesperson for ecclesiastical affairs for 
Venstre, Flemming D. Larsen stated ‘This draft amendment represents 
unprecedented law carelessness. There has been no preceding committee work 
or commission work, which would have informed all aspects, all consequences 
of the proposed law. This is a very, very big problem’ (Folketinget, 2012b: 1st 
neg. contrib. 84). The spokesperson for ecclesiastical affairs, a Social Democrat, 
Karen J. Klint provided the following response along with a range of similar ones 
on the theme: ‘I am convinced that L106 has had a more careful preparatory 
procedure than most other draft amendments seen from earlier governments… 
There have been many parliamentary motions paving the way for us to get here. 
There have been meetings with the minster. It has also been an option to take 
this to the committee level. And then there has been an extraordinary long 
                                               
 
 
63 Political parties supporting the draft amendment L106 were EL, SF, S, RV and 
LA. Parties against were KF, DF and V, though V and KF considered the policy to 
be an ethical question and thus set all its MPs free to vote irrespective of the 
official party stance. As a result both parties had a third or more of its MPs 
voting for L106.  
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consultation process in relation to the drafts to give the Folkekirke environment 
a chance to get heard’ (Folketinget, 2012b: 1st neg. contrib. 122).  
The second theme was perhaps the most obvious, concerning sexual 
equality and recognition of homosexuals in society. Indeed, these meanings were 
emphasized by Klint (S), in her primary parliamentary address supporting L106: 
‘…this proposed law will make a huge difference in many Danes' lives, [and] it is 
an important message that we as a society recognize difference and equal worth 
no matter who you are or who you love’ (Folketinget, 2012b: 1st neg. contrib. 
66). In the Socialist's primary parliamentary address, spokesperson Pernille 
Vigsø Bagge also pointed out that ‘…it can never be a task for the Folkekirke to 
exclude certain groups from participating in the community [‘fællesskabet’], 
neither the whole community nor parts of it’ (Folketinget, 2012b: 1st neg. 
contrib. 184). The meaning of sexual tolerance and recognition of homosexuality 
was not essentially contested in the debate, and none of the MP's spoke against 
inclusion or tolerance, but rather celebrated these values.  
However concerning the policy the government pointed out, that when 
registered partnership was introduced within legislation in 1989, it became 
impossible for same-sex couples to enter a legally binding relationship in 
religious communities (cf. the above quote from the coalition statement). 
Homosexual couples could neither get married nor registered as partners in 
church. The reason was that religious leaders (from the Folkekirke, recognized 
and approved religious communities) had only been delegated the authority to 
marry and not to perform registered partnership, which was the only option for 
two persons of the same sex. This is why the rather heated parliamentary 
negotiations not only touched upon questions of equality and tolerance, but also 
about the very meaning of marriage. This was the third theme. Politicians from 
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especially the Danish People's Party and the Conservatives protested to make 
marriage something else, other than between a man and a woman. For example 
Christian Langballe for the former party noted that ‘Marriage starts from the fact 
that it takes a man and a woman to make a child and start a family – this is what 
reality and biology tells us, this is what experience and tradition tells us’ 
(Folketinget, 2012b: 3rd neg. contrib. 12; see also Møller's response at 
Folketinget, 2012b: 1st neg. contrib. 214). The proposer of L105, Minister Manu 
Sareen, also participated in the debate of L106: ‘The notion of marriage is not 
something special or theological. It is the parliament which decides the content 
of the Marriage act… Ultimately this is unrelated to the Folkekirke. The church 
simply has an authority to marry delegated…’ (Folketinget, 2012b: 3rd neg. 
contrib. 290).  
However, while the central underlying meaning of a policy program on 
same-sex marriage would be expected to involve sexual tolerance, symbolic 
recognition and the very understanding of marriage, it was another theme which 
became the most fiercely debated issue: the relation between the Folkekirke and 
the state. This was the fourth theme. To be sure Eyvind Vesselbo, the 
spokesperson of the largest center-right opposition party, Venstre, stressed this 
theme in his primary address: ‘Venstre naturally supports equality between all 
groups in our society… and as mentioned we are not against that homosexuals 
becomes equals to others in this policy area…’ (Folketinget, 2012b: 1st neg. 
contrib. 2). However, then Vesselbo added: ‘We must oppose that the parliament 
decides what the Folkekirke must do. We believe that these things must come 
from within the Folkekirke, and that the Folkekirke itself must decide whether 
homosexuals can enter marriage in the church.’ (Folketinget, 2012b: 1st neg. 
contrib. 2). Similarly, Christian Langballe, spokesperson of the right-wing Danish 
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People's Party affirmed: ‘In Danish People's Party we are not after gays or 
lesbians. I believe that it is a good thing that homophile people do not need to 
hide themselves in public [‘krybe langs husmurene’], but are recognized and 
respected as equal citizens’ (Folketinget, 2012b: 1st neg. contrib. 108). Yet for 
Langballe who is also a pastor, went further than Vesselbo in his questioning of 
the right of the parliament to change the meaning of marriage to include same-
sex couples ‘…we in the parliament must respect and recognize that the 
Folkekirke is an Evangelic Lutheran religious community founded on the 
Articles of Faith [‘bekendelsesskrifterne’], in which e.g. marriage is a firmly 
defined thing… It takes a man and a woman to found a family’ (Folketinget, 
2012b: 1st neg. contrib. 108). Besides taking issue with the general 
understanding of marriage, by this statement Langballe questioned the right and 
appropriateness of parliament to pass legislation regulating parts of the 
Folkekirke's administration, which he believed ought to be regulated by the 
Articles of Faith: ‘The state should respect that the Folkekirke has an inviolable 
zone, which cannot just be steamrolled’ (Folketinget, 2012b: 3rd neg. contrib. 32) 
he later stated in the same debate. Thus he questioned not only the division of 
labor in this policy area, in which the state passes legislation that the church has 
not asked for or proposed. Also, he indirectly questioned whether the 
constitutional separation between church and state (article 4) had been violated, 
as the Articles of Faith had not been respected.  
The response from the MPs supporting L106 was well illustrated by Klint: 
‘So, again we must hear the notion "the Folkekirke deciding for itself" 
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[‘Folkekirken selv’]… I have been informed by a previous minister of 
ecclesiastical affairs and member of the parliamentary committee of 
ecclesiastical affairs that this notion does not exist64… so the question becomes 
hypothetical. Who constitutes a Folkekirke deciding by itself and who can speak 
on behalf of the Folkekirke? Neither the spokesperson from the floor nor I can 
do this. From this floor we speak on our own behalf and on behalf of our political 
group only’ (Folketinget, 2012b: 1st neg., contrib. 78). In this case we see two 
conflicting understandings of how the Folkekirke ought to be regulated by the 
parliament and the minister, a theme I now turn to. 
 
5.3.1. Focusing on two positions: Who can decide on marriage? 
It appears that one side supported the government's right to interfere in the 
internal affairs of the Folkekirke, in order to render it aligned with the moral 
climate in the parliament representing the people. ‘In many, many years SF 
along with other parties… have been fighting for two persons of same sex to be 
able to enter marriage in the Folkekirke. Today it looks like it will be possible to 
find a political majority for this legislation and therefore it is a day of joy in the 
name of equality, tolerance and love’ (Folketinget, 2012b: 3rd neg., contrib. 86). 
As we have seen, in contrast the other side maintained that such wishes should 
come from the Folkekirke itself and not the parliament.  
                                               
 
 
64 Klint is most likely referring to former Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs, Bithe 
Rønn Hornbech of Venstre, who also participated in this debate.  
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Analyzing the parliamentary policy debate, I find that the two positions 
differ in particular concerning the question of whether the Folkekirke holds any 
freedom of religion as a community in its internal affairs. 
It that respect, the government representing the former position actively 
used the Membership Law to regulate in accordance to the new policy of same-
sex marriage (both the pastors and the Folkekirke as a church have a legal 
commitment to deliver church services to its members), as there is no formal 
process for the Folkekirke to decide on its own affairs. From this perspective, as 
long as there is no internal board or synod to decide on the meaning of marriage 
on its behalf, the legislative power will have to do this to keep the church 
functioning. In other words, freedom of religion for the Folkekirke as a 
community makes little sense in this situation as only the parliament and the 
minister can make such decisions. That is, as long as the government does not 
violate the Folkekirke's Articles of Faith. The best the government can do is to 
consult and react on appeals from bishops and other Folkekirke representatives. 
As Bagge noted, ‘the absolutely most important thing to remember in in this 
context is that the Folkekirke cannot ask for this proposed law. It is the 
parliament which legislates on behalf of the Folkekirke… There is nobody able to 
speak on behalf of the church since it is the parliament which in principle is the 
synod of the Folkekirke’ (Folketinget, 2012b: 3rd neg. contrib.102).  
The opposition on the other hand stressed that while freedom for the 
pastor to act in accordance with his or her conscience is in line with the freedom 
tradition of the Folkekirke. To make legislation on behalf of the entire church 
community in this area was wrong. The Folkekirke is an independent church 
community and how it wishes to perform rituals of religious importance such as 
the marriage should come from within, on the basis of theological reflection and 
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debate. If this is not the case, the parliament risks dividing the Folkekirke by 
such legislation and creates inner conflict. As the former Conservative Minister 
of Ecclesiastical Affairs, Per Stig Møller stated ‘Thus they have succeeded in 
creating division in a time where we really should stand together. Article 4 in the 
constitution states that the Folkekirke must be supported; it doesn't say that the 
Folkekirke must be obstructed’ (Folketinget, 2012b: 3rd neg. contrib. 164). As 
such, the opposition did not question the legal competence to regulate the 
internal affairs of the Folkekirke of the minister, but stressed the tradition of 
regulative restraint that they believed should be observed in this case. 
Therefore, it came about there should have been much more open consulting 
with bishops and other theologians.  
To a wide extent, the debate between the two positions reflected different 
meanings of religious freedom in relation to the Folkekirke. During the 
discussion of the policy of same-sex marriage, the idea of regulative restraint for 
the state in relation to the internal affairs of the Folkekirke appears to be based 
on freedom of religion as an individual right to the government. As an example, 
Sareen stated that ‘we tell the pastors that L105 is an expression of liberal-
mindedness [or literally ‘free-mindedness’; in Danish ‘frisind’], an expression of 
respect for the internal affairs of the church, an expression of the tradition of 
freedom we cherish. And if one should not wish to marry a couple of same sex 
then one can simply say “not for me” and leave it to somebody else. To me, that 
is a potent act of freedom’ (Folketinget, 2012b: 3rd neg. contrib. 306). In contrast, 
the opposition emphasized that this individual right must be supplemented by 
some form of community right to decide for them self – a form of independence 
or autonomy. ‘The Danish Folkekirke is Evangelical Lutheran… which means 
that the Folkekirke is a clear, firm and well-defined religious community. We 
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have the Articles of Faith to refer to here, and though I know that some say it is a 
matter of interpretation, there really is some things so pronounced that we 
cannot neglect it and replace it with our own agenda. …Even the bishops have 
complained that it is not respected as a religious community. That's what they 
said. I don't know where the bishops would end up if they actually had 
permission to discuss the matter’ (Christian Langballe in Folketinget, 2012b: 1st 
neg. contrib. 124).  
The quotes represent the two positions taken in the parliamentary debates 
circling around the question of autonomy of the church vis-à-vis the state. Can 
and should the state interfere in the inner affairs of the Folkekirke, and how 
much?  
In relation to the regulation of the Folkekirke there is a general distinction 
between internal and the external affairs of the Folkekirke (as we saw in chapter 
4 finds its roots in natural law inspired by the Lutheran Two Kingdoms 
Doctrine), where it is custom that regulation of especially the former needs to be 
informed by theological experts. One way to understand this discussion 
concerning the autonomy of the church has been well captured in a Danish 
context by legal scholar Lisbet Christoffersen. She notes that there is a general 
discussion in European parliaments between those who believe that general law 
and rules enforcing e.g. equality should ‘also prevail within religious 
communities. Others… think that religious communities have a right on the basis 
of church autonomy to decide on their own’ (Christoffersen, 2010c: 587). As 
such, there is a question of how far the parliament's secular legislation can reach 
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into religious communities without violating their right to autonomy (as a 
reflection of corporate religious freedom).65  
Church autonomy is a theoretical position which interprets the principle of 
religious freedom as not only individual, but ‘...also a right for religious 
institutions to autonomy when it comes not only to organization and leadership, 
but also to the rules behind the leadership, i.e.: canon law or internal 
autonomous regulation of the legal framework on the basis of which the decision 
are made’ (Christoffersen, 2010c: 565; see also Christoffersen, 2006; for an 
authoritative anthology on church autonomy, see Robbers, 2001; within political 
philosophy, see Bader, 2007: 237-244). Thus, the notion of church autonomy 
means that secular ‘…legislation is seen as a limitation of freedom of religion, 
which can be justified as necessary in a democratic society in the interest of 
public safety; for the protection of public order, health or morals…’ (Robbers, 
2001: 585).  
Since the reformation and especially in a Norwegian, Icelandic and Danish 
context, there has been a tradition of treating the established church as a public 
law entity. This means that public laws and rules automatically applied to the 
established church as well, whereas the remaining religious communities were 
regarded as private law entities (Christoffersen, 2010c: 577; 581-582). 
                                               
 
 
65 For example, is a religious community allowed to discriminate against women 
when hiring priests or imams for religious reasons, when general non-
discrimination laws prohibits such elsewhere? In Denmark ‘…the parliament 
agreed that it must be part of freedom of religion for religious communities to 
decide on their own whether or not religious leaders should also be covered be 
the general rule on equal treatment.’ (Christoffersen, 2010c: 586). 
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Christoffersen argues that in recent years, there has been a move towards an 
increased emphasis on religious freedom as autonomy in a Nordic context, with 
the Danish Folkekirke remaining the most public and state-dependent entity 
(Christoffersen, 2010c). 66  
However, as we have seen in the above presentation of the parliamentary 
debate over the same-sex marriage policy, an understanding of the Folkekirke as 
a public law entity holding some degree of religious freedom as a community 
was in fact discussed.  
In relation to the policy debate on the notion of church autonomy, it is 
interesting to note that the promoters of the policy were mostly concerned with 
the Folkekirke and not all religious communities in general. As mentioned, the 
issue might be that the Folkekirke has traditionally been regulated under public 
law, while other religious communities are regulated by private law (i.e. as a 
private association). But this status as a public law entity leaves it unclear where 
the boundary between religious norms and political norms lies. If there is only 
                                               
 
 
66 For example, the major Swedish church-state reform in 2000 disestablishing 
the church leading to almost-full independence of the church (within the legal 
framework of the church law) maintaining its symbolic state recognition 
(Bäckström, Beckman and Pettersson, 2004; Modéer, 2010). Or the increased 
autonomy of the established Norwegian church beginning from the Church 
Agreement unanimously agreed upon in parliament in 2008, warranted by the 
constitutional amendments in 2012 and effectuated by the new church 
organization which took effect in 2013 with still more responsibilities being 
transferred from the state to the church like e.g. appointing authority and 
administration (Kyrkjerådet, 2012). 
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secular law and a not parallel legal system for any religious communities in 
society, then why should there be room for any religious norms at all?  
On the one hand we have seen examples of different governments making 
legislation directly related to internal affairs. One example was the law allowing 
women to be hired as pastors in the Folkekirke in 1947 (see Kirkeministeriet, 
2010: 40). Another example was the law on court hearings of clerical cases of 
dogma from 1992, a regular local (city) court of secular judges joined by two 
theological experts to decide on cases in which ‘…a pastor, dean or bishop in 
preaching or any other way has neglected the Danish Folkekirke's Articles of 
Faith’ (Lov nr. 336, 1992: article 1; see also Garde, 2011: chapter 2). On the other 
hand however, the regulatory reluctance also meant that the right to religious 
freedom as a community has been somewhat observed. First of all, parliament 
has never directly dealt with liturgical questions, and second of all Danish law 
does contain some form of religious freedom-as-autonomy, where the general 
legal standards of e.g. non-discrimination is exempted. An example could be that 
religious communities are allowed to only hire male priests or imams for of 
religious reasons, or of course the right to deny marriage with legality to same-
sex couples (on the first example, see Christoffersen, 2010c: 586). 
If we look at the wording in the explanatory memoranda to L105 and L106, 
it appears that the policy of same-sex marriage gave recognized and approved 
religious communities the freedom to opt-out as communities: ‘…it will be up to 
the individual religious community to decide whether two persons of same sex 
can enter marriage in the religious community’ (L106, 2012: 4). The Folkekirke 
did not receive this option as a whole but instead only the individual pastors, 
‘which for reasons of conscience do not wish to participate in a marriage of a 
couple of same sex, has the freedom to say no to this’ (L105, 2012: 2). One 
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interpretation of this difference could be that the Folkekirke were seen as a 
public entity without autonomy, so that it is the responsible minister who has to 
ensure that the church follows the law of the land. Thus, when the government 
and its supporters pointed at equality as their reason for the policy, and the 
opposing MPs objected to this with reference to the Folkekirke's independence 
and freedom from political interference, they were struggling over the 
autonomy of the internal affairs of the Folkekirke. This circles around the 
interpretation of article 4 in the constitution, and also significantly highlights 
that the bishops as the theological top-tier of the church community plays a 
central role in this question.  
 
5.3.2. Bishops: Leaders of the church or government officials?  
As mentioned above, one important element in determining whether article 4 in 
the constitution had been respected was to inquire with the bishops whose 
functions include theological supervisory authority, and they are responsible for 
composing rituals for Folkekirke pastors. In this connection, it should be noted 
that while the policy ended up being implemented, it was in fact unsettled (e.g. 
not tried through a legal process) whether a majority of the bishops 
representing the Folkekirke held the right to deny such a demand of regulation 
on the ground of religious norms. However, it is difficult to state that the 
government directly instructed the Folkekirke to implement the policy. While 
parliament can make public law on the Folkekirke's behalf and the minister can 
regulate the Folkekirke's affairs with royal decree, what is being regulated in 
this case is the legality of the rituals enforcing the marriage. Could the bishops 
simply have refused to make these rituals, if they believed that it was not 
compatible with the Articles of Faith, and consequently blocked a main aim of 
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the policy (since the parliament has retained itself from dealing directly with 
liturgy and the minister is only supposed to authorize liturgy by decree)? 
During the L106 debate Sareen referred to a meeting he had with the 
bishops before the policy was introduced to parliament, where the bishops was 
quoted stating that ‘…the parliament holds the competence to decide on the legal 
designation of partnerships between two of same sex… despite this 
disagreement [on the theological understanding of marriage] the bishops are 
willing to contribute to the process of composing the rituals’ (Folketinget 2012b: 
3rd neg. contrib. 298). Thus, we do not know exactly whether the Folkekirke's 
freedom as a community went as far as composing new marriage rituals.  
Perhaps because of this underlying uncertainty the role of the bishops in 
this policy were also open to parliamentary discussion, as it was questioned in 
the debate whether the bishops in fact wanted this (c.f. the Langballe quote 
above). In the public debate, it attracted attention that two of the ten bishops 
refused to participate in the policy implementation at all (that is, to help 
compose the ritual for Folkekirke pastors to marry same-sex couples). Two days 
before the policy came into legal force, bishop Steen Skovsgaard stated to a 
national newspaper: ‘It is not a ritual I wish to use myself…. The foundation of a 
Christian marriage to me is between a man and a woman… The case about 
church marriages of homosexuals have resulted in tolerance in the Folkekirke 
being strained to its limits and… [I] hope it will not lead to division’ (Skovsgaard 
in Rasmussen, 2012, a view also found in the L105 consultation view in 
Kirkeudvalget, 2012b: 8). In the same newspaper, bishop Lise-Lotte Rebel stated 
that ‘I have not wished to participate in the composing of the ritual… The Biblical 
promise of life in marriage between a man and a woman as God's good meaning 
with human life together cannot be included. Otherwise we would have to 
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rewrite the Bible’ (Rebel, 2012; a view also found in the L105 consultation view 
in Kirkeudvalget, 2012b: 2-7). Rebel and Skovsgaard shared the view that 
Christian marriage cannot be redefined to include homosexual couples, and 
therefore it would go against their conscience to conduct the ritual.  
A few days before the first parliamentary negotiations over L106 were to 
take place, additionally three bishops made a critical public statement in a 
national newspaper. Here they referred to the discrepancy between the 
recommendations of the recent committee on registered partnership in the 
Folkekirke from 2010 and the policy (Bro, Christensen and Nissen, 2012; the 
same report as mentioned in section 5.2.1. above). In the 2010-report the 
committee representing different opinions on same-sex couples in the 
Folkekirke had a majority wanting to maintain marriage in the church, but 
importantly the majority considered marriage and registered partnership to be 
two different entities (Kirkeministeriet, 2010a: 7-11). Furthermore, half of the 
committee members supported registered partnership to be legally entered in 
church. The three bishops thus continued the statement: ‘We say “no” to the new 
marriage legislation… it means that the Government renders its civil law 
definition of marriage theological validity. Hereby, the former balance between 
state and church has foundered. If the law is passed by a majority in parliament 
the church must consider whether it wishes to hold authorization to marriage 
on these conditions at all’ (Bro, Christensen and Nissen, 2012; they published a 
public statement 4 months earlier with similar arguments, see Bro, Christensen 
and Nissen, 2011). 
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At this point, it looked like the bench of the bishops were evenly divided. 
We know from the views expressed in the L105 consultation that five of the ten 
bishops consented to the policy (Church Committee, 2012a).67 Out of these, two 
were explicitly in favor of the policy (Peter Skov-Jacobsen and Peter Fischer-
Møller), two were neutral (Kresten Drejergaard and Kjeld Holm), and one 
consented while stressing the importance of maintaining the theological and 
cultural difference between marriage and partnership (Niels Henrik Arendt). 
Judging the consultation documents, the bishop's theological views on marriage 
had two in favor of same-sex marriage, two neutral and six arguing that it should 
not be called the same in a church context. However, at the time of the third 
parliamentary negotiation of L106, Sareen stated that he had found a majority 
(eight out of ten) willing to compose the ritual.  
We explore a good indication of why this is, focusing on a feature article in 
the national newspaper Jyllandsposten the 11th of June 2012 signed by eight 
bishops. It had the title ‘A new ritual of marriage is ready’, which contained their 
reasons for composing the ritual and in the end of the text they presented the 
actual ritual (Arendt et al, 2012). The statement established that amongst the 
bishops, quite different views on same-sex marriage existed and therefore when 
rhetorically asked ‘why then, despite disagreement, have we in unity composed 
this ritual?’ (Arendt et al, 2012), they referred to two reasons. First, despite 
                                               
 
 
67 In the consultation minute for L106, again only 8 bishops answered, of which 
4 were against, 3 had no comments and one answered (Kresten Drejergaard) 
that he did not oppose the possibility of same-sex marriage, but that he 
considered this an internal matter which in the future should be decided upon 
by the Folkekirke itself as other religious communities (Kirkeudvalget, 2012c). 
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different theological interpretations, the church should not find itself divided 
and thus bishoply unity was paramount in this situation. Second, what united 
the bishops was the recognition that ‘state of the law is that when the parliament 
decides that homosexual couples can enter marriage in the Folkekirke, then the 
Folkekirke holds an obligation to introduce such an arrangement’ (Arendt et al, 
2012). One could interpret the first answer to refer to the bishop’s role as 
leaders of the church, and the second referring to bishops as holding a degree 
for government official responsibility. As stated by one of the three bishops, 
Elisabeth Dons Christensen, who had earlier opposed the policy: ‘These are the 
conditions [for the Folkekirke] being connected with the state. As an established 
church we get some privileges [‘muligheder’], and at the same time there will be 
some duties. Thus it is to be a church, which is closely connected to the state' 
(Christensen in Bastrup, 2012). 
However, the above feature article by the eight bishops concluded that 
‘Even though the new Marriage Act has been proposed by the Minister of Family 
Affairs because it belongs to her field of responsibility, the public debate has 
almost exclusively been about the Folkekirke’ (Arendt et al, 2012). Besides 
repeating the critique of passing the legislation through the system too fast, the 
bishops in addition pointed out that ‘…the necessary distinction between the 
legislators and the Folkekirke has not been clearly maintained in this case’ 
(Arendt et al, 2012), meaning that parliament did not wait for the Folkekirke 
itself to submit a proposal. ‘With these rituals we thus wish to resume the old 
Danish tradition of due trust in the theological founding [‘dannelse’] of the 
pastors and the pastoral experience in connection with preparing church 
ceremonies’ (Arendt et al, 2012). 
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Thus, the statement of the eight bishops concluded the policy 
implementation, as the first same-sex couple became married a few days later in 
a Folkekirke church with full legality. In the debate over the policy, the tradition 
of regulatory restraint in relation to the internal affairs of the Folkekirke was 
evoked. The old Danish tradition of ‘due trust’ in the theological expertise that 
the bishops wished for could be considered a light form of church autonomy. 
However, in this case the church was not given such autonomy. 
On the basis of the analysis in this section, I would argue that while it 
remained legally unsettled whether the state in fact instructed the church to 
implement the policy, the political involvement in the internal affairs of the 
church was more apparent. The parliament passed law, allowing for the 
amendment of a ritual belonging to the internal affairs of the Folkekirke into a 
form of which six out of ten bishops did not theologically approve of (along with 
most responses in the consultation of both L105 and L106). Yet the government 
could take advantage of the particular doctrine of church-state relations which 
became the center of the policy debate in parliament, and which in the end a 
majority of bishops recognized as their duty to follow (some keenly, some 
principally disinterestedly, some reluctantly). Crucially, it was not merely legal 
arguments or the ecclesiastical fear of dividing the church that were the grounds 
for doing this. It was what I would identify as political considerations of 
adherence to the tradition of governmental regulation of the Folkekirke,68 and 
                                               
 
 
68 Bagge noted in the end of the 3rd negotiation of L106, that when 8 out of 10 
bishops agreed to compose the rituals it was ‘an expression of the bishop's 
acceptance of the church doctrine [kirkeordning], which promise that the 
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not the least a notion of maintaining the church as an important site of national 
belonging. It is especially the last point that I will elaborate on in the next 
section.  
 
5.4. When unity through separation creates tension 
As was discussed in chapter 2, an important theme in the story of peoplehood is 
the doctrine organizing the relationship between public religion and the state. I 
argued that this theme can be used to evoke a sense of ethical worth and trust in 
the political elites governing the system, democratically representing the people. 
As such, we would expect discussions about the proper relationship between 
religion and politics to tap into the constant reproduction of political identity. 
Furthermore, in a Danish context I pointed to a form of secularism which is 
based on separation-as-principled-distance. It signifies that rather than the state 
symbolically holding special relations with one or more religious communities, it 
instead adheres to the principle of treating all religious communities as equals 
(in contrast to treating everyone equally). This kind of secularism I called 
modest establishment, which is based on a particularistic variant of peoplehood, 
since it affirms a special politico-cultural importance of one kind of religious 
community.  
As pointed out, I argue that Danish political tradition to a large extent draws 
upon this form of secularism. From this perspective, the policy analyzed in this 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
 
parliament legislate on behalf of the Folkekirke, and when the bishops agree to 
compose the rituals it is because they think it is the right thing to do.’ 
(Folketinget, 2012b: 3rd neg. contrib. 106). 
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chapter can contribute to our understanding of the national importance of the 
separation doctrine. We can observe from the political language deployed in the 
policy debate that the fundamental model of establishment is not seriously 
contested by most MPs.69 In the debate only the odd couple of two minor parties, 
the far-left Enhedslisten and the economically far-right Liberal Alliance explicitly 
argued ‘…the state should not interfere in church affairs. This is also why I think 
it's good that we revoke a prohibition regarding what the church can do when 
marrying homosexuals. That is, the reason for supporting this proposal… but we 
should have an arrangement where the Folkekirke is its own master and the 
state its own master, and the two are separate’ as Liberal Alliance's Ole Birk 
Olesen stated (Folketinget, 2012b: 3rd neg. contrib. 18; see also Enhedslisten's 
Schmidt-Nielsen in Folketinget, 2012b: 3rd neg. contrib. 112). While they 
supported the policy in the name of greater freedom to pastors and more 
equality between sexual orientation, the state-church arrangement in their view 
is fundamentally wrong.  
However, besides these two parties the debate instead concerned how (not 
if), the Folkekirke could best be aligned with the moral and political climate in 
the Danish people. The conflict was centered round who should take initiative: 
the Folkekirke or parliament. Thus, it is apparent in this policy that within this 
general secularism doctrine the political views were divided in two positions 
competing over its meaning.  
 
                                               
 
 
69 Only EL and LA explicitly argued against the establishment during the L106 
debate, together representing 21 out of 179 seats in parliament or 11,7percent. 
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5.4.1. Particularistic qualities of Danish peoplehood 
The two positions in the policy debate can both be seen as affirming a 
particularistic ethically constitutive theme, that ‘they must be elaborated in 
particularistic ways if such stories are to explain why membership in a specific 
people is justified’ (Smith 2003: 97). Thus, we might search for clues in the 
political language in the policy debate for why a seemingly secular piece of 
legislation should be linked to the Folkekirke? Why is the Folkekirke particularly 
important in this respect?  
Let us start with a quote from one of the ministers behind the policy, Manu 
Sareen, who quoted in the national newspaper Politiken: ‘With homosexual 
marriage in the church we are able to take yet another step towards a society, 
which fully accept the equal status of individuals - no matter who you are or who 
you love’ (Sareen, 2011a). In this quote, which was part of the public debate 
leading up to the proposed legislation the following year, Sareen stressed the 
importance of realizing the policy of equal access to marriage specifically in the 
Folkekirke. A little later the same year, Sareen could then finally make the two 
amendment acts official in the national newspaper Jyllands-Posten. In that 
connection he stated that ‘As the Minister of Gender Equality and Ecclesiastical 
Affairs, I am content that the Danish Folkekirke now welcomes the whole nation 
[‘hele folket’]. This is how it should be. Just as no one is prevented from declaring 
their love in the church due to skin color or origin, no one should be denied due 
to their sexuality. It is both a human right to practice one's religion and to be 
free from discrimination due to one's sexuality. These rights are now also 
granted to the homosexual members of the Folkekirke’ (Sareen, 2011b). 
The policy technically regulates marriage in general, amending the 
Marriage Act to include same-sex couples for all marriages entered with legality 
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by civil registrars, recognized and approved religious societies and Folkekirke 
pastors. But when presenting the policy, Sareen stressed the Folkekirke marriage 
which also echoed the wording in the government's coalition statement: ‘The 
government intends to give all members of the Danish Folkekirke the option to 
get married in the church, irrespective of their sexual orientation’ (Regeringen, 
2011: 66, italics added), and which did not mention the general legal marriage 
redefinition. However judging from Sareen's statements, formulations such as 
‘another step towards a society’ and ‘the Danish Folkekirke now welcomes the 
whole nation’ hints the importance of the Folkekirke as a valuable symbolic site 
for the nation.  
It can also be understood the other way around. Since equality is important 
to the Danish people, it should also be important to the Folkekirke. In the case of 
equality in marriage Klint said ‘The love of any human being should be met the 
same respect from society, and all married couples should be called the same… 
This is an attitude towards human beings we should be proud of.’ (Folketinget, 
2012b: 3rd neg. contrib. 58). Specifically in relation to the Folkekirke, Bagge 
argued ‘Several polls has been made on this question, and since 80 percent of 
the population are members of the Folkekirke, and there is a large majority of 
the population in favor for making legislating legalizing same-sex marriage in 
the Folkekirke, then one must assume that the members of the Folkekirke also 
support this’ (Folketinget, 2012b: 3rd neg. contrib. 110). Considered from this 
position, is was a matter of securing religious freedom to the individual 
Folkekirke pastor since before the policy, they did not have the possibility to 
marry same-sex couples if they so wished. One Social Democrat MP, Mogens 
Jensen stated ‘It is not to steamroll the Folkekirke to decide that one cannot 
marry homosexuals, despite that we know that two-thirds of the pastors wish to 
do it, and when we know that many parish councils wish so too... With this 
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legislative proposal the priests are actually given freedom to decide for 
themselves whether they want so or not’ (Folketinget, 2012b: 3rd neg. contrib. 
46). This position regarded gender, sexual and religious equality to be central 
values to the nation in general and therefore, the government directed its focus 
in the policy to the Folkekirke as a public law entity.  
The position criticizing the amendment acts also affirmed a special national 
importance of the Folkekirke. But in this respect the difference was rather based 
on a concern for breaking the traditional ties between the people, the state and 
the church. As a former minister of Venstre, Birgitte Rønn Hornbech stated 
‘Gender neutrality is being forced on the Danish people and the Folkekirke. The 
government is altering historical, cultural and Christian understanding of 
marriage without debating it. It is hard times in Denmark with a government 
utterly disregarding a common [related to the people, ‘folkelig’] and 
ecclesiastical debate about that which concerns us all. Today, with a stroke of 
the pen the government tries to wipe out an ancient culture and common 
[‘folkelig’] self-understanding…’ (Folketinget, 2012b: 3rd neg. contrib. 248). Also 
an MP from the Danish People's Party, Alex Ahrendsen, stressed the connection 
between the people and the church ‘The Left often speak of social cohesion 
[‘sammenhængskraft’] but with this attack on the church they divide the Danes 
and the church. The Folkekirke has been a unifying force for Denmark. This they 
want to destroy…’ (Folketinget, 2012b: 3rd neg. contrib. 168).  
From this perspective one of the main aims of parliament is to ensure a 
legal framework, which facilitates strong cohesion and unity within the church. 
This unity is based on certain values which are not up for political negotiation, 
and these values are of importance to the people. This vision finds some 
similarities in Mynster's State Church Model (see chapter 4), in that it 
emphasizes an idea of the Danish people united in the Evangelical Lutheran 
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religion, a connection many centuries old. Thus, the Folkekirke hold the right for 
constant upkeep by the state not only for its own sake, but for the sake of the 
cohesion and wellbeing of the people. This is also the reason why the official 
opinion of the opposition parties, Venstre, the Conservative and Danish People's 
Party fairly explicitly declare that in Denmark there is religious freedom, but not 
equality, understood as equality between religious communities.70  
With reference to a previously rejected legislative proposal to allow for 
same-sex couples to become ‘life companions’ [‘livsfæller’] with similar legality 
as marriage, yet with a different ritual and name, the Conservative MP Lene 
Espersen, specified in the L106 debate ‘I wish to make clear that I believe that 
homosexual couples should be able to marry in church, but I do not believe that 
marriage should be gender-neutral. To me it is absolutely critical that we 
maintain the values which society is based on, and that we keep up the 
traditions and the culture which cement us together’ (Folketinget, 2012b: 3rd 
neg. contrib. 166). Integrity of the traditional church community is connected to 
                                               
 
 
70 In an article in the national newspaper Kristeligt Dagblad the political parties 
were asked on their official position on state-church relations. Here, the 
Conservative Charlotte Dyremose stated that ‘we wish to maintain religious 
freedom but not religious equality… We wish to maintain the privileged position 
of the Folkekirke and Christianity in our society.’ And Venstre's Per Bisgaard: 
‘the constitutionally privileged position of the Folkekirke must be maintained… 
and the state must restrain itself from interfering in the affairs of independent 
churches and other religious communities.’ (as quoted in Schou, 2011). In the 
party program for the Danish People's Party it is established that ‘the 
Folkekirke… is and must continue to be the Danish people's church, where 
pastors enjoy freedom of preaching. It is important to establish that in Denmark 
our constitution guarantees religious freedom, but not religious equality.’ 
(Dansk Folkeparti 2009).  
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the integrity of the national community. As we saw before, there is concern of 
taking state recognition of same-sex marriage into church affairs, as it may 
create intra-church conflict and this would therefore politicize the church.  
The struggle over meaning in the policy relating to church-state relations to 
a large extent was based on a shared understanding of the Folkekirke as a public 
good and an important site of national belonging. However, they differed in the 
way the Folkekirke entered as an ethically constitutive theme in a more general 
story of Danish identity.  
One possible interpretation of the reason for political contestation over this 
theme is that one side considered the Folkekirke as a particularly important 
means to achieve certain values and identity (i.e. equality and gender-
neutrality), and the other side sees the preservation of the church as a cultural 
and religious reservoir, as an aim in itself (e.g. maintaining an unpoliticized 
church, a Lutheran foundation and a cultural embeddedness). Both perspectives 
appeal to the ethical worth of the political community, either in the form of 
affirmation of the Christian heritage or as the bearer of a tolerant culture. As 
Smith noted ‘To believe one's self to be a beloved child of God or a member of a 
superior race or the descendant or heroic ancestors or the bearer of a brilliant 
culture is to have a firm basis for a sense of meaning, place, purpose, and pride’ 
(Smith, 2003: 98). Indeed, the policy agenda for the Social Democrats states 
‘When thinking about Danish culture we often think about allotment gardens, 
village churches, open sandwiches [‘smørrebrød’], homely togetherness [‘hygge’] 
and Dannebrog. Behind these wonderful Danish symbols lie something still 
more profound and important. It is the story about a country which became one 
of the best in the world by political struggle’ (Socialdemokraterne, 2011: 12) 
  
206 
Within the policy the particularistic story of Danish peoplehood was evoked 
from different perspectives, and in particular the Folkekirke-state relation 
became an important theme. As we shall see in the next chapter, these different 
ways of evoking ethical worth of being a member of the political community 
became further accentuated when the political focus turned directly to how the 
Folkekirke should be governed. The question of reforming the church 
governance has increasingly gained momentum, as still more political parties 
question the appropriateness of a secular parliament legislating on behalf of one 
particular religious community. This may highlight a society characterized by 
increased religious pluralism (including areligious citizens), and declining 
membership rates of the Folkekirke. As will be discussed further in chapter 6, 
this should be seen in the context of different recent cases bringing into question 
the appropriateness of the church-state relation, based on regulatory reluctance 
and a lack of formal rights and division of labor. The same-sex marriage policy 
can be seen as a culmination of such a tendency. Amongst those in favor of 
greater formalization of the Folkekirke arrangement, some see it as a way to 
protect the Folkekirke from further interference, while others see this as a first 
step towards further separation and eventual equality between religious 
communities. 
 
5.4.2. Making sure the church does not turn ‘queer’ 
This also points to tensions between different political agendas, to be 
fulfilled by the government proposing the policy of same-sex marriages. On the 
one hand the government consisted of parties that were all opposed the former 
center-right government’s tight leach on the Folkekirke, and for not showing any 
will to equalize other religious communities with the Folkekirke. In 2005 in a 
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press release from the Social Democrats, Klint stated that ‘We want a Folkekirke 
with room for differences [‘rummelighed’], tolerance and democracy. And the 
church must be further detached from the Minister. However, this is not the 
same as separating the state and the church’ (Klint, 2005) In 2008 SF's Bagge 
wrote in a debate piece that ‘…it is misunderstood love to keep the Folkekirke in 
an obsolete and inefficient structure. The Folkekirke must be reformed so it can 
develop and even flourish’ (Bagge, 2008). On the other hand, the intention to 
supplement the existing marriage ritual with a new one was framed as a matter 
of not discriminating against citizens on the grounds of self-ascribed sexual 
orientation. However this framing was only possible because Sareen considered 
the Folkekirke as falling under the responsibility of the state. The state legislates 
on its behalf and thus falls under the same standards of rights and duties as any 
other public institution. According to the policy promoter's statements during 
the parliamentary debate, the state not only held the right to regulate marriage 
in the Folkekirke, they responded to a moral duty to do so to ensure equality and 
freedom in the national church and thus for the whole nation.  
The chairman of the Atheist Society did not miss the opportunity to deride 
the government’s awkward position in the matter after the policy was presented 
to the public: ‘After all, it is not just the Folkekirke, which had the permission to 
discriminate based on people’s sexuality. In Denmark we have about 120 
approved religious communities all with the right to officiate legally binding 
weddings, if they so wish. But now, they have enjoined one of them to marry 
homosexuals - why should this not be the case for all approved religious 
communities?’ (Lindgreen, 2011). He points to the fact that the Folkekirke was 
not given the same religious freedom as a community as the rest of the religious 
communities.  
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The tension thus consisted in the actions of the government that wanted to 
affirm an interpretation of Danish secularism based on ideas of mutual distance, 
equal treatment and religious freedom within the existing institutional regime of 
establishment. Whilst at the same time they pursued political ends (i.e. non-
discrimination of same-sex marriages), whose means would violate those very 
principles. Eventually, the government promoted equality between two types of 
sexual orientation at the expense of the Folkekirke's autonomy and the 
neutrality of the state. This was exactly what they were criticized for. By 
expanding the rights of one sexual minority in the Folkekirke, the government 
not only challenged the custom practice of the state, but also caused additional 
tensions in relation to the status of the remaining religious minorities.  
 
5.4.2.1 Sexual freedom as a substitute for political freedom? 
The case in this chapter teaches us something more general about secularism. 
The amended Marriage Act of 2012 not only concerned the rights of homosexual 
citizens, but also the affirmation of a particular cultural norm in Danish 
nationalism. Naturally, this in turn touched upon the issue of political identity. 
Religion sociologist Grace Davie has asked the question of why we find 
established churches are being assigned such nationally important roles. With 
her term vicarious religion, she conceptualizes a phenomenon similar to that of 
the Folkekirke. Davie points to how a minority of the population functions as 
devout people of faith on behalf of the consenting, though not actively religious 
majority (Davie, 2000: chapter 2 and 3). According to Davie, vicarious religion is 
not only performed religion on behalf of the majority. Religious communities can 
often become subject to questions of pressing moral and political issues, which 
is difficult to solve elsewhere in society. Davie herself has pointed to the debates 
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of homosexuality in the Church of England as an example of this (Davie, 2006: 
26).71 
Certainly, it should not be questioned how important the possibility of 
homosexual marriage in the church has been for the 128 couples who took 
advantage from the amended marriage act passed till 2013 (Statistics Denmark, 
2014c). If we look at the data, official statistics indicate that about 21 percent of 
total same-sex marriages were conducted in the Folkekirke in 2013, which is 
significantly lower than the general average of about 39 percent being married 
in the church the same year.72  
                                               
 
 
71 From the perspective of the Folkekirke, a less optimistic reading of the 
‘vicarious religion’ could be that of theologian Jørgen I. Jensen who wrote the 
book The Distant Church in 1995 (‘Den fjerne kirke’). In this influential book 
Jensen states that while the mere existence in both the physical and cultural 
landscape still hold a potential to have an effect on human beings, it is an effect 
decoupled from its religious preaching partly because the church is associated 
with a ‘claustrophobic situation of boundaries.’ (Jensen, 1995: 8). Thus, ‘the 
distant church’ is experienced as isolated, romanticized, symbolic and without 
access. Another interesting interpretation is that of the Danish church historian 
Hal Koch, who noted that despite numerous revivalist, spiritual, secular or even 
atheist movements countering the Folkekirke, and the fact that at best a couple 
percent of the population attend church services, still the overwhelming part of 
the population is member of the Folkekirke. Koch asked: ‘which kind of 
religiosity underlies this behavior?’ (Koch, 1960: 396). Koch suggested that the 
answer lies in the notion of ‘folk’ or ‘common’ religion (‘folkereligion’) 
characterized as 1) securing a safe existence in fertility, growth and richness; 2) 
inspiring gratitude and veneration for life; 3) and finally that it provides 
guidance in faith and action in life (Koch, 1960: 396-399). 
72 In fact, 39 percent church marriages in 2013 represents a fairly strong 
downward tendency - in year 1997 more than half the marriages were in the 
church. The total number of same-sex marriages in Denmark in 2013 were 359 
or 1,4 percent of all civic and church marriages in Denmark that year, see 
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On the other hand, it does not appear that the marriage act was driven by a 
pressing societal demand pertaining to a large section of the population that 
extends its jurisdiction to the inner affairs of the church. In fact as one bishop 
pointed out neither homosexual marriage, nor blessings of registered 
partnerships are often seen in the church relative to heterosexuals (Søgaard, 
2012). Following the analysis of the policy and Davie's ideas, I would argue that 
during the policy debates the Folkekirke played as an important site of national 
belonging, as the church community represents vicarious religion.  
In her most recent book On the Muslim Question (2013), Anne Norton 
noted how sex and sexuality in the west has become a site of fundamental 
disagreement among philosophers and politicians alike. ‘This is the terrain of the 
cultural wars, and underneath […] debates of sex and sexuality, equality and the 
sanctity of the family, the role of women, culture and rights, continue unabated’ 
(Norton, 2013: 45). As one example Anne Norton points to how the 
controversial Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn (assassinated in 2002) through his 
open and flamboyant homosexuality, enabled his supporters to affirm their 
sexual tolerance even as they manifested their immigrant intolerance. The effect, 
she claims, was that sexual freedom came to substitute political freedom 
(Norton, 2013: 56). Was something similar at stake in the case of the same-sex 
marriage act? Did the politicians downplay religious freedom of the vicarious 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
 
Statistics Denmark, 2014a; 2014b; 2014c. However, investigating these 
numbers, I found these official numbers to be subject to some uncertainty 
because of category confusion in collection and processing of data by Statistics 
Denmark, The Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs and the county registrars.  
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religion (the national church) in the name of sexual freedom for the 
heterosexual majority protecting a sexual homosexual minority? 
Interestingly, Jasbir Puar has offered a framework to approach when 
homosexuality is included in ‘liberal discourses of multiculturalism and 
diversity’ (Puar, 2007: 77), in order to strengthen the national narrative, but at 
the same time drawing up the boundaries of ‘us’ and the ‘others’. She coined it 
homonationalism to signify ‘…how “acceptance” and “tolerance” for gay and 
lesbian subjects, who have become a barometer by which the right to and 
capacity for national sovereignty is evaluated.’ (Puar 2007: 336). As is also 
Norton's argument, Puar claims that politicians publicly embracing 
homosexuality are often deeply embedded in a particular national interpretation 
of freedom, emancipation and citizen rights. In this way, mainstream political 
discourse recognizing a certain version of homosexuality can come to disqualify 
or even contribute to racial and sexual segregation from the national imaginary 
if certain groups does not fall within the limits of ‘us’ (Puar 2007: 336). Why? As 
the Danish scholar on culture and sexuality Michael Nebeling Petersen points 
out, homosexual citizens do not represent evil forces threatening public morality 
as they did in the political discourse in the 19th and the first half of the 20th 
century. Today rather than threatening the national community they are now a 
demonstration of the national community (Petersen, 2014: 74; see also Bech, 
1992). In that connection, Puar points out that ‘queer’ not only designates 
something other than heterosexuality, it also points to what exactly is not in 
accordance to normality or common norms (see Puar, 2007: 24).  
If we apply the notion of homonationalism to the contested ideas of the 
policy, we might start to question not only the right of a secular state to interfere 
in the inner affairs of a religious community, but also of the political thinking 
behind the amended marriage act. If homosexuality is part of a common national 
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narrative of Danish peoplehood, how are other religious communities then 
evaluated if further equality between religious communities is obtained? That is, 
will the marriage act be part of a ‘homonationalism’ underscoring the otherness 
of non-Christians, or even groups not open to accept same-sex marriage in their 
belief system? Was the policy also an attempt to make sure the church was not 
turning queer (in the sense of deviating too much from public norms)?  
 
5.5. Concluding remarks: Danish secularism and symbolic recognition  
As the analysis has shown in this chapter, there are some rules of conduct when 
it comes to the regulation between religious communities and the state in 
Denmark. These rules of conduct we could also call a doctrine of separation or a 
tradition of Danish secularism. In the policy analysis, we observed that the legal 
and institutional arrangement of the Folkekirke is regulated with concern of 
religious freedom, either for the religious communities or the individual 
Folkekirke pastor to choose in accordance with their conscience. Furthermore, 
the Folkekirke’s corporate freedom (or autonomy) was a point of contestation as 
many opposition MPs stressed the tradition of regulatory restraint as important 
for the Folkekirke as a community, somewhat independent from the state in 
matters of internal affairs. Here, the concern was not so much for the religious 
neutrality of the state or the parliament, as it was for the protection of the 
Folkekirke from politics.  
Thus in this specific policy debate, while most political parties 
acknowledged the constitutional establishment, it appeared that disagreement 
was structured in terms of how they interpreted the connection between Danish 
peoplehood and the Folkekirke. As will also be touched upon in the next chapter, 
some interpret this connection as merely a cultural tradition not standing in the 
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way of other religious communities’ place in Danish peoplehood. Others 
maintain that religious equality would threaten the deep roots of Danish identity 
and fundamental values. In the first case inequality is only symbolically 
supported (in practice by affirming article 4 in the constitution), but at the same 
time treating everybody as equals is a declared agenda for all the policy-
supporting parties (i.e. to give all religious communities similar rights and 
duties). In the other case religious equality is more or less explicitly rejected (KF 
and DF directly, while V is silent on the issue), with reference to the deep and 
natural link between Danes and the Christianity of the Folkekirke.  
In relation to a republican understanding of citizenship, the first position 
can be criticized for not respecting the equality of citizenship. This is understood 
as the recognition of all citizen’s equal inclusion in the political community by 
the state (the republican egalitarian argument that the state should treat all 
citizens equal both legally and symbolically, see Laborde, 2013: 85). Besides this 
republican objection, the other position in addition might also be criticized for 
their too exclusive particularistic vision of Danish peoplehood by linking some 
political values with a specific Christian church and theological tradition. Here it 
may not only be historically, but act as a guideline for religious governance 
today. Thus, equality between religious communities is not acceptable, as this 
would threaten the coherence and foundation of Danish identity. Such a 
peoplehood is difficult to rhyme with even a minimalistic understanding of 
equality from a political liberal perspective. Yet an interpretation of religious 
freedom as not only individual or collective but corporate, may also criticize the 
government’s policy for granting the Folkekirke too little co-decision in its own 
internal affairs (see also the next chapter on this discussion).  
Given the apparent overlap between notions of separation (between the 
state and the Folkekirke) and peoplehood in the case of same-sex marriage, the 
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theoretical framework developed in earlier chapters thus becomes relevant. In 
this terminology, what the different positions on Danish secularism share is a 
similar conceptual morphological structure. They both ground their boundary-
setting of religion and politics in a Lutheran conception of secular law (the 
Folkekirke as a public law entity), coupled with a particularistic type of 
peoplehood. However, it is especially when it comes to the additional quasi-
contingent category of religious equality that they differ. This I argue is at the 
same time what draws the line between what basic liberal justice can justify and 
what it cannot (following Laborde's reading of Rawls, see chapter 2). 
When one political discourse supports a symbolic establishment, and insists 
on treating anybody as equals irrespective of religious persuasion I argue it is a 
type of principled distance, and thus hold the potential to reside within the 
parameters of political liberalism. In the case of same-sex marriages, we saw 
how the left-wing government struggled to strike a balance between such liberal 
principles of religious freedom and equality of sexual orientation on the one 
side, and their dependence on an existing social imaginary (particularistic 
Danish peoplehood) on the other. They tried to maintain a formal equality 
between all religious communities, arguing that the policy pertained to all 
authorities of legal marriage be they civil or religious. Though in practice, it was 
only the Folkekirke in the form of its bishops which saw itself as obliged to 
implement the policy into actual rituals. At the same time they pointed to the 
cultural and symbolic importance of the Folkekirke. This of course, put the 
government in an awkward position in relation to its other policy agenda of 
further autonomy for the Folkekirke.  
Following Laborde, it is possible to make the argument based on 
mainstream Rawlsian liberal justice that some form of Danish modest 
establishment can be justified (see chapter 2). As we saw in this chapter, the 
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traditional separation doctrine in Danish politics has been based on an arm's 
length policy of regulatory restraint, but when this principle is challenged, it is 
difficult to maintain the liberal principle of treating all religious communities as 
equals. 
In this respect, it is not surprising that both civil and religious (i.e. 
Folkekirke) marriages were legalized for same-sex couples. Traditionally, the 
national church has been a central site for affirmation of Danish peoplehood as a 
vicarious (official) religion. The theme of sexual tolerance might be a difficult 
question for the vicarious religion to deal with, but it might also function as a 
normative compass in the troubled waters of multiculturalization for a, until not 
many years ago, highly homogeneous population. If homosexuality now is part 
of the national narrative of Danish peoplehood, how are other religious 
communities then evaluated if further formal equality between religious 
communities is to be obtained?  
In an increasingly multicultural context, the state and the government find 
it still more difficult to legitimize interventions like the 2012 marriage act. 
Again, the apparent problem is religious equality vis-à-vis peoplehood. Even 
though the Folkekirke enjoys certain privileges compared to other religious 
communities, the church is so vulnerable to political intervention that it might 
not compensate the advantages. This may explain why only few of the 
‘dissenting’ religious communities have complained about their formally 
unequal religious status, in comparison to the Folkekirke. They know that there 
are strings attached.  
Nevertheless according to republican political liberalism they should be 
concerned about both the constitutionally privileged Folkekirke and new 
marriage legislation. The ‘modest establishment’ of Denmark constitutes 
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symbolically an unequal recognition of citizenship (on this point, see also 
Laborde 2013: section IV). The Folkekirke is not only a peculiar historical 
artifact and a church for the majority of the Danish population; it is symbolically 
an important site of the people. The Christian symbols, which the Evangelical-
Lutheran church of Denmark is considered to be heir to, permeate virtually 
every official symbol (see also Adriansen, 2003). As things stand now, the 
question of the relationship between the Folkekirke and the state concerns all 
Danish citizens, as it affects certain central elements of its peoplehood. When the 
2012 marriage acts were passed and thus applied to the rituals and self-image of 
the Folkekirke, it also concerned a certain vision of Danish peoplehood. 
As we saw in this chapter, one of the most salient points of debate was not 
so much homosexuality and marriage as it was about autonomy of the church 
vis-à-vis the state. Many contributors to the debate pointed out there seemed to 
be a paradox exposed. It should have been the Folkekirke itself taking initiative 
and possibly even deciding whether it wanted to introduce same-sex marriages 
as a religious community. But the Folkekirke neither holds opinion-making or 
decision-making competences in this regard, nor a decision-making body at a 
national level. In this sense, the case of the current governance reform of the 
Folkekirke in the next chapter is intimately connected to this paradox. It can be 
seen as an attempt to solve a problem, which arguably turned 165 years old this 
summer. When the new constitution on the 5th of June 1849 introduced the 
Folkekirke, it also introduced the problem of a state church in an age of religious 
freedom. 
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Chapter 6  Modernizing religious governance?  
 
 
6.1. Introduction  
‘Respecting the special status assigned by the constitution to the Danish 
Folkekirke the government wish to arrange a more modern and clear structure 
of governance’. Coalition statement by the government, 2011.  
 
his opening quote represents the first explicit attempt by a government 
to reform the relationship between the Folkekirke and the state for ¾ of 
a century. With the former chapter analyzing the political circumstances, 
meaning and tensions of the same government's decision to legalize civil and 
church same-sex marriages, one could argue that the current case of 
modernizing church governance is quite an opposite agenda. While both cases 
arguably operate under assumptions of promoting modern conditions of 
marriages and church-state relations, the former does so at the expense of the 
latter. The reason is that the former had to take advantage of the state's pre-
constitutional right to regulate the inner affairs of the Folkekirke. While the 
latter, as we shall see in this chapter, tries to grant the Folkekirke more 
autonomy from the state on exactly such issues in addition to economical 
governance.  
As we see from the quote, the efforts to reform the governance of the 
Folkekirke are framed by ideas of transparency and modernization. Of course, 
the question is what such modernization reforms would entail?  
On the one hand we have seen a constant flow of reforms adapting and 
attuning the church organization, in order to make it more aligned with other 
T 
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state administration entities governed by public law. From that perspective, the 
current reform efforts which as we shall see, are explicitly drawing on the 
former two decades of reforms (of HR, economy, IT, local governance structures, 
etc.), and can be understood as part of the constant and incremental 
development. This incremental and ad hoc regulation appears to be a distinctive 
mark of the modern history of the Folkekirke, which is sometimes underlined as 
a virtue of state officials, politicians and public opinion makers alike. 
Modernization of church governance from such a perspective would entail only 
rule clarifications and simplification.  
On the other hand, there is an alternative string present potentially sewing 
disharmony in the above perspective. It comes from two sides. Internally, the 
problem seems to be the constant resignation of memberships of the Folkekirke 
of around 1 out of 250 each year, a strong decrease in the number of new 
members (children baptized), and a general decrease of the use of core functions 
such as confirmation, marriages and funerals (Krak, 2012; however see also 
Lüchau, 2012, who shows that changes in the membership basis is slow but and 
gradual). In addition there is an exceedingly low level of participation of the 
members in the democratic bodies in the Folkekirke, resulting in a lack of 
legitimacy (Dabelsteen and Rostbøll, 2013). Externally, the composition of the 
general population has been undergoing a very fast cultural and religious 
pluralization during the last half a century, a development which by no 
indication will stop. As Lisbet Christoffersen has pointed out ‘…almost 25 
percent of the Danes are not members of the Folkekirke. Almost 10 percent is 
something else like Muslim, Buddhist, Eastern Church-Christian or free church 
members. Almost 15 percent of Danes are not at all members of any religious 
community. It is a growing number… It is not a sustainable situation, that the 
minister decides everything, when not everyone is part of the Folkekirke’ 
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(Christoffersen as quoted in Rehling, 2014b). Modernization in this case points 
to more substantial reforms.  
This chapter will analyze the ideological language and meaning of the 
reform policy so far, by looking at the conflicting political arguments in the 
debate which was sparked by the new government taking office in 2011. It 
begins by fleshing out the historical context to the reform policy in section 6.2, 
before turning to an analysis of the central available texts of the current policy 
process in section 6.3. The final section 6.4 will conclude by relating the 
discussion to the earlier chapters. 
 
6.2. Historical context of the policy 
In this section we will both briefly revisit the 4 former official attempts to realize 
article 66 in the constitution (a church constitution see Folketinget, 1999), and 
in the following subsection touch upon the most important aspects of the recent 
decades of church governance developments. 
 
6.2.1. Four former proposals 
If the current 2012-committee's work results in a governmental legislative 
proposal, it would not be the first time in Danish political history this has 
happened. In fact, from the period of 1848 to 1940 a range of proposals have 
been tried out politically, but of no avail as they all failed. However, it might be 
instructive to look upon the proposals before turning to current affairs. The 
following brief section will not go into detail with the proposals, as these have 
been described thoroughly by Glædemark (1948), Iversen (1992), Gammeltoft-
Hansen, 2006: 411-412, Rasmussen (2011; 2012), Andersen (2012), and in a 
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supplement to Report 1544 (Kirkeministeriet, 2014a). Instead the following is 
based on these sources.  
The first proposal was made by Monrad in 1848 described in a legal order 
(‘cirkulære’) and was an attempt to order the church-state relation, as the new 
free constitution was to come into force. ‘…The political changes happening will 
be fundamentally influencing the Danish Folkekirke and it must in particular be 
the undertaking of the government to realize the same principles in the church 
as has been exercised in the state’ (Monrad quoted in Rasmussen, 2011: 57).73 
However, it was never to be followed through as Monrad withdrew from 
government shortly after and thus there was no one to promote it.  
Four years and a constitution would have to pass before the first actual 
church committee to consider a constitution was appointed in 1853, by the 
Minister of Educational and Ecclesiastical Affairs Anders Sandøe Ørsted. All 18 
members agreed on establishing local parish councils,74 but were divided on a 
national church council (9 proposed an advisory assembly with a right to be 
consulted in church legislation, 7 proposed a council of bishops fixed by law). 
The recommendations were never made into concrete legislative proposals 
however, as a new government meanwhile took office and Carl Christian Hall 
became Minister of Educational and Ecclesiastical Affairs.  
                                               
 
 
73 According to Rasmussen, this text was the first to mention the name 
Folkekirke, literally meaning people-church, was officially used (Rasmussen 
2011: 57). 
74 At this point there were no elected bodies with opinion-making or decision-
making competences at any level of the Folkekirke organization, see J. C. 
Christensen's reforms below. 
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A private group of church leaders and political intellectuals called 'The 
Twelve' composed a new private proposal in 1856, where some of the most 
important members were overlapping from the former committee. The result 
was quite similar to the former committee's majority proposal, but firstly the 
church council members were now to be elected by districts. Secondly, the 
council also was imagined to hold a right to be consulted in matters of 
administration.  
In 1859 Monrad composed a new official proposal, this time a church 
constitution within which elected councils at local (parishes), regional 
(deaneries) and highest, national levels were to be established. The latter 
national church council had the right to be consulted and give consent to 
regulation by most royal decrees, and a general access to comment on 
government policies related to the church. This was criticized for granting too 
much influence to lay people (by the Conservatives), or too little (by the 
Grundvigians).  
Seven years after the last proposal dissolved in disagreement within church 
circles, Prime Minister Christian Emil Krag-Juel-Vind-Frijs appointed a church 
committee of 23 members in 1868. A majority of committee members proposed 
a church council divided by mainly lay persons and the clergy, with fewer 
bishops and theological and legal experts added. But due to change of minister 
seats, no legislative proposal was introduced as Hall again became the Minister 
of Educational and Ecclesiastical Affairs.  
An actual Church Council was administratively appointed in 1883 by 
Minister of Educational and Ecclesiastical Affairs Jacob Scavenius, which 
functioned as an advisory body to the minister until it was abolished by royal 
decree in 1901 by the Minister of Educational and Ecclesiastical, Jens Christian 
  
222 
Christensen (since it was never established by law). However, two years later 
Christensen instead introduced local parish councils and a national church 
committee for a 6 year test period from 1903. While the parish councils were 
written permanently into law in 1912 and are in existence today, the church 
committee despite having functioned almost as a church council was never 
made permanent. 
Finally, in 1928 the last church committee to be appointed was proposed by 
the Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs Fritz Charles Bruun-Rasmussen. Though 
parliament saw a sufficient majority to approve the committee, they were deeply 
divided on the issue. The committee presented its recommendations twelve 
years later in 1940, but it itself was deeply divided and had only minority 
recommendations. The largest minority (10 out of 26) recommended 
establishing an elected church council with a right to be consulted and a 
requirement of consent in internal matters (4 additional members supported 
the motion without the requirement of consent). Besides the deep division in the 
committee, the Second World War in addition contributed to a legislative 
proposal that was never to be passed.  
Thus, we saw four committees appointed (1853, 1868, 1903, and 1928), 
some central ‘private’ proposals (Monrad's of 1848 and 1859, The Twelve's of 
1856) and a de facto church council between 1883-1901. For the next 72 years 
until the 2012 church committee was appointed, there was no further official 
attempts to settle the question of church governance and administration at a 
national level regulated by one common law.  
Reading the recommendations from 1848 to 1940 which all attempted to 
realize article 66 in the constitution (establishing one coherent law regulating 
the Folkekirke), some common themes emerge. From the start, and as was 
  
223 
mentioned in the debates of the founding constitutional assembly, there has 
been an idea of creating a coherent body of legislation for the Folkekirke, a 
constitution. Second, as the new ideas of freedom rights were codified and 
implemented in the constitution, it was expected that the new Folkekirke would 
see reforms both internally and externally to bring it up to date. Third, a central 
premise of such a law would be that the church itself should have some degree 
of self-determination in the form of councils, in particular at local and national 
level. Fourth, these councils were to be predominantly elected councils and not 
purely appointed. Fifth, the composition of these councils were to be mix of both 
laypersons and representatives from the clergy. And finally, legislation 
regulating the church was to be held by the parliament, but with some form of 
institutionalized right to be consulted by the church councils. As we shall see, all 
of these elements are to some degree present in the current reform efforts.  
 
6.2.2. Recent developments leading up to 2011 
As we saw in the last section, there have been serious attempts to systematically 
settle the relationship between the Folkekirke and the state several times, 
especially in the second half of the 19th century. Arguably the current 2012 
committee work finds its roots in these events, but not at least in policy 
developments of the last several decades. Before we arrive at the present time, I 
find it important to observe the most important points of these decades. 
From the municipal reforms in 1970 we saw a general movement in public 
administration towards rule simplification and decentralization, which for the 
Folkekirke meant the start of a transfer of decision-making competences 
particularly regarding church property from the Ministry to the level of dioceses 
(Law no. 260, 4 June 1970). This tendency continued through the 1980's (e.g. 
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Law no. 268, 22 May 1986) up until the 1990's (e.g. consolidated act no. 454, 11 
June 1992). The 1990's also saw rule simplification in other areas such as those 
regulating employment of pastors and the role of local parishes in this. This 
range of structural reforms was both about efficiency and modernizing, but also 
about making clear what the state funds and what it does not.  
As such, some of the same problems of the early attempts to settle the 
arrangement of the Folkekirke was re-experienced, but from an ad hoc and 
piecemeal approach. As one ministerial committee report evaluating the 
mentioned reforms, in addition to the Folkekirke economy published in 1982 
stated ‘The Folkekirke performs a range a tasks which technically is not related 
to the church but which are conducted by the Folkekirke for the whole society to 
enjoy… It is thus a fact that the Folkekirke relieve society of a significant sum 
through the conduct of these functions’ (Report 952 as quoted in Folketinget, 
2003). The new reforms were about identifying which functions the Folkekirke 
administered on behalf of the state, and thereby to evoke greater 
trustworthiness in the arrangement of the state funding civil services delivered 
by the church.  
These reform laws were part of the material discussed in the ministerial 
Simplification Committee's report no. 1405, published in two parts during 2000-
2001. The first part of report 1405 dealt with the need ‘to simplify laws and 
bureaucracy’ but also to ‘create a better foundation of information on the 
economy of the Folkekirke, in order to engage in or prevent criticism’, as the 
government's mandate to the committee stated (Kirkeministeriet, 2000: sec. 
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1.2.).75 In the report it was stated that the last 10-15 years represented an 
almost total reformulation of church laws to ‘modernize and simply’ form and 
content, and to decentralize. However, the committee also reported a need for 
less bureaucracy and greater local participation in decision-making 
(Simplification Committee, 2000: sec. 1.1).  
The Simplification Committee was appointed in 1999 by the then Minister 
of Ecclesiastical Affairs, Magrethe Vestager (RV). In an address following its first 
publication she stated at the National Association of Parish Councils that ‘…in 
recent years there has been much debate around the Folkekirke on the need for 
                                               
 
 
75 Criticism in this case might have referred to the debate sparked by the 
increasing sense of dissatisfaction with the stance of the Folkekirke in civil 
society and in relation to the state; see e.g. the influential anthology of leading 
theologians called The Mouth and Voice of the Church [‘Kirkens Mund og Mæle’], 
see Auken et al. (eds., 1992). There has been a steady flow of publications 
debating the Folkekirke – to mention but a few important since: The Folkekirke 
Arrangement From a Theological Perspective [‘Folkekirkeordningen teologisk 
belyst’], see Kirkeligt Samfund, 1992; a theme issue in the journal Kritisk Forum 
for praktisk teologi called God, King and Country [‘Gud, konge og fædreland’], see 
Kjems and Bundgaard-Nielsen, 2001; Shut Down the Folkekirke – The Ambulant 
Deathbed [‘Nedlæg Folkekirken – Et oppegående dødsleje’], see Bjerg and 
Steffensen, 2003; Folkekirke? The Church in the Danish Society [‘Folkekirke? 
Kirken i det danske samfund’], see Lindhardt, 2005; God Save Denmark. 
Confronting the Secularism [‘Gud bevare Danmark. Et opgør med sekularisme’], 
see Bjerager, 2006; Anthology of Ecclesiastical Law: The Folkekirke deciding for 
itself [‘Folkekirken selv’], see Christensen et al (eds.), 2007; and Church 
Constitution [‘Kirkeforfatning’], see Andersen et al. (eds.), 2012; and the ongoing 
debate in the monthly Grundtvigian journal Danish Church Tindings [‘Dansk 
Kirketidende’], the Inner Mission weekly Inner Mission Tindings [‘Indre Missions 
Tidende’] and the national conservative and anti-modernist Turn of Times 
[‘Tidehverv’], along with the national newspaper Christian Daily [‘Kristeligt 
Dagblad’].  
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partially new structures and a need for new life and activities in the churches. 
We are approaching a time, where a lot of these debates will end up in decisions 
of changes’ (Vesstager as quoted by Vincents, 2000). Here, we saw an emerging 
ministerial attention to reforms more comprehensive than the earlier ad hoc 
economic and structural changes.  
To be sure, the succeeding Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs in the same 
government, Johannes Lebech (RV), reiterated this message at the annual 
meeting of the National Association of Parish Councils two years later. ‘I can't 
help provoke by asking, has the time come where we must work intensely on 
changing the apparently unchangeable structure of the Folkekirke? Has the time 
come, where we erase some of the centuries old boundaries and possibly end up 
unite the existing parishes and churches to e.g. 500 larger parishes?’ (Lebech, 
2001). He later asked the Simplification Committee to look into this, which was 
never realized in their final report, possibly as the appointed committee was ‘… 
too narrow a forum to discuss final recommendations of such matter.’ As bishop 
Søren Lodberg Hvas noted (Hvas quoted in Sørensen, 2001).  
Some weeks before Lebech's suggestion, the same Hvas had proposed that a 
ministerial commission dedicated to discuss the overall structure of the 
Folkekirke in order to improve the internal democracy should be appointed 
(Hvas, 2001). However Lebech rejected this on the grounds that such a 
discussion should not be taken in a committee as ‘the association of parish 
councils has expressed concern for a structure commission… and I do not have 
political support for such a thing…’ (Lebech quoted in Sørensen 2001).  
While no commission or committee was appointed, a smoldering debate on 
the overall structure had nevertheless been revitalized within church and 
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political circles. This was significantly noted after the decision in Sweden to 
strongly relax the link between the established church and the state in 2000.  
With the new center-right government in place in 2001, the debate not only 
questioned how state funding and organizational reforms were best conducted, 
but a related debate was raised concerning who holds the right to govern the 
internal affairs of the Folkekirke? The question was especially accentuated after 
the newly elected Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs Tove Fergo (V), announced 
that a long-planned new edition of the officially authorized hymnbook of 1953 
would be stopped (a ministerial committee had been working on a proposal for 
years), as she did not see a need for a new edition. The debate came to center 
around on the one side whether the minister could and should stop such work 
related to internal affairs, and on the other side whether the bishops (who led 
the hymn book work) were editing the new edition without appropriately 
consulting the local parishes (Iversen, 2008: 153-157). As bishop Hvas 
concluded ‘this whole process exposed quite different opinions of who decide in 
matters of the Folkekirke's internal affairs’ (Hvas qouted by Havmand, 2002). 
Nevertheless, the case isolated the minister politically and provoked requests 
from the Social Democrats, The Christian People's Party and Radikale Venstre on 
imposing restrictions to state regulation of the church. ‘Normally I have been 
reluctant in the discussion, but my opinion has changed after Tove Fergo. We 
have seen a conflict of positions between the minister and the representatives of 
the church, which is not appropriate in normal procedures. She has simply 
broken the respect for written and unwritten rules’ as the spokesperson for RV, 
Niels Helveg Petersen stated (Petersen as quoted in Madsen, 2003). Jan Sjursen 
from Christian People's Party specified ‘After the new government came to 
power it has been even more urgent with a clearer distribution of competences 
between state and church, because Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs Tove Fergo 
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simply interfere too much in the internal affairs of the church’ (Sjursen as 
quoted in Madsen, 2003). Fergo ended up accepting the revision of the 
hymnbook after substantial criticism from the media.  
As has been argued elsewhere (e.g. Selskab for Kirkeret, 2012: 161-163), 
this case contributed to a concern that there was a gradual shift in the use of 
state intervention in Folkekirken's internal affairs. Besides the Marriage Act 
exposing the unsettled aspects of legal competences, another recent illustration 
of such a fear concerned the abolishing of the public holiday, General Prayer 
Day, as a part of the tripartite talks between the unions, the employers' 
organizations and the government in 2012. The talks concerned the need to 
increase competitiveness and productivity, and taking out just this day was 
estimated to be a revenue-raising exercise worth at least 2 billion kroners for 
the state (Damgaard, 2012). The question of religious feasts and holidays are 
normally considered a matter of the internal affairs, but preliminary tripartite 
talks had not consulted the Folkekirke or its organizations before proposing the 
reform initiatives. And again (besides practical complaints that parents need the 
day off to prepare their children's confirmation celebrations), the respect of 
internal affairs was a prevalent argument. As bishop Peter Fischer-Møller 
objected in the public debate ‘…the question of the General Prayer Day is a case 
which is not without importance to the church… Therefore the labor market 
parties and the government should consult the relevant actors of the church 
before potentially making any agreements’ (Fischer-Møller as quoted in 
Politiken, 2012).  
Both the hymnbook and the holiday case resulted in a public debate critical 
of the government proposals and therefore it did not go through. In both cases, 
the debate was as much about the original political arguments (the 
appropriateness of a new hymnbook and competitiveness versus holidays) as a 
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discussion of the limits of state interference in church affairs. From this 
perspective, the same-sex marriage case followed the same path. It started with 
a concern for non-discrimination of sexual orientation in respect to state 
recognition of legal living arrangements. But as we saw in the previous chapter, 
the government managed to get the amended marriage act passed, even though 
the debate also shifted to the fundamental question of limits to state 
intervention in the Folkekirke's internal affairs. When the former Minister of 
Ecclesiastical Affairs, Per Stig Møller attended the annual meeting of the National 
Association of Parishes in 2011 he too stressed that the whole legislative 
process of the parliament legislating on behalf of the church (about same-sex 
marriage) exposed a weakness in the arrangement of the Folkekirke, as it does 
not have a church council to decide in such matters. At this meeting he explicitly 
encouraged the Folkekirke to start thinking about making a church constitution 
proposed by parishes and pastors (Kirkeministeriet, 2011a). 
Thus, when the new center-left government took office in 2011, the idea of 
trying to arrange the relationship between the state and church at a general and 
more principled level was not a new one. If we look further into the period of the 
center-right governments between 2001-2011, there was a still stronger will to 
reform the Folkekirke arrangement. Additionally at the same time, we saw a 
reluctance to open up this discussion by the different minsters of ecclesiastical 
affairs.  
As such, Fergo sustained Lebech's refusal to appoint a structure 
commission despite the wishes from both the bishops and the National 
Association of Parish Councils (Vincents, 2005). The succeeding Minister of 
Ecclesiastical Affairs, Bertal Haarder (V), also adapted this political course. ‘First 
of all we have a municipal reform which means that denary boundaries are to be 
changed. Therefore I appoint a committee […] It might be that in the wake of the 
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committee's work a few adjustments will be made, but I do not support the big 
and all-embracing solution’ (Haarder quoted in Hornemann, 2005). The reform 
mentioned was concerned about economic and structural changes on a rather 
large scale, but it was more a clarification of competences than changes of them 
or in general pertaining to the church-state relationship (see Kirkeministeriet, 
2006; and Kirkeministeriet, 2007). The purpose appeared to be a 
‘modernization’ of the structure and administration to prepare the church ‘…to 
work on giving its members more church for the same money. Or even better, 
more church for less money…’ as the minister proclaimed (Haarder, 2007).  
The next minister on the post, Birthe Rønn Hornbech (V), also affirmed the 
political agenda of ad hoc-reforms without large-scale changes. In her period in 
office two further initiatives was taken in the direction of structural reforms, 
which were both important steps towards the current 2012 committee's work, 
which is worth mentioning.  
The first was a ministerial committee appointed in 2008 to look into 
changing state grants from financing specific entries in the budget (such as 40 
percent of pastor wages or all of their retirement pensions etc.), to a block grant 
possibly administered by a democratically elected budget reference group on 
behalf of the Common Fund, which resulted in report 1511 (Kirkeministeriet, 
2009).  
It was not the first time such a proposal for changing the economic support 
of the state to the Folkekirke was introduced, nor was the motivation behind it 
new. Four times previously this has occurred in modern times, where there had 
  
231 
been proposals and discussions about block grants.76 The first proposal in 1991 
by SF was inspired by then bishop Herluf Eriksen's ideas. He argued that it 
would easier to justify the Danish state funding the church if the funding was 
directed not to pastor wages, but to the services the Folkekirke delivers on 
behalf of the state (i.e. maintenance of cultural heritage, funeral service and 
cemeteries, marriages, civil registration, and cultural activities, see also 
Kirkeministeriet, 2009: 45-62). Otherwise, it would look too much like a secular 
state funding religious activities of only one religious community, and only 
funding purely state functions. If reformed, the church could also decide on its 
own affairs regarding hiring pastors, allocation of funds to new church 
initiatives etc. (as cited by the parliamentary Church committee in Folketinget, 
2003).  
What was characteristic about the succeeding variations of the block grant 
reform proposals was that they had all been motivated by roughly the same 
concern: a clarification of economic state-church arrangements and further self-
determination to the church in core church functions. At the same time, these 
proposals met criticism. Firstly, it was conceibved that such reforms might 
function as a preparation for a full divorce between the state and the church. As 
Birthe Rønn Hornbech argued in the parliamentary debate of the first block 
                                               
 
 
76 There were three parliamentary motions all referred to the parliamentary 
church committee after the first parliamentary negotiation; see B 57 by SF 
(Folketinget, 1991), B 80 and B 115 by the Christian People's Party (Folketinget, 
2000; and Folketinget, 2003). Later in 2003, a ministerial committee was 
similarly appointed to compose different models for block grants (cf. 
Kirkeministeriet, 2003), but was rejected by the minister after negative 
consultation views. 
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grant proposal: ‘…to make such a clear distinction between state and church 
affairs as the proposers does, is, according to Venstre, in violation with article 4 
in the constitution, which as we all know establish a special obligation of the 
state towards the Danish Folkekirke as an Evangelical Lutheran church’ 
(Hornbech as quoted in Kirkeministeriet, 2003: 42). Secondly, transferring the 
authority as employer for the pastors from the state to the church would 
potentially threaten pastor's theological freedom. As Karen J. Klint (S) argued in 
the 2000 parliamentary debate, status quo: ‘…makes us certain that we have free 
preaching because we have a Folkekirke' (Kirkeministeriet, 2003: 44). If a 
secular state formally hires the pastors then no theological pressure would be 
put on them, unless they stepped aside the Articles of Faith. Finally, there was a 
concern for economic and structural reforms as having hidden budget 
reductions, which both the proposers and their opposition were against 
(Kirkeministeriet, 2003: 42). 
All former proposals had been rejected and so was the 2009 report, in 
which all committee members representing the Folkekirke (the bishops, deans, 
pastors and parish councils) rejected block grants in general (Kirkeministeriet, 
2009: 31). Furthermore, in the following consultation process there was an 
overwhelming negative response (see the consultation minute, Kirkeministeriet, 
2010b). As a conclusion to these (dismissive) recommendations the Minister of 
Ecclesiastical Affairs, Birthe Rønn Hornbech made it public at a summit meeting 
for Folkekirke leaders shortly after. ‘The message is clear and neither Ventre, the 
Conservative People's Party nor the Danish People's Party wants this. This, I 
have told the Finance Minister’ Hornbech quoted in Vincents, 2010).  
In these string of block grant reforms proposals, we saw the same pattern 
as mentioned before. The discussion of an administrative or organizational 
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reform turned into a discussion of protecting the Folkekirke and its relation to 
the state.  
This pattern was also present in the second ministerial initiative under 
Hornbech, which regarded the permanent implementation of diocese councils in 
2009 (see Lov nr. 506, 2009). This was a significant reform as it established a 
third, and as yet highest level of elected councils in the Folkekirke organization 
(the other two being local parish councils and deanery councils). The policy was 
motivated by ‘…a wish from the bishops to contribute to a democratization of 
the statutory diocese committees regarding economy… by granting a decision-
making mandate as this would be good for the Folkekirke democracy.’77 While 
the final 2009 proposal did not meet substantial resistance from the Folkekirke 
organizations in general (see the consultation minute, Kirkeministeriet, 2008a) 
or at the political level (the proposal to make the councils permanent was 
unanimously agreed upon in parliament, see Folketinget, 2009a), some criticism 
was aired. It came especially from the Social Democrats and the Danish People's 
Party, arguing that the legislative proposal represented too little or too much 
top-down governance. The spokesperson from the former party Karen J. Klint, 
complained that ‘I am seriously tired of this kind of bit-by-bit legislation instead 
of looking at a holistic solution for the Folkekirke. I would much rather see a 
discussion of how we arrange the economy and leadership of the Folkekirke in 
the future’ (Klint as quoted in Vincents, 2009; a view also supported by SF and 
RV, see Folketinget, 2009a: 1st neg. contrib. 8 and 36). This contrasted with the 
                                               
 
 
77 The diocese councils were introduced in 2002 in a test period, evaluated in 
2007-2008 (see report 1495, Kirkeministeriet, 2008b) and then made 
permanent in 2009 by law.  
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objection from the latter party, where the MP Søren Krarup noted ‘I am really 
not doubting the good intentions. I only wish to warn against this belief that we 
should help the Folkekirke… I know of nothing more dangerous than this 
helping-the-church; helping the slightly backward people in the local parishes, 
because it means that common people become declared incapable of managing 
one's own affairs….’ (Folketinget, 2009a: 1st neg. contrib. 24). In these two 
quotes we recognize on the one hand a wish for more self-determination for the 
Folkekirke, and on the other hand a fear of too much top-down governance 
limiting the decentralized and free organization at the parish level and therefore 
threatening the close church-state relation.  
Certainly, there have been more initiatives raised within the last decades 
than mentioned here, but I have selected the most important ones in order to 
render probable the tendency of an increasing sense of the need for certain 
reforms. These accommodate developments in demography, urbanization, and 
the religious composition of the population, at the same time when different 
ministers have wished to follow a gradual ad hoc approach to reforms. As we 
saw in chapter 4, the latter approach has arguably been the preferred political 
solution since 1849. However, if we look at the official position taken by the 
national political parties regarding the fundamental church-state relationship, 
the balance between these two positions is slowly shifting.  
While The Conservative People's Party (see Det Konservative Folkeparti, 
2014) and the Danish People's Party (see Dansk Folkeparti, 2002) are 
supporting a preservation of status quo of the institutional and legal 
arrangement, Venstre is open to some degree of modernization and clarification 
of the relation but only to maintain the church's special position in society (see 
Venstre, 2014b). In contrast, Enhedslisten (2014) and Radikale Venstre (2014), 
are parties officially supporting full separation of Folkekirke and state in order 
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to obtain further religious equality. Further, the Socialistisk Folkeparti, Liberal 
Alliance and the Social Democrats are explicitly supporting greater equality 
between religious communities, but maintain that it should still be within the 
constitutional framework, respecting some form of traditional establishment 
(see Socialistisk Folkeparti, 2014b; Socialdemokraterne, 2014; Liberal Alliance, 
2014; Folketinget, 2009b and Schou, 2011). It has not been specified by any of 
the parties exactly how greater equality should be realized, but the ongoing 
process of reforming the church governance is an interesting place to better 
understand the development of these positions. 
 
6.3. Analysis of the actual policy 
As mentioned, the policy in case is the first governmental attempt to reform the 
church-state relationship as a whole in 72 years. In the coalition statement from 
2011 we can read ‘The constitution assigns the Danish Folkekirke a special 
position. While observing the constitutional special position of the Folkekirke, 
the government wishes to arrange a more modern and clear governance 
structure for the Danish Folkekirke, cf. also article 66 in the constitution “The 
constitution of the Folkekirke is established by law”. The government will 
appoint a committee which shall provide proposals to a more coherent and 
modern governance structure for the Folkekirke with a clear distribution of 
responsibility for economic and substantive matters’ (Regeringen, 2011: 74).  
In the spring of 2012 the newly elected minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs 
Manu Sareen (RV), held a conference on the future of the church including all 
branches of the church landscape to officially start the process described in the 
coalition statement (Ministeriet for Ligestilling og Kirke, 2012b). At the 
conference, it was discussed how to clarify the responsibilities for economy and 
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content in the Folkekirke, with the wider aim of ensuring a broad and inclusive 
church in the future (Ministeriet for Ligestilling og Kirke, 2012b). In September 
2012, the ‘Committee on a more coherent and modern governance of the 
Folkekirke’ was established, with the support of all political parties (Ministeriet 
for Ligestilling og Kirke, 2012c). The committee's mandate was to consider if 
and how the promissory clause 66 in the constitution could be realized by 
creating ‘a clear connection between different links in the governance structure, 
so to change the structure as necessary and possibly to complement it with one 
or several new democratic bodies, and to establish clear rules for the 
distribution of responsibility… especially in relation to the common economy of 
the Folkekirke and the substantial matters of the Folkekirke’ (Kirkeministeriet, 
2014a: 12). This agenda of the government and the work of the committee is to a 
large extent a response, or a continuation, of the considerations and 
developments described in the former section.  
At the time of writing, this chapter the policy in question had not yet 
resulted in a concrete legislative proposal from the government to be discussed 
in parliament. According to the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs the plan will be 
to compose a legislative proposal based on report 1544, as well as the 
consultations and the public debate, which will then enter political negotiations 
and possible revisions. Finally, the proposal will be sent via consultation in 
order to be proposed to parliament in the new parliamentary year, starting in 
October 2014 (Kirkeministeriet, 2014b). That is, if the government finds 
sufficient political backing.  
When the unresolved policy is analyzed here, it is because a substantial 
amount of texts are already available to analyze the ideological language and the 
forms of decontestation of the policy. Especially I focus on the committee's 
report 1544 published in April 2014, which both contain a summary of the 
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committee's former discussion paper and the views, which the consultation 
process resulted in, along with the new recommendation by the members (see 
report 1544, Kirkeministeriet, 2014a). Also, of relevance is the views gathered in 
the consultation process of two months after report 1544, published in June 
2014. Finally, I will draw upon the most central political statements in the public 
debate since the government's agenda was revealed in the coalition statement in 
2011. Together with the historical references provided earlier in this chapter, I 
find the available empirical basis sufficient to perform a meaningful analysis of 
the ideological concepts of secularism and peoplehood in this policy. Let is now 
turn to the building blocks of the policy.  
  
6.3.1. Having ears to the ground: Discussing the policy 
In order to understand the concrete ideas and arguments surrounding the policy 
we will have to look into the more specific aspects of the committee work, and 
how they tried to accommodate the vision of the government and the many 
different interests of the Folkekirke landscape.  
As mentioned, the initiative of the policy process was proposed in 2011 in 
the coalition statement and the subsequent appointment of the committee. As 
there has been a tradition of broad agreements in parliament regarding large 
changes in the Folkekirke, it was an important first step for Minister of 
Ecclesiastical Affairs Manu Sareen, to get all parties to support such a committee. 
‘I am incredibly happy that all of the parliamentary parties support the 
appointment of the committee, its assignments and its composition… I hope the 
committee will result in proposals which can find an equally broad support for a 
more modern structure of governance for the Folkekirke’ (Sareen as quoted in 
Information, 2012). 
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Here we see that Sareen himself emphasized the composition of the 
20person committee. It consisted of 11 members representing different 
organizations or elected bodies of the Folkekirke (also representing different 
theological groupings), 3 members including the chairman who are legal 
experts, 3 members who are state representatives (who generally abstain from 
voting on the concrete policy proposals) and 3 members who are politicians. The 
latter category does not represent the full spectrum of the parliament however, 
but only contains members from the three political parties officially in 
opposition to the policy: Venstre, the Danish People's and the Conservative 
People's Party. For example, the Venstre representative Britta Schall Holberg, 
stated the day the committee composition was made public ‘…I enter this work 
with a completely open mind. But at the same time I must admit, that I don't see 
a need for a church constitution’ (Holberg as quoted in Clausen, 2012). From 
Sareen's above quote it appeared that he hoped to accommodate such future 
objections from these parties by including them in the committee, and thereby 
granting them a voice early in the process (on this point, see Clausen, 2012 or 
Rehling, 2012). As we shall see, the committee work did not convince the three 
politicians of the need for a church constitution in the final round of 
recommendation votes, and they pointed to much more minimalistic changes 
(see also Rehling, 2014a). 
After a series of meetings, the committee presented a discussion paper to 
be sent in public consultation (Ministeriet for Ligestilling og Kirke, 2013a). The 
paper contained a brief description of the history, key functions and customary 
political regulation of the Folkekirke (Ministeriet for Ligestilling og Kirke, 
2013a: 4-16; 27-30), but most importantly it contained three models of how to 
better govern the internal affairs and three main models of improved economic 
governance. Besides the option of no reform at all, the models ranged from 
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formalizing the status quo into law to ‘as much self-determination as possible’. 
The two pairs of models were supposed to be thought as parallel as possible in 
order to consider the same elected bodies to govern both functions, and thus 
potentially establishing some variation of a common national decision-making 
body (but also leave open the option not to merge the two areas) (Ministeriet for 
Ligestilling og Kirke, 2013a: 45). 
Regarding the internal affairs, the discussion paper suggested three models. 
The first would entail no new administrative or decision-making bodies or 
change the state-church balance, but would limit the minister's influence by 
writing in law what is now customary practice (such as giving the bishops the 
right to be consulted before regulation, clearer rules of regulation etc.). The 
second model would entail some increased self-determination to the Folkekirke 
by establishing a Church Council consisting of representatives of lay members 
(elected by the parish councils), the clergy, and the ministry and church 
organizations. The Church Council would then have the right to be consulted 
along with the bishops and thereby participate in the decision-making process 
regarding internal affairs, regulated by royal decree. The third model would 
further increase the level of self-determination for the Folkekirke by granting 
the Church Council a right to be heard not only in matter of internal affairs, but 
also other broader Folkekirke matters now regulated by law (e.g. regulation of 
employment of pastors, their education etc.).  
Second, the committee considered three main models regarding the 
economic affairs. Again, the first model did not entail any new bodies or change 
the state-church balance, but would formalize existing arrangements into law. 
These included the duty (currently only a custom) to consult the budget 
reference group (‘budgetfølgegruppen’, the minister's advisory group 
representing Folkekirke interests) and the Folkekirke Common Fund's Joint 
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Council (‘budgetsamrådet’). This model also contained the option to replace 
these two groups with one elected body representing the Folkekirke, and to 
make it mandatory for the minister to present the budget and church tax 
planning to the parliamentary Financial Committee in order to make the process 
more transparent. The second main model would establish a new 
representative, an elected body regarding budget and accounting planning. The 
idea would be either to have an elected body holding decision-making 
competences but within rules established by the minister (which can vary from 
narrow to fairly broad rules, model 2a), or that an elected body and the minister 
must reach consensus before the budget of the Common Fund is approved (with 
the minister holding the ultimate decision-making competence, model 2b). 
Finally, the third model would imply creating a governing body for economic 
affairs for the Folkekirke, with wide decision-making competences regarding 
both prioritizing and proposing budget and church taxes (which will then be 
presented to the minister for approval, who also maintains the right to deny 
such initiatives).  
The three economic models also contained an option similar to the before 
mentioned block grants, either to change to a general grant to the Folkekirke's 
Common Fund or to continue the direct financial support e.g. 40 percent of 
pastor's and dean's salaries. Of course, the different models would have different 
ways to decide how this general state grant to the Folkekirke would be 
distributed. 
The discussion paper is interesting compared to former decades of ad hoc 
reforms, as some of the models envisioned one or more bodies of governance at 
the highest level based on a coherent piece of legislation. This would potentially 
realize article 66 in the constitution promising a church constitution (models 2 
and 3 regarding the internal affairs operated with a 'Church Council', see 
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Ministeriet for Ligestilling og Kirke, 2013a: 18-26, and model 2a, 2b and 3 
regarding common economy operated with a ‘Folkekirke Agency’ or an 
‘Economic Administrative Board’, see Ministeriet for Ligestilling og Kirke, 2013a: 
33-44).78 Thus in these proposals, the newly implemented 10 permanent elected 
diocese councils from 2009 would potentially no longer be the highest level of 
democratic governance in the Folkekirke organization.  
However, it should also be noted that the committee's work was limited or 
conditioned on central indicators such as that the Folkekirke must be 
Evangelical Lutheran, must have close relations with the state, that it must be 
available all over Denmark, that it respect the freedom of pastors, common 
members and theological minority groupings, that the decentralized tradition of 
strong local parishes will stay unified into one church community and finally 
that democratic legitimacy of church governance is important (Ministeriet for 
Ligestilling og Kirke, 2013a: 6-14, which were strongly inspired by the earlier 
report 1511, see Kirkeministeriet, 2009: 63-72).  
Together, these indicators created two main premises for the committee's 
work, besides emphasizing the importance of tradition and close connection to 
the state and peoplehood. First, no proposal could violate article 4 in the 
constitution, where committee's mandate stated ‘In constitutional law and 
ecclesiastical law literature the term “support” in article 4 must be conceived 
broadly, that is, as an obligation for the state to give both financial and moral 
                                               
 
 
78 It should be noted that also model 1 for both internal affairs and economic 
governance could realize article 66 by establishing a legal foundation for future 
regulation based on status quo depending on how far the legislation goes, but 
just without a national level of governance bodies.  
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support to the Folkekirke’ (Ministeriet for Ligestilling og Kirke, 2013a: 8). It was 
this principle of support which was the point of departure. Secondly, the 
customary practice of the minister regulating internal affairs by royal decree 
would not be challenged, ‘…because of the special character of the internal 
affairs the committee would like that the internal affairs continues to be 
regulated by royal decree or royal order instead of being regulated by law in 
parliament’ (Kirkeministeriet, 2009: 17). 
The committee would not break with the status of the Folkekirke as a public 
law entity and thus not grant it legislative autonomy, i.e. maintaining the 
parliament as the principled legislator and the minister as the de facto regulator 
(Kirkeministeriet, 2009: 15). For this reason, none of the models included the 
possibility to legally limit the right of the Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs to 
regulate the internal affairs. Or even the more extensive possibility to hand over 
full decision-making competence to a national level synod, in both cases, making 
the legislator the regulator and not the minister representing the executive. 
Furthermore, both would still be possible within the constitutional framework 
of article 4 and 66. As such, even the most extensive committee models 
proposed did not take full advantage of the options technically possible within 
the constitution.79 
                                               
 
 
79 This was also noted in some of the consultation views, e.g. the deanery council 
Vor Frue_Vesterbro: ‘…we cannot understand why, besides two models where 
the minister maintain his right to veto, the committee did not compose a model 
4, where the Church Council would get the competence to recommend a 
proposal the minister would be obliged to act upon after negotiations…’ 
(Ministeriet for Ligestilling og Kirke, 2013d: 3). 
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From the succeeding consultation views, it became clear that more than 85 
percent of the views were in favor some kind of reform beyond status quo. 
Among these all the bishops and diocese councils, most deanery and parish 
councils along with church organizations (see the consultation minute at 
Ministeriet for Ligestilling og Kirke, 2013b). Of all of these, the question of 
internal affairs being governed by an elected body equally split the bishops and 
deanery councils, while most diocese councils and church organizations along 
with the national association of parish councils and the association of pastors 
supported a governing body. Regarding the economic governance, all bishops 
and diocese councils and most deanery councils supported an elected body 
rather than a governing body, with the national association of parish councils, 
the association of pastors and church organizations. Thus, there appeared to be 
a fairly wide support from the most central church actors for reform in the 
direction of a church constitution in some form or another.  
From both the committee and the consultation views, one of the central 
arguments against establishing governing bodies was that the current 
arrangement is well-functioning. Also, that there are too few cases of internal 
affairs to meaningfully establish a body governing this, and that a council would 
be tempted to speak on behalf of the whole church community (see Ministeriet 
for Ligestilling og Kirke, 2013a: 23, 26, 40, 41 and 44; Kirkeministeriet, 2013: 8, 
or for example bishop Skovsgaard, in Ministeriet for Ligestilling og Kirke, 2013c: 
7). In contrast, arguments in favor of elected governing bodies were that is was 
natural for the church to decide on its own affairs, that the democratic 
legitimacy behind church regulation in general would increase. Since politicians 
do not have the same knowledge of church matters as they used to, it is 
therefore important to let the church decide on its own matters (Ministeriet for 
Ligestilling og Kirke, 2013a: 23, 26, 40, 41 and 44; Kirkeministeriet, 2013: 5-6 
  
244 
and 8-9). For example, the association of pastors argued: ‘…the experience we 
got from the introduction of the marriage ritual of same-sex couples […] created 
a great deal of confusion in the parishes, that the minister alone could decide 
that a ritual was to be made and that the bishops reacted so different as they 
did…’ (Association of pastors in Ministeriet for Ligestilling og Kirke, 2013e: 8).  
 
6.3.2. Counting the votes and making recommendations  
In spring the following year the committee published the 448 pages final report 
1544 based on the discussion paper and the consultation process. Report 1544 
contained a detailed description of the current arrangement of church 
organization, decision-making competences, the internal affairs and the 
economic structures. Along with this it also contained brief comparative 
descriptions of church-state relations in the Nordic countries, Germany and the 
United Kingdom. Further, it contained a minute on the above-mentioned 
preparatory committee discussion, a restatement of the central indicators of the 
foundation for the committee's work, and most importantly it contained 
legislative proposals by the majority of committee members, and minority 
proposals representing the opposition politicians in the committee.  
In the following I will briefly touch upon the restatement of the indicators 
and then move onto the recommendations, which in combination with the 
surrounding public debate help expose the political thinking for and against the 
government's policy.  
Let us therefore first turn to the central indicators. In comparison to report 
1511 and the 2003 discussion paper, one new independent indicator was added 
in report 1544 under the title The Folkekirke and the People: ‘The importance of 
the Folkekirke for the cohesion of the people [‘sammenhængskraften’] is among 
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other things reflected in the use of the Folkekirke as a site of gathering for all 
Danes regardless of religious affiliation at the celebration of official events like 
the church service before the opening of the parliament and in church services 
celebrating flag days or memorial days important to all of the population’ 
(Kirkeministeriet, 2014a: 153). In this connection, according to the committee 
report the general aim of the Folkekirke is to ‘preach the Gospel of Christ as the 
savior of the world (with reference to article 4 in the constitution), and to be a 
community of equal responsibility for all baptized Danes in cooperation with the 
clergy… which is probably why a great majority of the population is part of the 
Folkekirke. Therefore, it is a culture-bearing factor contributing to national 
cohesion [‘folkelig sammenhæng’] and an interpretation of the meaning of life for 
the individual human being and the Danish society’ (Kirkeministeriet, 2014a: 
151).  
While the report does note that the Folkekirke is not the only contributor of 
religion-based preaching and thinking to the Danes (Kirkeministeriet, 2014a: 
152), we still see a rather strong particularistic theme in the story of a people, 
which emphasizes an ancient source of worth and tradition. Consider 
formulations in the report like: ‘Christianity has had a great importance for the 
Danish people and the development of the Danish society for more than a 1000 
years’ Kirkeministeriet, 2014a: 151. The Folkekirke thus is perceived to have an 
active function of creating cohesion and common trust in the people. With this 
newly added central indicator, the committee stressed that any reform of the 
state-church arrangement should consider this deep, cultural anchoring in 
Danish peoplehood, suggesting that too drastic reforms might thus have 
negative effects on the cohesion and unity of the Danish people. ‘The committee 
believes that potential changes in the governance of the Folkekirke must be 
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evaluated in the light of… the Folkekirke as an Evangelical Lutheran church and 
the seven main indicators’ (Kirkeministeriet, 2014a: 149). 
In particular three members of the committee made their final 
recommendations in the report pointing to few changes, with reference not only 
to the religious function of the church but also to the Folkekirke's importance for 
society in general. They represented the three political parties not in favor of 
further church independence, but in various degrees in favor of the continuation 
of status quo in church-state relations. 
The Danish People's Party's representative Jesper Langballe, passed away 
just before the report was published but he represented the most conservative 
position amongst the committee members. He wanted the current arrangement 
to continue unchanged both in economical and internal affairs (Kirkeministeriet, 
2014a: 17). In a debate article published on the day of the first committee 
meeting, he warned against making the church independent and especially 
establishing governing bodies ‘granting the Folkekirke a mouth and a voice 
[‘mund og mæle’] – that is, besides preaching the Gospel in churches each 
Sunday… [the Folkekirke] will have an authoritative message on foreign policy, 
abortion and all sorts of political issues. The Folkekirke will quickly become 
totally politicized’ (Langballe, 2013). He argued that the current church-state 
arrangement was the best and the most free in the world. ‘Thus it has been for 
163 years and thereby it is Grundtvig's interpretation of the constitution which 
won the discussion’ (Langballe, 2013). Having read the majority 
recommendations after the 1544 publication, Langballe's son and a leading MP 
of the same party and a pastor, Christian Langballe, stated in a national 
newspaper ‘…this is the most radical change since the Reformation, because they 
are determined to introduce a Church Council at all costs [‘med djævlens vold og 
magt’] to speak on behalf of the Folkekirke’ (Langballe, 2014).  
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Regarding the internal affairs, the two other opposition party 
representatives, the Conservative People’s Party, Charlotte Dyremose, and 
Venstre’s Britta Schall Holberg followed this line of reasoning. They did not wish 
a Church Council with competences in both economic and internal affairs, but 
rather followed the line of model 1 from the discussion paper to a large extent. It 
would be a formalization of current affairs into law, in order to make it more 
clear and legitimate. The current arrangement made clearer would best ensure 
that no one speaks on behalf of the church, ensure tolerance towards theological 
differences and ensure freedom (Kirkeministeriet, 2014a: 191-192, 198-203, 
231-233).  
In the beginning of the committee's work in 2012, this position was also 
backed by the chairman of the Conservative People's Party, Lars Barfoed who 
was afraid that the committee's work would result in the separation of church 
and state. ‘Instead of drowning the Folkekirke in lengthy debates about 
organization and bricks with a risk of splitting it up into atoms we should use 
our energy on discussing how we best can get the Christian Gospel into our 
everyday…. That society rests on Luther's thoughts means that we as human 
beings have a fundamental freedom. Through centuries these thoughts have 
influenced the Danish people to understand that they are all in the same boat 
and have to be forgiving of each other. Therefore fanaticism, holiness and 
arrogance is un-Danish’ (Barfoed, 2012). It is interesting that the argument of 
freedom for the church spills over to the question of freedom for the people, that 
this discourse appears to premise the sociological connection between 
Folkekirke members and the Danish population. This argument was also 
apparent in Venstre's former Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs Birthe Rønn 
Hornbech, who also wrote in a debate article ‘When I am such a bitter opponent 
to a central church council it is because such a council for certain would crush 
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the wide spiritual freedom [‘åndsfrihed’] which is the distinguished 
characteristic of the Folkekirke and which is the salt of life for all spiritual 
freedom in the society of Denmark…When the anti-totalitarian and anti-
authoritarian Grundtvig …ended up accepting the arrangement with Rigdagen as 
the supreme council for church legislation it was because he knew that a church 
council would limit the spiritual freedom' (Hornbech, 2013).  
Perhaps the most significant change from status quo proposed by 
Dyremose and Holberg in current arrangements would be a rather 
comprehensive negative limitation on the minister's influence, that any 
comprehensive changes in internal affairs would need to have at least 8 out of 
10 bishops agreeing in order to be implemented (Kirkeministeriet, 2014a: 360). 
In an interview Holberg later explained ‘It cannot be repeated what we saw with 
the church ritual for the homosexual couples. It was unclear who should decide 
what. I would rather see that the bishops are granted the right to recommend 
initiatives to the minister’ (Holberg as quoted in Rehling, 2014c). 
Further regarding the economic dimension, together with two 
representatives from the association of pastors, Dyremose and Holberg argued 
for the continuation of the current state grant system e.g. of direct support to 
pastor salaries with reference to the recommendations in the earlier report 
1511 (see above). As in report 1511, the arguments were based on the fact that 
changing the system would open up the potential for budget reductions, that the 
state has a commitment to support the Evangelical Lutheran community, and 
that there should be a close relation between the state and the Folkekirke 
because the ‘…pastors of the Folkekirke performs a comprehensive amount of 
work reaching well beyond preaching and servicing the members of the 
Folkekirke… for example as mediators of the cultural cohesion in society’ 
(Kirkeministeriet, 2014a:192).  
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When it came to the governance of the economic affairs, Dyremose and 
Holberg differed. While Dyremose aimed for the most conservative reform (the 
legislative formalization of the current practice, the model 1, see 
Kirkeministeriet, 2014a: 283-300), Holberg argued for an Economic Committee 
of the Folkekirke with similar competences as the one imagined by the majority, 
but without block grant (see Kirkeministeriet, 2014a: 301-334).  
Indeed, after Report 1544 the three opposition parties all stated that while 
further clarifying legislation might be necessary, they would not support in 
parliament any model resulting in a general governing body for the Folkekirke 
for both internal and economic affairs (Vincents et al, 2014; see also Rehling, 
2014a and Venstre, 2014b). Of course, this would pose a problem if the position 
of the former minister Sareen before the committee started still applied. ‘It is 
enormously important to have all parties with us. It is not my church, but the 
church of the whole people, so we must have a broad political support’ (Sareen 
as quoted in Clausen, 2012) 
Now, turning to the majority of committee members, 13 out of 17 
recommended the establishing of a general governing body on behalf of the 
Folkekirke as a community vis-à-vis the state.80 It was a solution combining 
model 2 regarding internal affairs and model 2a regarding economic governance 
in the same governing body, in addition to change over to a block grant 
arrangement (the latter only 11 out of 17 supported). This would entail 
establishing a Bishop Collective and a Folkekirke Common Committee 
                                               
 
 
80 The committee members counted 20 in total, but the three state 
representatives abstained from voting.  
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[‘folkekirkens fællesudvalg’], giving these two elected bodies decision-making 
competences in economic matters and the right to be part of (but not 
independently hold), competence in decisions on internal affairs 
(Kirkeministeriet, 2014a: 229). Specifically the Folkekirke Common Committee, 
which would have a majority of lay persons, would hold the competence to 
decide on church taxes, budget and accounting within the rules determined by 
the minister, in addition to have a right to be consulted in internal affairs. 
Regarding the latter, only if a statutory majority of 2/3 in the Bishop Collective 
and an ordinary majority in the Folkekirke Common Committee both agreed, 
they can recommend to the minister a new initiative (e.g. new regulation, 
appointment of committees, consultations etc.). The minister would still hold the 
right to deny such recommendations and he could take initiative himself, but 
only after consulting the two new elected governance bodies. Thus, two new 
laws would technically realize article 66 of the constitution: one on economic 
governance (establishing the Folkekirke Common Committee), and one on 
internal affairs (establishing the Bishop Collective) which together would make 
custom practice into statutory form (Kirkeministeriet, 2014a: section 10.1 and 
10.4).  
In the light of what I in chapter 2 has suggested as a Danish tradition of 
modest establishment, it is interesting to notice the approach taken in the 
majority proposal. In the explanatory memorandum to their legislative 
proposals, they note that they do not wish to change the existing balance 
between church and state based on current law which ‘… traditionally does not 
distinguish between the internal and external affairs of the Folkekirke…. The 
internal affairs does not escape the competence of the legislator’ 
(Kirkeministeriet, 2014a: 339; see also 351). However, the proposal would make 
rules of how to regulate the internal affairs: ‘…in this way the proposal thus 
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merely give statutory form to the demarcation of the internal affairs according 
to common practice’ (Kirkeministeriet, 2014a: 347). While confirming the 
Folkekirke as essentially a public law entity by regulation retaining the 
minister's competence by royal decree, they would impose certain parameters 
for this tradition and a formalized right to consultation of the bishops and the 
Folkekirke Common Committee.  
The remaining minority committee member, who decided not to vote for 
any of the legislative proposals, was legal scholar Lisbet Christoffersen. She 
noted in her own minority recommendation that there is an important issue to 
be solved in defining the competences of the minister regarding internal affairs. 
Christoffersen noted that the current arrangement is compliant with the 
European Convention on Human Rights regarding internal affairs (see 
Folketinget, 2014: article 9 ratified by Denmark in 1953 and fully incorporated 
in Danish law in 1992, see Lov nr. 285, 1992). However, she also argued that the 
compliance only exists as long as the majority of Folkekirke bishops and broad 
circles in the Folkekirke in general support the minister's initiatives. As she 
wrote, it is necessary to ‘…determine clear procedure rules to continuously 
make clear when a regulation of internal affairs is done in favor of the 
Folkekirke, and when it can be determined that a regulation constitute a 
limitation of the religious freedom of the Folkekirke, which in that case self-
evidently can and must be grounded in relevant considerations (necessity, 
proportionality, the concern of other people's freedom or rights etc.)’ 
(Kirkeministeriet, 2014a: 235). Christoffersen thus recommended a model in 
between the two former, in which the minister's competences regarding internal 
affairs would be negatively limited by a statutory majority of the bishops 
(possibly checking this power of the bishops by granting the Common 
Committee a consultation right) (Kirkeministeriet, 2014a: 236).  
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After report 1544 was published, the newly elected Minister of 
Ecclesiastical Affairs, Marianne Jelved (RV) together with the government 
supported the majority recommendation to ‘… limit the possibilities of a 
potential regulation-officious Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs to make decisions 
forced upon the members of the Folkekirke’ (Jelved, 2014b). At the same time 
she tried to counter criticism directed by the minority representatives of the 
committee, by stressing the majority recommendation would not limit the local 
autonomy and freedom for parishes and pastors, or that the Bishop Collective 
and Folkekirke Common Committee would start speaking on the church's behalf 
of political issues (Jelved, 2014b). Besides the government endorsement, the 
majority recommendation got support from SF and LA. SF's spokesperson 
Pernille Vigsø Bagge stated ‘It is a very important step now taken with the 
committee's recommendations, and it is good that the Folkekirke itself will be 
able to decide on both economy and internal religious affairs. But really, we 
would like to see a further dismantling of the Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs 
power’ (Bagge as quoted in Nielsen, 2014). Also Liberal Alliance's spokesperson 
of ecclesiastical affairs Mette Bock supported the majority recommendations. 
‘We're now in a situation where we can carry through a reform on an 
enlightened and thoroughly discussed basis, which indeed holds the promise of 
real decentralization. Church and state should not be separated, but the church 
should to a larger extend be of the people and not of the politicians or 
government officials’ (Bock, 2014).  
In these views supporting the government's policy we see a conception of 
the reform as ensuring higher degrees of corporate freedom, especially to 
further self-determination of economic affairs and to some extent to internal 
affairs. It is not necessarily challenging the particularistic notion of Danish 
peoplehood as affirmed by an Evangelical Lutheran community, but rather 
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challenge the lack of freedom for the Folkekirke. As Langballe and Hornbech 
evoked Grundtvig as the father of the freedom tradition protected by the current 
church-state arrangement (along with many other MP's from V, DF and KF), so 
did the proponent for the policy. For example, Jelved noted in an address at the 
annual meeting of the National Association of Parish Council in 2014 that both 
society and the Folkekirke must be governed to respect freedom. ‘Grundtvig's 
philosophy was that we must have freedom to take responsibility…. This is the 
whole philosophy behind the values which created the Danish society through 
associating, co-operative movement, the Danish model, the wind power industry 
success etc. It all builds on personal freedom, equal worth and committing 
communities’ (Jelved, 2014a). In this quote we actually see all three of Smith's 
themes: economic, political and ethical, in order to evoke a story of Danish 
peoplehood. 
As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter the government currently 
evaluates Report 1544 and the subsequent debate and consultation at the time 
of writing, in order for Minister Jelved and the government to decide whether a 
legislative proposal should be composed. Regarding the consultation process of 
Report 1544 it first of all did not present many new arguments for or against the 
reform models, though concrete models were discussed. Secondly, reorientating 
state grants to block grants in general did not find support, but so did the 
majority recommendation regarding establishing the Folkekirke Common 
Committee and the Bishop Collective. Establishing how substantial the general 
support for the majority recommendations were is perhaps up for discussion, 
since between 33-38 percent of all view were positive therefore suggesting 
fairly divided opinions within the Folkekirke. On the one hand, while the 33-38 
percent represented the single largest group they were still far from merely a 
simple majority. Whilst on the other hand all the major actors such as a majority 
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of bishops, diocese, deanery and parish councils along with most major church 
associations and church-political groupings81 officially supported the two new 
governing bodies as recommended by the majority.  
In general, none of the committee members were fully against any 
legislation clarifying some aspects of the church-state arrangement, and also 
between 52-59 percent of the consultation views saw a need for some further 
regulation by law. However, there might still be a long way to go for the policy to 
be realized. Whatever the case it would certainly not be the first time 
disagreement or more urgent political questions for the parliament functioned 
as the rock on which a legislative proposal to realize article 66 in the 
constitution was wrecked.  
 
6.4. Concluding remarks: New reforms and old ideas  
Based on the above analysis I will now conclude this chapter by identifying three 
main themes of political thinking in this policy area. 
First and most obvious, we have the question of realizing the promissory 
clause in article 66 in the constitution: the church constitution. This theme 
contains the struggle over an understanding of the church either as an 
independent body vis-á-vis the state, or rather as a public law entity. As we saw, 
this struggle over meaning was to a large extent based on a concern for making 
                                               
 
 
81 The church-political groupings are organizing many Folkekirke members, 
especially in parish councils, similar to political parties. The major groupings are 
the ‘left-wing’ Grundvigians, the ‘right-wing’ Indre Mission and ‘center’ Kirkeligt 
Centrum, along with other ‘right-wing’ grouping such as Luthersk 
Missionsforening, and Tidehverv. See e.g. Schwarz Lausten, 2004: 248-268. 
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the church speak with one voice (realizing its right to exercise corporate 
freedom by itself), or to keep it fully decentralized (maintaining the tradition of 
spiritual freedom within the Folkekirke and thus in society as a whole). 
Secondly, we saw the question of how to best distinguish between the 
Folkekirke and the state. In particular, this question came to center around the 
concern of whether internal affairs should be considered subject to the secular 
legislator's competence (which it currently is, but limited by customary practice 
of regulatory restraint) or whether it should be limited to a certain degree or 
even made self-governed. Finally and as an indirect result of the two above 
discussions, we saw the more general question of the proper place of religion in 
relation to the state. This discussion concerned especially the evocation of 
Danish peoplehood as linked to the faith of the Folkekirke as a community. Thus, 
reform discussions concerned not only the level of democratic legitimacy, 
budgetary transparency or minority tolerance/protection but also how the 
consequences for the general political community would be in terms of ethical 
coherence, fundamental values and cultural worth.  
In the policy debate established so far, we have seen a concern for 
distinguishing between church and state grounded in a notion of religious 
freedom. With Freeden's terminology we might say that the conceptual core of 
Danish secularism (separation) appears to be interpreted as the establishment 
arrangement, but embedded in a certain cultural context. Further, we can 
observe that it is the adjacent component of religious freedom, and not the 
conceptual core itself, which is subject to ideological contestation. 
To understand this contestation of the interpretation of religious freedom, I 
turn to Christoffersen, who entered the committee as a legal expert in law, 
religion and society. Within the legal literature on law and religion relating to a 
North European context, she has distinguished between the discourses of 
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separation and intertwinement, respectively. The former sometimes represents 
the logic of church autonomy as ‘the right for religious communities to act 
outside the law of the state, framing their own legal structures’ (Christoffersen, 
2010c: 565) and the latter emphasizes the importance of distinguishing but not 
separating (Christoffersen, 2006: 109; see also Vinding, 2013: 125; or an 
alternative distinction between ‘religious institutional pluralism’ and ‘strict 
separation’, see Bader 2007: 203).82 Intertwinement does not entail separation 
‘…since that would mean pressuring the single individual as well as the system 
into a choice between either secular or religious legitimacy’ (Christoffersen, 
2006: 109).  
As we have seen in the parliamentary policy debate, these different 
perceptions were in play and they were all grounded in reasons of religious 
freedom. From ideas of full separation and disestablishment as supported by 
Enhedslisten and Liberal Alliance (because only a religiously neutral state allows 
all religious communities to enjoy equal freedom), to affirmation of status quo 
with potentially unlimited state control as supported by the Conservatives and 
                                               
 
 
82 I deliberately make a rather crude reading of Christoffersen here, as I wish to 
direct the discussion to a context of modest establishment, and thus not a 
theoretical conversation on universal separation. Christoffersen note, that while 
the separation thesis and church autonomy are overlapping concepts they also 
potentially conflict. On the one hand full-fledged church autonomy would fully 
separate church and state both normatively and institutionally, but on the other 
hand the resulting parallel legal system would potentially conflict religious and 
(secular) legal norms (Christoffersen, 2006: 114-115). A well-presented 
practical example of this tension would be the hijab debate in France by Laborde 
(2008) in which she discuss the tension between republican norms of freedom 
(‘to be forced to be free’), individual and the concept of domination, especially in 
the civil form of dominium. (Laborde, 2008: chapter 7).  
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Danish People's Party (because the constitution require the state to uphold the 
Folkekirke's special status and to govern on its behalf, so that collective and 
individual freedoms within the Folkekirke for members and pastors are 
secured). In between, we find a middle position of some minimal autonomy 
formalized in an established arrangement with considerable state control. Here, 
supported by the Socialists, the Social Democrats, Radikale Venstre and Venstre 
(because both the latter's internal freedom and some degree of self-
determination for the church community is important for religious freedom).  
Thus, while the status quo arrangement of Danish church-state relations 
might be empirically identified more as intertwinement and less as church 
autonomy-as-separation, as Christoffersen suggests, the horizon of political 
positions of the policy debate had both affirmations of intertwinement and 
alternatives to the existing order. As W. Cole Durham noted in a comparative 
study of different traditions of Western church autonomy regimes ‘…as one 
examines actual protection of religious autonomy in practical administrative 
contexts, one begins to note a variety of ways in which the scope of religious 
autonomy protections are narrowed. These differences may reflect deep-seated 
cultural variations, in the way that freedom of religion is understood and 
interpreted’ (Durham, 2011: 28).  
While the current government's attempt to realize a policy of further 
independence and self-determination for the Folkekirke might appear to be a 
whole new, and perhaps foreign critique of an old time-honored Danish political 
tradition, in fact we have seen quite a few similar attempts especially in the 
second half of the 19th century. Furthermore, the current committee builds on 
recent reports and structural reforms from the last couple of decades. Thus, in 
the case of Danish political and cultural tradition, it seems that the different 
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positions of the policy debate came close to historical ideas, some of which were 
discussed in chapter 4.  
First, we have the notion of intertwinement describing the status quo. On 
the one side as affirming the hegemony of secular law (i.e. the Folkekirke as a 
public law entity), and on the other the acknowledgement of two different 
normative systems which should not be confused. This interpretation of the Two 
Kingdom's Doctrine exhibits some similarities with the Pufendorfian legal 
tradition in Danish politics, the so-called collegial system (‘Kollegialsystem’), 
which regards the church as an association whose jus circa sacra (external 
affairs) is governed by public law, but jus in sacra (internal affairs) were an 
ecclesiastical matter for the church itself to decide. ‘…the idea was a principled 
distinction between church and state, while maintaining the latter as hegemonic. 
It can be perceived as an early kind of tolerance with limited church 
independence and a corresponding freedom of conscience…’ (Rasmussen, 2011: 
44). The idea of a common domain (a social contract) of freedom and law 
regulation to bring order in society was linked to the church, in that the secular 
sovereign, the monarch, governed its organization. Public religion from this 
perspective maintained order (rights and duties) in accordance to natural law, 
but also functioned to unite subjects into a common society (Rasmussen, 2011: 
44). In the context of Northern Europe, it appears that the description of Danish 
intertwinement contains an understanding of national identities as being 
characterized by their overwhelming affiliation with the established church, 
irrespective of religious convictions (Christoffersen, 2006: 118). In this respect, 
intertwinement implies on the one hand that a sense of cultural belonging is 
keeping the majority of even secular Danes as members of the Folkekirke (often 
called the ‘culturally Christians’ or the ‘secular Christians’). However on the 
other hand it implies that having the Folkekirke as a site of national belonging 
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does not rhyme with any degree of church autonomy. In this sense, 
intertwinement and the Pufendorfian natural law reading of Two Kingdom's 
Doctrine share some common ground.  
Regarding the above middle position, it could be argued that some of the 
current reform efforts of the church-state relations could be seen as a first step 
in this direction. Christoffersen has pointed in this direction herself, by arguing 
that intertwinement as a concept is not inherently referring to a Lutheran 
tradition of embedding establishment and national identity into state power, but 
theoretically holding the potential to deal with society's increasing religious 
pluralism. Christoffersen has suggested a more egalitarian model of 
intertwinement which deals with the challenge of multiculturalism, not by fully 
separating religious communities and the state, but rather ‘…to remove the 
distinction between public law and private law in the field of religion in the 
Nordic countries in order to secure a legal foundation for all religions to have a 
public character and (thus) legitimacy to contribute to the composition of 
societal values’ (Christoffersen, 2005: 224). In this vision, equality is not 
achieved by making the Folkekirke as independent as current religious 
communities regulated by private law, but to integrate other religious 
communities into public law (while granting a higher degree of self-
determination in internal affairs to the established church). She points to a 
‘platform for all’, ‘a legal framework for a pluralistic model’ or even the ‘creation 
of a new unity’ (Christoffersen, 2005: 228), in which religious communities 
gather around one public order regulated by secular law, and influenced by 
public debate in which religions also have a voice.  
If I have read Christoffersen correctly, the connection between the idea of 
further self-determination of the established church while maintaining its 
governance by public law, comes to be a way of dealing with the issue of 
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religious equality between all religious communities. It is perhaps not a 
coincidence that all political parties supporting initiatives toward further self-
determination of the Folkekirke also support further equality of all religious 
communities. In this line of thought, there are similarities to the reconstructed 
Civil Church Model by Grundtvig, which in a sense pursued the Pufendorfian 
reading of the Two Kingdom's Doctrine further into the age of religious freedom 
to all Danish citizens. While Grundtvig maintained a strong romantic 
(particularistic) perception of political identity as an ethnos founded in 
tradition, language and Christianity he also envisioned the possibility of one 
common legal, religiously neutral framework for all religious communities. The 
whole structure would exist in order to preserve autonomy understood as 
decentralized entities of faith, enjoying freedom as communities within the state 
structure. Without conflating to two, one might point out that Christoffersen's 
preferred model promoting ‘an ethnos-based multi-religious composition of 
values’ (Christoffersen, 2005: 228) for society, might not be alien to Grundtvig's 
vision of a civil church. That is, an idea of maintaining a certain cultural and 
political tradition as a particularistic marker of political identity, while including 
a polyphony of religious voices in the public debate.  
From the point of view that the conceptualization of secularism developed 
in this thesis, it is relevant to consider whether we imagine a political order 
based on secular morality or religious morality. Whether our social imaginary 
expressed in political discussions regarding the policy area of religion-politics 
relations take as a point of departure a neo-Durkheimian or a Post-Durkheimian 
dispensation. While Taylor argues that these two dispensations in today's 
political discourses are in a constant struggle, in the Danish case I would argue 
that it is very much related to not only the constitution of modern political 
legitimacy, but also to the link between secularism and peoplehood.  
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To use the terminology of chapter 2, we see that both the intertwinement 
and the egalitarian intertwinement operate with separation as principled 
distance, and exactly not with separation as mutual exclusion. However, while 
the former model affirms a particularistic story of the Danish people by 
maintaining the church as ‘the guardian and articulator’ of political identity, ‘that 
of the whole society, to which everyone must belong’ (Taylor, 2007: 442), the 
latter, at least theoretically, hold the potential to be realized in a public order 
based on an universalistic story of Danish peoplehood. There is a crucial 
difference whether one's political identity is guided by or informed by religious 
knowledge. And it is at this crossroad of political principles the debate in 
Denmark currently stands. The difference between what I in figure 3 (page 42) 
have categorized as modest establishment and contextual secularism is not to 
ground one's secularism in separation as principled distance (as they both do), 
but how these principles of religious freedom and religious equality are 
grounded in peoplehood. What is in play is the adjacent components 
constituting the conceptual structure of secularism, as an ideological concept. 
If Danish secularism were to change from being dominantly characterized 
by modest establishment to something more similar to contextual secularism, 
we might understand such a development on the background of preceding 
chapters as a further advance of the secularization process. And again, not 
understanding Danish society being more modern or rational or less religious 
(the idea of incomplete secularity), but understanding it as the ongoing 
transformation of public religion and its relation to the state (on this point see 
also Wyller, Breemer and Casanova eds., 2014). Granting the Folkekirke more 
autonomy as corporate religious freedom would be the first step (potentially 
through the current reform efforts covered in this chapter), and treating all 
religious communities equally would be the second. As the chairman of the 
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ministerial church committee wrote a decade ago: ‘…groups within minority 
churches [all those religious communities not being the Folkekirke] wish for 
more religious equality, while still growing groups within the majority church – 
the great Evangelical Lutheran religious community we call The Danish 
Folkekirke with a membership rate of 5/6 of the population – yearn for more 
religious freedom’ (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2004: 119). In this article he argued 
that while the realization of more freedom to the Folkekirke and more equality 
to the religious communities can be settled apart, they are both legally and 
politically interconnected problems. 
If the current policy debate covered in this chapter is understood from such 
a secularization perspective, it is interesting that a potential first step of making 
secularism less affirmative of particularistic Danish identity and more of 
universalistic Danish identity comes from religious circles one again. Back then, 
it was not (only) a religious struggle of both being a Danish citizen and not 
following official orthodoxy but a more general critique of how the state governs 
public religion. From bishops over pastors and regular church members to legal 
and theological experts, there are a growing number of voices wishing a clearer 
and more principled relation between the state and the Folkekirke, with many of 
these in addition pushing for further church autonomy. If such views were to be 
implemented into a policy, they would indeed change the institutional 
expression of Danish secularism, and possibly point in a direction of a new 
theme in the Danish story: equality between religious communities. 
Having analyzed the Danish separation doctrine as an ideological concept 
stressing its polysemy, rendering several interpretations available in the public 
discourse in chapters 4, 5 and 6, I will now turn to the final stage of my study: 
the conceptual reconstruction of Danish secularism.  
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Chapter 7 Reflections on Danish secularism 
 
 
7.1. Introduction: ‘After you my dear, after you’ 
hen identifying the general Danish interpretation of separation 
principles, two facts should be noticed. The first is that the church-
state-regime of establishment was forged at a time when an 
astonishing 99 percent of the population were members of the Folkekirke in 
1849. Up until 1985, 91 percent of the Danish population were members, and 
today it is still surprisingly high (just above 78 percent) (Statistics Denmark, 
2014d). In that sense, the general premise of Danish secularism has historically 
been the religious homogeneity of the Danish society and was contrived in what 
might be called a multilutheran culture, where religious conflicts confined 
themselves to this religious outlook (Dabelsteen, 2012). Keeping this in mind, 
the second fact might come as a surprise. The Danish population is considered to 
be one of the most secularized in the world when measured on religious practice 
and personal belief (Norris and Inglehart, 2004: 84; Casanova, 2014: 27). 
The combination of the two facts which roughly applies to all Nordic 
countries, has inspired some to claim that established religion within the 
parameters of a liberal (secular) democracy, is the most efficient way to 
maintain a secular public sphere (Stark and Finke, 2000: chapter 9), recently 
affirmed by Phil Zuckerman (2008: 111-113). Of course, this idea is as old as 
public critique of established religion is. A ‘recent’ example could be the Danish 
politician and journalist Viggo Hørup, who wrote this in his newspaper, 
Politiken. ‘…I love and esteem the State Church, because for us freethinkers it is 
W 
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the best defense against excessive and dissolute religious agitations… Regarding 
us freethinkers we are going nowhere… we will never leave the Folkekirke. To 
all the not so well-mannered inquiries for us to leave, we answer with greatest 
courtesy that it is a dear duty: After you my dear, after you. I leave it to you to go 
first!’ (Hørup, 1893). 
This kind of establishment regime with widespread popular support in the 
form of membership of the church, I identify as a secularism doctrine. 
Specifically, I place this type of doctrine separating religion and politics within 
the second quadrant in figure 3 (see chapter 2, page 42). Danish secularism 
operates with a framework of secular law embedded in a particularistic, 
Lutheran political identity, not unlike what Taylor has termed as the common 
ground strategy, but instead a mode of religious conflict resolution, which 
premises some sort of shared religious and cultural political identity within the 
state. He defines ‘the common ground strategy’ to be aiming at establishing ‘…a 
certain ethic of peaceful coexistence and political order, a set of grounds for 
obedience, which while still theistic, even Christian, was based on those 
doctrines which were common to all Christian sects, or even to all theists’ (1998: 
33). According to Taylor this kind of secular argument has its origin in the 
bloody 16th and 17th century wars of religion between Catholic and Protestant 
princes, which in turn led to a doctrine beyond confessional disagreements to 
unify the subjects around a common legitimate social order.  
In general, religious freedom and institutional tolerance is fairly strong in a 
comparative perspective, but as was evident in chapters 5 and 6, both at 
institutional and policy levels Danish politics relating to religion is sometimes 
filled with internal tensions.  
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Regarding the relation between secular law and a particularistic, Lutheran 
political identity, it is to a wide extent a result of the rather peculiar role the 
state takes in relation to the established church in Denmark. Legal scholar Lisbet 
Christoffersen has pointed out that the whole notion of legal authority in 
Lutheran societies like the Danish, is based on the principle that ‘there is no law 
but secular law’ (Christoffersen, 2013a: 118). As a consequence, secular law is 
expected to protect both liberal rights (e.g. freedom of and from religion), and to 
secure a space for religious communities. Here, we see clear parallels to the 
relational interpretation of Luther's Two Kingdoms Doctrine (discussed in 
chapter 4), which gave the temporal sovereign full authority (save the spiritual 
world) and could expect its subjects to exhibit unconditional obedience to his 
laws and decisions. I argue that the Folkekirke is integrated in the above secular 
law in the following way. All religious communities enjoy their liberal rights as 
long as a) they too recognize no other law than secular law, and b) that the 
Folkekirke maintains its historical (and still legally unsettled) link to the state, 
because it is of special cultural importance to the nation.  
Even so, it does not make sense to consider Danish law as Lutheran. 
However secular law is functioning in a political identity, which is quite 
particularistic. Thus the secular state not only goes to the Folkekirke to quench 
its thirst for belonging and (particularistic) ethical worth, but the state is also 
perceived to hold the responsibility to keep the source pure. That is, to make 
sure the Folkekirke follows the moral and social standards of the general 
population (e.g. when the state introduced democratic parish councils in 1903, 
female pastors in 1948 or same-sex marriage in 2012, for the sake of democratic 
values, gender equality values or sexual equality values). Thus a majority in both 
the parliament and the church is reluctant to let the latter govern its own affairs, 
as it could lead to religious contestation and denaturalize the image of the 
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Folkekirke as a site of shared national belonging. ‘No law but secular law’ 
indicates that the church, its organization and governance in principle is a 
secular affair. Only the internal affairs related to rights and worship are (mostly) 
a theological concern, and thus not political. What Catholic and Reformed 
churches in other countries calls canon law (rules regulating internal affairs for 
its clerics, members and organization according to existing interpretations of 
canon literature), the Lutheran established churches have traditionally rejected. 
Certainly, there is a tension between this ecclesiastical self-image of the 
Lutheran established churches in Denmark, Norway, Finland (even for the 
Swedish church) and the tendency to grant the churches even more autonomy, 
since it results in more and more self-governance.  
We can identify Danish secularism as representing the logic of modest 
establishment as discussed in section 2.3. The Folkekirke might not be ‘justified 
by appeal to principles of justice’ but at the same time it is not perceived to be ‘in 
violation of them’ either (Laborde, 2013: 82). As we saw in chapter 5, the 
arrangement sometimes means that other religious communities have wider 
religious freedoms, than do the constitutionally privileged Folkekirke. Largely 
because along with the special link to the state also comes the possibility for the 
state to interfere. Yet, we still see cases of religious minorities being caught in 
the crossfire between politics of religious tolerance, rather harsh laic (or anti-
religious) stances and anti-immigration (e.g. on the Danish Burka affair, see 
Christoffersen, 2013b). 
This historical modus vivendi appears so strong that the locus of 
disagreement between the leading politicians is not whether or not the church 
should remain established, but rather how it should be established (Dabelsteen, 
2011a). Let us now turn to how we might conceptualize Danish modest 
establishment, on the basis of the former chapters.  
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7.2. Morphology of Danish secularism: Freedom, equality and the people 
In this section I will reconstruct the conceptual structure of Danish secularism. I 
ask what is characteristic about it, or in Freeden's words ‘what entitles us to use 
the same word for its manifestations?’ (Freeden, 1996: 61). As discussed in 
chapters 2 and 3, ideological concepts like secularism contain a core component 
(without which it would be unrecognizable as secularism), and a range of 
additional components attached to the core in recognizable patterns: adjacent 
and peripheral components. In Figure 6 below (page 273) I have illustrated how 
the conceptual structure might look like.83 Here, we see that the core component 
of Danish secularism is separation, which I understand to be essential for its 
formation. However, separation in this context should be understood as 
separation-as-principled-distance. This conception does not signify a principle 
of equal treatment, but of treating everybody equally. That it is this conception 
of separation and not separation as exclusion is due to the core's position, in 
relation to its attached components.  
Regarding adjacent components, Freeden first points to the logical 
attachments of components to the core. These are ‘necessary options and 
permutations which are invariably brought into play by any concretization…’ 
(Freeden, 1996: 68). In relation to secularism as an ideological separation 
                                               
 
 
83 In earlier works, I have termed Danish secularism ‘folkekirkelighed’, reflecting 
the three dimensions of a political doctrine encompassing especially the 
elements of identity, the people (‘folk’), the institutional arrangement of the 
national church (‘kirke’) and the political principle of equality (‘lighed’) 
(Dabelsteen, 2011a, 2012).  
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doctrine, these are often identified as the liberty, the equality and the neutrality 
principle in political philosophy (e.g. Audi, 2011: chapter 2). In Figure 6 we thus 
find equality and freedom as logically adjacent components. However, parallel to 
the core component ‘logical adjacency is both a constraint on the indefinite 
variety of a concept and an opening for its indeterminate and pluralistic 
structure’ (Freeden, 1996: 69). We will therefore find particular conceptions (or 
semantic constraints) in a Danish context. As we have seen, individual freedom 
is a strong and universal right in the constitution (see Folketinget 1999: article 
67, 68 and 70), while corporate freedom appears to be only partial. As chapters 
5 and 6 exposed, this has to do with the notion of church autonomy which 
applies to all religious communities besides the Folkekirke that is considered to 
be a public law entity.  
Similarity, individual equality is universal (e.g. article 70 in the constitution 
establish that no one may be denied their political or civil rights due to their 
religion. Equality is also protected by the non-discrimination principles in 
European Convention On Human Rights, cf. Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2004: 120), but 
corporate equality too is partial. Due to the tradition of separation-as-principled 
distance in Danish politics today, the guiding ideal has been de facto to treat all 
religious communities with more or less equal rights and privileges (tax-
exemptions, marriage authorization, burial grounds etc.).84 Nevertheless, it is 
                                               
 
 
84 Guiding ideals does not always lead to ideal practice. There have been cases of 
complaints of recent unequal treatment – often not in the form of denial of equal 
rights, but in delayed and bureaucratic implementation. For example, 
permission to build mosques (e.g. Jacobsen, 2011) or permission to establish 
burial grounds (Lægaard, 2010); see also Nielsen (ed.), 2012.  
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only de facto equal since the Folkekirke symbolically hold a special status and 
because the state has a direct duty to support the Evangelical Lutheran Church 
as an established church, as written in the constitution (Folketinget, 1999: 
article 4). In fact, the Folkekirke can be considered as the fourth independent 
pillar of the Danish state besides the classical three state powers. The Danish 
constitution defines in article 3 the legislative, executive and judicial power and 
article 4 establishes the ‘fourth’ element of the state domain, Folkekirken (see 
Folketinget, 1999; Christoffersen, 2010b). As chapter 4 showed, the partiality of 
corporate equality might stem from a time when religious equality was 
something important to promote within the Folkekirke between all members of 
the Church. This aspect of religious equality can also be understood as a 
particular interpretation of multilutheran tolerance, the idea of the 
‘accommodative’ [‘rummelige’] church. Significantly, this may contain a wide 
range of different denominations within the perimeters of Evangelical Lutheran 
theology. 
Also found within Figure 6, we find a culturally adjacent component, 
peoplehood, as part of Danish secularism's morphology (and indeed for all types 
of secularisms, I argued in chapter 2). In relation to the separation doctrine, I 
have argued that Danish peoplehood belongs to the type, which I have called 
particularistic peoplehood, borrowing from Smith's terminology of peoplehood. 
The story of Danish peoplehood is founded on what Smith would term a 
particularistic ethically constitutive theme in that it evokes a strong sense of 
membership and belonging, to an ethnos of a certain language, culture, history 
and most of all religion. This component is culturally adjacent as it imposes 
further semantic constraints on the whole morphological structure of Danish 
secularism. The Danish people is not conceptually attached to the separation of 
  
270 
religion and politics as a logical inference, but because it is deeply embedded in 
the same historical, cultural and institutional context.  
At this point one might notice that one of the components, which would be 
expected to be an important logical adjacent component to secularism, the 
neutrality principle (governmental neutrality toward religion and the religious, 
see Audi, 2011: 45-49), is placed at the ‘edge’ of the concept together with liberal 
democracy. These two components to secularism I define as part of the 
concept's margin, which Freeden describes as ideas which are related either 
historically (perhaps it once was adjacent to the core), pragmatically (non-
ideational events in e.g. international politics can make some ideas relevant to a 
concept), or conceptually (other concepts or ‘ideologies force them on the 
agenda, but the ideology in question relates to them only reluctantly and 
contingently’, Freeden, 1996: 79). State neutrality and liberal democracy are 
both relevant ideas to Danish secularism. However, they are not necessarily 
essential to make it conceivable in the same way, as freedom, peoplehood and 
equality are vital to understand what Danish secularism is. Relating to the 
neutrality principle this is because the concept is not based on separation as 
exclusion, as neither modest establishment nor contextual secularism would live 
up to the demands of neutrality understood as a kind of institutional 
agnosticism.85 
                                               
 
 
85 On institutional agnosticism, see e.g. legal scholar Frederick Schauer's 
definition ‘It is a process – some might call it the meta-doctrine, and others 
might call it second-order doctrine – that presupposes the undesirability of 
having a rule, principle or doctrine for one institution that is not applicable to 
another.’ (Schauer, 1998: 107). Paul Riceour too defines institutional 
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Finally, in Figure 6 I identity Lutheranism and the welfare system to belong 
to what Freeden has termed the perimeter of the concept.86 The perimeter 
components helps the ideological concept gaining ‘…relevance for specific 
issues, to incorporate and identify significant facts and practices, to embrace 
external change, and to provide the greater degree of precision necessary to 
interpret the core and adjacent concepts’ (Freeden, 1996: 79-80). As the 
introduction to this chapter indicated (together with chapter 4), what we might 
call Lutheran culture plays an important role for the political and legal 
interpretation of separation, equality, freedom and people. Not at least the 
Lutheran Two Kingdoms Doctrine is relevant in this connection. However not as 
a doctrine of institutional (spatial) separation of church and state (which was 
foreign to the original conception), but as a relational doctrine constitutive of 
Danish culture and secularity (Witte, 2014).  
Perhaps surprising to some, I also identify the welfare regime as a relevant, 
but peripheral influence on Danish secularism. In the last couple of years there 
has been an increasing interest in a better understanding of both the 
characterization, origins and comparative differences between welfare regimes 
by looking into the role of public religion, as part of a more historic and context 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
 
agnosticism: ‘… the state neither recognizes nor supports any religion. This is 
religious freedom in negative, the price being that the state itself has no religion. 
This goes even further; this means that the state does not “think” in these terms, 
that it is neither religious nor atheist.’ Riceour, 1998: 128), see also Bader, 2007: 
179) and Laborde, 2008: 36-37). 
86 Freeden terms both marginal and perimeter components peripheral 
components to signify their relation to the core in relation to adjacent 
components, see Freeden, 1996: 78. 
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sensitive approach (for a prominent example of this, see Kersbergen & Manow, 
2009; in a Danish context, see Sørensen, 1998; Andersen, 2006; Petersen and 
Petersen, 2009). Just as secularization was not a simple and uniformed process, 
neither was the formation of the early modern welfare regime. To be sure, 
Lutheran Evangelical Christianity was not functionally differentiated from the 
state apparatus only to disappear with modernity. Rather, as the secular social 
functions of the monarch's church was slowly transferred to state institutions, 
public religion became integrated in the formative process of creating a welfare 
regime, and contributed to the production of its normative foundation. As 
political scientist Sigrun Kahl has pointed out in relation to welfare regimes in 
predominantly Lutheran countries, ‘… there is today a “hidden” religious 
curriculum that is deeply engrained into the secular institution of social 
assistance’ (Kahl, 2009: 289; on the Lutheran ‘hidden sacrality of the secular’ 
toady, see Witte, 2014). Historically, Folkekirke-Christianity has contributed to 
shape the political horizon of understanding and possibility of what is to be 
considered just social policy. One might argue therefore, that a certain 
connection still exists today (Petersen, 2006).  
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Figure 6. The morphological structure of Danish secularism, illustrated with core, 
adjacent and peripheral components 
 
This is the cluster, or structure, of components as illustrated in Figure 6 which 
together form the ideological concept of secularism. It is this conceptual pattern, 
which is a forceful and persuasive decontestation of policies relating to religion 
and politics in Danish discourse.  
Of course, Figure 6 represents an attempt to reconstruct the conceptual 
structure of Danish secularism into recognizable patterns that should not be 
conceived as static or absolute. Rather, the inherent plurality and essential 
contestability of political concepts results in ideological contestations both 
internally and externally, which together with historical events and cultural 
change makes ideological concepts fluctuate (but not contingent) over time. This 
is also why Freeden speaks of ‘conceptual concatenations’ (Freeden, 2013b: 122, 
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124) between the core and other components (the arrows in Figure 6 goes both 
ways), and not a one-way effect of the core on its surroundings.  
Having laid out the morphology of the main secularism doctrine in Danish 
ideological language, I will now turn to its dominating manifestations.  
 
7.3. Assertive and accommodationist secularism 
In earlier chapters I showed how during the period of political modernization 
from the beginning of the 19th century, different visions of ordering the relation 
between religion and politics, specifically between religious communities and 
the state, have been animated in public discourse. Specifically in chapter 4, I 
argued that the current Danish separation doctrine contains traits of all of the 
three historical church models.  
Presented in a fairly stylized fashion we might say that the supreme right of 
the state, in casu the Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs, to regulate the church's 
internal affairs warranted by royal decree can be traced back to the State Church 
Model. The idea of some areas of the church community to be governed by the 
church itself because it should be considered an independent religious 
community can be traced back to the Independent Church Model. And finally the 
notion of religious freedom being best secured by subjecting all religious 
communities to public law, thereby granting all communities equal 
responsibility and duty towards the same common political identity might stem 
from the Civil Church Model. As we saw in the succeeding chapters 5 and 6, 
these traits are indeed present in today's doctrine in varying degrees. 
However, also apparent within this shared understanding of how religious 
communities and the state should interact, is that in particular two 
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interpretations are struggling to dominate the discourse.87 Elsewhere I have 
reconstructed and traced the two dominating separation doctrines in Danish 
political debates, in particular from 2001-2010 (see Dabelsteen, 2011a: chapter 
IV and V). By treating the ideological struggle over Danish secularism as 
containing several positions, my reconstruction seeks to further nuance existing 
studies of Danish secularism, which has been more focused on the presence of a 
singular doctrine within the political community, e.g. Mouritzen (2006); Berg-
Sørensen (2010); Christensen (2010). In the following I will highlight their 
traces by a few examples in the recent public debate since then (see also 
Dabelsteen, 2015).88 
The first variant can be termed accommodationist Danish secularism. Within 
the last few decades it has extensively developed as a critique of the status quo 
of church-state relations, and thus a contestation of the natural link between 
Christianity and the Danish people (see the assertive variant below). Prevalent 
                                               
 
 
87 The following dichotomy is inspired by Cécile Laborde and her analysis of 
French republicanism (Laborde, 2008) and Ahmet Kuru’s categorization in 
relation to American style secularism (2009).  
88 There is a third less prevalent, though growing discursive presence of what we 
might consider a separation doctrine closest to a humanist, hyper-substantive 
secularism in Danish public debate. However, since it does not yet influence 
leading politicians in the same degree as the other two I leave it out for the time 
being (e.g. Dabelsteen, 2011a: chapter 2). See also section 5.4. on the shared 
position of Enhedslisten and Liberal Alliance in relation to the two dominating 
discourses. 
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among the leading politicians of the current government,89 it is pushing for more 
accommodation, that is, equal treatment of religious communities in society. 
Even though they maintain an acceptance of the cultural and particularistic 
primacy of the Folkekirke in Danish identity, they continue to criticize the 
current institutional regime for unduly excluding other religious communities 
from equal political treatment.  
Related to this, a further feature of accommodationist Danish secularism is 
that it traditionally has been skeptical about the enforcement of the customary 
practice. On the one hand they questioned the quite extensive authority of the 
state when it comes to the internal affairs of the Folkekirke, in both 
administrative and dogmatic matters. On the other hand, they wish the status of 
non-members of the Folkekirke to be considered as equal in their right to enjoy 
various privileges.90 Thus, we can observe a take on religious tolerance more in 
accordance with a principle of treating all as equals (not equal treatment, since 
established religion is upheld). 
One recent expression of such a view was articulated in 2012 by SF's 
spokesperson for Ecclesiastical Affairs Pernille Vigsø Bagge, who suggested that 
The Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs ought to be renamed either The Ministry 
of Religion, Ministry of Philosophies of Life [‘Ministeriet for Livsanskuelser’] or 
                                               
 
 
89 Consisting of Socialdemokratiet, and Radikale Venstre, but supported by 
Socialistisk Folkeparti (part of the 2011 government coalition but broke out in 
protest in early 2014) and Enhedslisten. 
90 Notice, that equality for all citizens in society is still an interpretation aligned 
with a traditional Lutheran understanding of secular law; see Christoffersen 
(2013a).  
  
277 
Ministry of Religious Affairs. She stated ‘we are clearly approaching a state of 
affairs in which people have all sorts of religious persuasions and philosophies 
of life, and I think we should be able to accommodate this’ (Bagge quoted in 
Sparre and Steensbeck, 2012). While the suggestion generated substantial fury 
in the public debate and was rejected by virtually all party leaders across the 
parliament, the idea was in fact not new.91 During the 2011 run-up for the 
parliamentary elections, the committee for reforming the governance of the 
Folkekirke was mandated to consider some form of autonomy for the 
Folkekirke. However, as I discussed in chapter 6 this also entailed the question 
of more equal distance between the state and religious communities in general. 
As the Social Democrat spokesperson for Ecclesiastical Affairs, Karen Klint 
stated on behalf of the parties SF, S and RV which were then in opposition. ‘We 
will begin to work on a modern constitution for the Folkekirke if we enter 
government. In our finance bill we have financed a task force for this purpose. It 
is intolerable that the state takes responsibility for employing and 
                                               
 
 
91 Rather than an ideological unseating of the idea, the denial can be related to a 
lack of party discipline and political timing of the sender. During the cabinet-
making after the elections in September 2011, Pernille Vigsø Bagge was by many 
identified as having been outmaneuvered politically as she got no ministerial 
office (though she got the second-highest number of personal votes in SF), see 
e.g. Kristeligt Dagblad, 2011. This she publicly protested against calling the new 
government a ‘flop’ and stated ‘I campaigned on a platform of 5 issues: early 
retirement benefits, unemployment benefits, gender equality, and North Jutland 
influence. Gone are the first two issues. The church office went to a non-member 
possibly with no clue about neither it or gender equality. And North Jutland 
influence is long gone… Who knows if I'm a member of SF at the end of day.’ 
(Information, 2011). Thus, at the time of the quote her own party and the 
government discredited her statements politically. On a brief outline of the 
political context of the 2011 election, see chapter 5.  
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administrating the economy for the Folkekirke. Of course this would tamper 
with the function of the Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs. There should be an 
independent ministry for religion or simply a ministerial office concerning 
religious conditions in Denmark’ (Klint as quoted in Schelde and Johansen, 
2011). From this quote we might recognize the idea of religious equality through 
shared state regulation, as it was presented in chapter 4 as Grundtvig's 180 
years Civil Church Model' (see chapter 4).  
The accommodationist discourse of cultural and religious accommodation, 
through equalizing the religious communities ’upwards’ to the status of the 
Folkekirke, can be recognized in quite a number of earlier statements by leading 
politicians. To take one example of this accommodative logic before the period 
already covered in chapters 5 and 6, former minister and Social Democrat 
leader, Svend Auken stated ‘… it is discrimination against many religious 
communities that the Folkekirke gets its contributions through the public tax 
demand note. It gives the church a great advantage. Religious equality means 
that the state offers to collect subscriptions on behalf of all religious 
communities’ (Auken as quoted in Information, 2004). Another example could 
be the ‘neutral common prayer day’ proposed by Klint ‘…where all religions can 
pray for the nation, peace in the world, or the well-being of your neighbor if one 
does not wish to pray for anything religious’ (Klint as quoted in Vincents, 2008). 
And while SF officially ‘…supports a full rights-based equality between the 
Folkekirke and recognized and approved religious societies’ (Socialistisk 
Folkeparti, 2014a), RV has on several occasions made statements such as ‘We 
certainly do not wish to change the Folkekirke. But we do want to be is more fair 
to the other approved religious communities. In Denmark we have freedom of 
religion, and this can be emphasized by granting equal conditions’ (Nielsen, 
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2009). Taken together, while the accommodationist variant does seem to push 
for further equality between religious communities, it is done (still) within the 
tradition of Danish modest establishment evoking a particularistic political 
identity.  
The second position I call assertive Danish secularism, which can be 
considered the ideological defense of the current institutional church-state 
regime. It predominantly finds it proponents in the leading political figures from 
center-right, to populist-right end of the political spectrum.92 The central 
argument here for is the Evangelical Lutheran Church to maintain a 
constitutionally privileged relation to the state, in contrast to other religious 
communities such as Muslims and other ‘dissenting’ Christian denominations. In 
a time of immigration and globalization, it is increasingly important to defend 
and assert Danish culture and values in society to maintain Danish identity and 
cohesion. The Folkekirke plays a vital role in this effort. 
In the above-mentioned debate on renaming the Ministry of Ecclesiastical 
Affairs, we saw this interpretation of the Danish separation doctrine being 
adopted. For example the chairman for the Conservatives, Lars Barfoed 
responded ‘We have a Folkekirke in Denmark. It appears from our constitution. 
By far the greater part of the population is member of the Folkekirke. Our whole 
culture rests on a Christian-humanist foundation. It is therefore a natural and 
right thing to have a Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs which handles the 
organization and legal framework of the Folkekirke’ (Barfoed as quoted by 
                                               
 
 
92 Particularly the parties Venstre, The Conservatives and Danish People’s Party. 
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Jørgensen, 2012). Venstre and DF referred to the majority being Danish too, but 
at the same time emphasized the deep religious and cultural roots of the Danish 
nation and the concern of including more Muslims into society (Kristeligt 
Dagblad, 2012). The latter party's spokesperson of Ecclesiastical Affairs, 
Christian Langballe argued ‘Should the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs have a 
new name? This was the opinion of SF's group chairman and spokesperson for 
Ecclesiastical Affairs, Pernille Vigsø Bagge… Why? You've guessed it. It starts 
with “I” and ends with “slam”. According to SF it is offensive to Muslims that we 
in Denmark have a Folkekirke and a Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs. I guess 
the next thing will be to remove the cross from Dannebrog [the Danish flag], and 
have Christmas prohibited, because it insults Muslim's feelings’ (Langballe, 
2012).93  
This reasoning is first of all fueled by fear of politicization of religion in the 
public sphere, should full religious equality be implemented between religious 
communities. As long as religious conflict is confined to the Folkekirke as it 
effectively has been throughout modern history, social order is maintained.  
Secondly and related to the former, they believe that the religious or 
spiritual liberty (in Danish ‘åndsfrihed’) is best protected in the Folkekirke when 
the church is not institutionally autonomous from the state. Rather, the state 
should carefully assess the will of the church and then decide on its behalf. To 
eliminate the top decision-making layer of the church organization, it ensures 
that the clergy would not have to fight over the true exegesis of the Gospels for 
                                               
 
 
93 Besides the apparent word-play in Langballe's quote (‘I-slam’), the ending 
‘slam’ connote sludge or dirt in Danish.  
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the Church. Otherwise, it would become as spiritually paternalistic in the church, 
which is what they originally protested against (i.e. the Catholic Church). These 
features of state regulation and depoliticization of the Folkekirke can be clearly 
recognized both in historical debates (see chapter 4), in the debates on same-sex 
church marriages (chapter 5), but not at least in the debates concerning new 
self-organizing competences for the Folkekirke (e.g. as a synod, see chapter 6). 
This stance appears, however, to conflict with the reading of Rawlsian political 
liberalism in chapter 2. The reason is primarily, that political order is prioritized 
over the Folkekirke's freedom to govern itself out of fear of religious conflict 
(remember, all other religious communities are fully autonomous). In that sense, 
a particularistic vision of peoplehood is asserted on political institutions 
unequally.  
Thirdly, many of the proponents of assertive Danish secularism still simply 
regard the Danish people as Evangelical-Lutheran people, as we also saw in the 
quotes above. As such this secularism expresses a kind of religious tolerance, 
which with Rainer Forst could be termed a ‘permission conception’ (Forst, 
2012). They might accept non-Evangelical Lutheran citizens as part of society, 
but on the condition that they recognize and abide by official Christian 
institutions and practices. 
A final defining characteristic of the both variants of ethno-Lutheran 
secularism relates to what role religion is assigned in the public sphere. The 
assertive version takes an exclusivist stance towards religion in public reason. 
Religion in the public sphere should only relate to religious practices and not to 
politics. As such, any kind of religious conflicts or programs should not spill over 
into arguments concerning public law. Assertive Danish secularism would argue 
that the Folkekirke almost literally is the embodiment of the Lutheran Two 
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Kingdoms Doctrine, and thus is the condition of possibility for secularity itself. 
As the former government's minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs, Birthe Rønn 
Hornbech stated. ‘The Constitution establishes in an Evangelical way that we are 
citizens in two kingdoms… On Evangelical ground we shall distinguish between 
what is the kingdom of the king and of God’ (Hornbech, 2009). Secular law 
(excluding religious motivations) can be upheld only if a Lutheran cultural order 
is recognized, because this entails distinguishing between spiritual and temporal 
authority. For this reason, pastors of the Folkekirke should not partake in 
political life as representatives of the church community, and other religious 
utterances in public debate might be considered un-Danish or even extremist. It 
is a conception of tolerance founded in a cultural, religious hierarchy legitimized 
by a majoritarian perception of authority, and is seen as a remedy to avoid 
conflicts by repressing religion from the public sphere.  
In contrast, accommodationist Danish secularism is more including on the 
matter, and is reluctant to consider the existence of an autonomous Folkekirke, 
or alternative forms of religious practice in the public sphere as threats to the 
social cohesion of the Danish society. They are in principle open to include other 
religious communities in the deliberation of how to arrange political institutions, 
as the attempts of changing the name and function of the Ministry of 
Ecclesiastical Affairs is an indication of this. Nevertheless, both of these 
competing secularisms share an understanding of the Folkekirke as a public 
good for the wider society and not just for the members of church members, 
which is why they both rely on a particularistic social imaginary. I have summed 
up two positions in Table 1 below. 
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Table 1. Key differences between the two dominating variants of Danish 
secularism  
Components Assertive secularism Accommodationist 
secularism 
Status quo 
institutional 
arrangement 
Should be protected. 
Changes of governance and 
institution should only be 
gradual and help preserve 
existing structures under 
new conditions. 
Is perceived to be obsolete 
in some respects and should 
be adapted to reflect the 
surrounding society's 
development. 
Religious equality Consider it strong within the 
Folkekirke, and de facto in 
society. But the symbolic 
status should not be 
extended to all religious 
communities. 
The problem is not the 
Folkekirke's close 
relationship to the state per 
se, but that other religious 
communities do not enjoy 
equal status.  
Particularistic 
peoplehood 
The Danish people is 
considered a Christian 
people, and the Folkekirke is 
a vital site of national 
belonging.  
The Danish people has 
Christian roots, which 
should be respected, but 
other perspectives can be 
accommodated in the 
construction of Danish 
identity. 
Religious freedom 
for the Folkekirke 
The Folkekirke is a public 
law entity and a public good. 
The Folkekirke should be 
granted further church 
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As such it does not make 
sense to speak of freedom 
for the Folkekirke, as it is the 
state, which ensure its 
member's freedom through 
regulation. 
autonomy closer to the 
degree other religious 
communities enjoy in 
respect to self-governance 
and regulation.  
 
This finalizes my empirical analysis of chapters 4, 5 and 6 by reconstructing 
Danish secularism in its two dominating and competing variants. The hope is to 
provide a conceptual framework, to better understand Danish secularism in a 
close future likely to contain substantial institutional changes in a scale not seen 
in centuries before. One of the drivers of cultural and religious change is often 
identified as multiculturalism, as also mentioned in chapter 1. I will thus 
complete the circle by returning to this theme as a concluding reflection on the 
conditions of Danish secularism.  
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Chapter 8 Conclusion  
 
  
ithin the discipline of political science, the thesis has positioned itself 
between political theory and interpretive policy analysis. This 
approach has been necessary due to the ‘object’ of study: not what 
the policies do or how efficient they have been implemented, but what they 
mean.  
In studying meaning in the political language surrounding selected policy 
cases, I have been inspired by the ideology analysis of Michael Freeden and 
interpretive realism. As shown in chapter 3, Freeden is concerned with 
empirically prevalent discourses understood as the practical usage of political 
principles by actors for the purpose of decontesting and making natural political 
choices, which could otherwise have been different. Following Freeden's 
approach entails giving up the ambition of normatively evaluating politics, 
taking just principles from political philosophy as one's primary point of 
reference. Studying politics is to study the structure and development of key 
ideological concepts as they are expressed in actions, texts, utterances or in 
some fourth form. To be sure, such political language is based on the various 
principles we find in political theory, but in reality prioritized and put to use 
very differently.  
This is so, not only because of strategic agenda or cultural discrepancies, 
but also because political decision-making environments do not always allow for 
all principles to be fulfilled. For example in cases of conflict, arming oneself with 
even the best ideal arguments cannot clearly settle how one person's religious 
freedom to express oneself in the public sphere should be prioritized vis-à-vis 
W 
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another's freedom from religious symbols. This is also why Freeden believes the 
political theorist observing these cases should limit herself to interpret and 
structure the ideological meaning in the situation, and not trying to normatively 
evaluate it (and thereby producing further ideological meaning herself, Freeden 
2013: 15). Practical politics can best be conceived as muddy waters, which the 
political theorist will have to navigate through and find a way to better 
understand how political thinking is structured in actual political language.94 
So what do I conclude after studying the research question: how we can 
conceptualize the current separation doctrine of religion and politics in a country 
like Denmark where the structures of established church and peoplehood overlap?  
First of all when it comes to the policy area of religion and politics, I have 
found that one important way to structure our understanding of how the 
architecture of secularism differs in different contexts, even though secularisms 
always stand on the same foundation, separation, which is to pay attention to the 
particular kinds of political unity the political actors directly or indirectly affirm. 
Pushing a political agenda inspired by a particular form of secularism is 
profoundly interconnected with the activity of evoking a sense of political 
identity. The way ‘we’ deal with religion in the public sphere is not purely a 
matter of political principles such as religious freedom or religiously neutral 
state regulation, but also a part of producing or reproducing a certain story of a 
people. As I have argued, the question of producing political identity should be 
                                               
 
 
94 Or as Freeden would characterize ‘the political’: ambiguous, indeterminate, 
inconclusive and vague (Freeden 2005). 
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considered part of the very concept of secularism when it comes to ideological 
language.  
Second of all, from this approach of studying politics relating to public 
religion, I have made the argument throughout the thesis that while Danish 
secularism does not express the institutional ambitions of a fully disestablished, 
exclusivist separation, it does hold the potential to reside within the parameters 
of political liberalism. As we have seen, some variants of Danish secularism 
holds this potential in theory, and sometimes also in practice. Analyzing the 
most important current cases in Danish politics within this policy area, same-sex 
marriages in 2012 (chapter 5) and the ongoing church governance reform 
process (chapter 6), I have tried to show the principles Danish secularism is 
based on, how it works in practice and the challenges it struggles with today. 
A main ambition of the thesis has been to show how we might 
conceptualize secularism in political theory in a way more sensitive to real life 
politics. It does so in particular by emphasizing political identity, or peoplehood, 
as one of the most important contextual elements in order to understand how 
secularism works in practical politics. Specifically, I have shown how one branch 
of possible ideal-typical secularisms, modest secularism, should be taken 
seriously as a doctrine of separating religion and politics. In my 
conceptualization, modest secularism is based on separation of religion and 
politics by principled distance (i.e. treating everybody as equals), in order to 
support a particularistic story of a people. This ideal-typical secularism should 
be considered in line with other perhaps more familiar types from the 
theoretical literature, such as procedural or ethical secularism of the exclusivist 
kind (both based on mutual distance ensuring that everybody is treated 
equally), see chapter 2. 
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On the basis of the policy cases in chapters 5 and 6, one might expect some 
institutional changes to be introduced in the near future between the state and 
public religion. In that connection an interesting question would be if the 
current trend towards granting the Folkekirke further autonomy as an 
independent religious community continues, how the two dominating Danish 
secularisms will develop correspondingly. Hopefully, the conceptual work done 
here will prepare us to engage in further analysis. It will be especially interesting 
to observe how the story of Danish peoplehood will be told in political discourse 
in light of such changes, and whether it can maintain its particularistic theme if 
equality between religious communities increases. What Danish secularism 
might look like in the near future is of course speculative, but the conceptual 
map developed in section 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 offers three possible (ideal-typical) 
routes, dependent on which kind of separation principle and which kind of 
peoplehood will be prevalent. One factor influencing such developments might 
be the increased cultural pluralization of Danish society.  
 
8.1. Conditions of multiculturalism: A story with many narrators  
There has been one aspect of secularism and peoplehood which has deliberately 
not been addressed directly so far. The thesis has been predominantly focused 
on what could be called the doctrine of separation pertaining to the political 
identity of the majority, and with good reason this has primarily been related to 
the meaning of the governance of the Folkekirke. But as chapter 4 also have 
shown, the development of the separation doctrine has been driven not only by 
concern for the governance of the majority's religion, but also in dealing with the 
religious minorities. The same can be said about today's conditions, many heated 
and controversial public debates relating to the connection between religion and 
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politics concern religious minorities within Danish society. There are plenty of 
recent cases to confirm this point such as the Mohammed Drawings, several 
debates on banning burkas in public spaces, Catholics suing the state for unequal 
treatment, the location and permission to build religious sites like prayer rooms, 
Mosques and Muslim cemeteries etc. As with the same-sex marriages in the 
Folkekirke, in all these cases the debates eventually turned to the question of if 
and how the state should regulate public religion.  
Thus, there is another side to the separation doctrine, which relates to the 
religious minorities and their relation to Danish peoplehood and secularism. 
Many of the political theorists referred to in this thesis have actually dealt 
extensively with the question of both secularism, and the challenge of religious 
and cultural minorities, or what is often termed the challenge of 
multiculturalism. The main concern is the condition of already present, or 
increased, religious and cultural plurality in society. The discussion within 
political theory on equal recognition of citizens irrespective of cultural affiliation 
arguably started with thinkers such as Will Kymlicka (e.g. 1995), Charles Taylor 
(e.g. 1992), and Iris Marion Young (e.g. 1990). These thinkers have been 
presented as struggling over at least two different takes on the challenge of 
cultural plurality, that of a communitarian or a liberal response (see Spinner-
Halev, 2006).  
The main challenge of multiculturalism seems to be that potential tensions 
between the majority culture and for example immigrants, does not seem to be 
solved simply by referring to individual rights and duties. Rather, immigrants 
are conceived as groups organized by culture or religion and as such, the 
question is whether liberal democracy can and should protect groups and not 
just individuals. The answer of course, is guided by one's ontological take on the 
social world from the perspective of political action, and it raises a range of 
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interesting questions. Can the identity and integrity of a group be recognized 
politically at all (e.g. the German minority in Southern Denmark or various 
Muslim immigrant groups) and if so, should it be ascribed equal worth vis-á-vis 
the majority identity? Another perspective would perhaps also deem collective 
culture important, but not politically relevant. The only sort of community to be 
protected by state action or public law should be a purely political one, a state of 
law protecting individuals irrespective of gender, religion, culture, color etc. A 
third, perhaps more pragmatic perspective would open up for group identities 
to be respected by the state because they (the groups,) best empower individual 
autonomy. In any case, if one accepts some decree of cultural recognition or 
support politically, then new questions arise. First of all, what kinds of group 
identities are relevant and secondly, how do we prioritize worth of the 
individual versus the collective in cases of conflict (for an overview of the 
debate, see Song, 2010)? 
I will not go further into the discussion here, but limit myself to note that 
multiculturalism can be both a sociological description of a demographic 
development and a normative justification (or critique) of recognition of group 
identities within societies dominated by a majority identity. These questions are 
naturally not irrelevant for the discussion of secularism and peoplehood, and 
some of the most recent debates on multiculturalism have indeed related to the 
question of state recognition of religion, in this thesis often called establishment.  
Interestingly, some of the themes in these debates touch upon several 
points made earlier in the thesis, which is why I will briefly address them here. 
As an example, Tariq Modood observes that if multiculturalism as a normative 
justification amongst other things entails the recognition of minority religious 
identities, then any kind of secularism based on what I have called separation-
as-exclusion would clash. ‘…Religion should play no or a highly restricted role in 
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politics, or at least law and governance' (Modood, forthcoming: 1). As he argues 
for the necessity of cultural inclusion of minority groups, he insists on another 
‘moderate’ kind of secularism which not only holds the promise for separation-
as-principled-distance, but also institutional ‘state-religion connexions’, what he 
calls moderate secularism (Modood, forthcoming: 1). It is a way for Modood to 
maintain secularism as a concept relevant even for regimes of establishment, but 
in the spirit of multiculturalism.95 The possibility of equal inclusion of religious 
communities through pluralizing existing establishments into arrangement he 
calls ‘multi-establishment’, or ‘public multi-faithism’ (Modood, forthcoming: 12-
13, see also Modood 2013: chapters 4 and 8). This reconstruction of Western 
European style secularism based on historical compromises has quite 
convincingly shown that moderate secularism, liberal political rights and the 
equal recognition of citizen's group identity can at least in theory be compatible 
in some form of establishment. As Modood argues, ‘The issue, then, driving the 
sense of crisis of secularism in Western Europe is the place of Muslim identities, 
or identities that are perceived to be ethno-religious… The rising multicultural 
challenge and gradual weakening of the political status of Christian churches, in 
particular, the national churches, has been taking place at the same time’ 
(Modood, 2013: 171-172). To use the terminology adopted in this thesis, 
                                               
 
 
95 Modood states that in order for moderate secularism to be legitimate, it must 
adhere to what Veit Bader has also called Liberal-democratic morality: 
‘…demanding minimal morality of liberal-democratic constitutional states, 
adding political freedoms, political equality and political autonomy and equal 
respect (modern nondiscrimination) to the more minimalist concept of agency 
characteristic for all morality…’ (Bader, 2007: 72; see also Modood, forthcoming: 
8). Thus, Modood, as well as Laborde and Bader differentiate between degrees of 
liberal morality and how demanding it would be.  
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Modood then seems to suggest maintaining an institutional separation-as-
principled-distance arrangement. This is supported by a universalistic 
peoplehood, not unlike Lisbet Christoffersen's egalitarian intertwinement as 
discussed earlier (containing traits of the Civil Church Model). 
However, in chapter 2 this model would be placed in the quadrant called 
contextual secularism, which was inspired by Bhargava's normatively preferred 
model. Although Bhargava and Modood share several arguments on secularism 
(see e.g. Bhargava, 2011), they differ on the question of the ability of existing 
establishment arrangements to accommodate the demands of equal inclusion 
and recognition of multiculturalism. ‘…the multiculturalization of this secularism 
[i.e. Modood's moderate secularism] is neither easy nor sufficient. It is not easy 
because it presupposes massive change in the cultural background. Institutional 
adjustments are bound to be difficult because an internal link exists between the 
collective secular self-understanding of European societies and deeply 
problematic institutional arrangements. Quite plainly, current European 
institutions are deeply biased…’ (Bhargava, 2013: 78). 
I think that Bhargava points to something very important here, namely the 
importance of deep-seated political identity embedded into existing political 
institutions and language. He further argues, ‘Removing biases from European 
states will not be easy because of resistance from the right, institutional 
resilience, and differences between Christianity and Islam, not to mention 
between Christianity and non-Semitic religious such as Hinduism. Moderate 
secularism will be severely tested’ (Bhargava, 2013: 79). Bhargava in other 
words might accept that there exists some systematic and liberally based 
doctrines of separation in many European states, even those with 
establishments. Yet he does not believe that the state's accommodative and 
supportive approach to one historically dominant religious community can be 
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extended to other religious communities (for a defense of ‘religious institutional 
pluralism’ ranging from weak establishment, plural establishment to non-
constitutional pluralism, see Bader, 2007: 171-173; 203).  
I agree that these are the obstacles for Modood's multifaith, multiculturalist 
secularism, but I think Bhargava does not directly address the main underlying 
phenomenon producing such obstacles, the importance of peoplehood in 
secularism.  
Modood underestimates what is the crucial point of my reconstruction of 
secularism, drawing on Smith's theory of peoplehood. Here, stating that any kind 
of separation doctrine, be it based on strict liberal exclusion or pragmatic state 
relations to religion, evokes some vision of political identity which requires 
more than just and fair principles of inclusion and accommodation. In other 
words, if Modood's multicultural secularism were to succeed, it would have to 
involve breaking down existing political identities based on the majority of the 
population. 
What my analysis indicates is that within liberal democracies with 
established religion, the future policy choice need not to be between ‘multifaith 
nationality’ or ‘monoculturalist nationalism’, as Modood's prognosis would have 
put it (Modood 2013, 182). This is due to the fact existing state institutions like 
national churches play such an important subordinate part in the story of a 
people. If the commendable vision of multifaith nationalism was to come into 
existence in a Northern European context (including England), the very idea of 
establishment would have to be challenged and not enforced.  
We saw an attempt to do exactly this in Sweden in 2000, when Svenska 
Kyrkan was almost disestablished without bringing other religious communities 
closer to public law regulation. In other words, religious communities in Sweden 
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did not achieve further equality by levelling-up, but by levelling-down. This does 
not need to entail the removal of religious knowledge or voice in public 
deliberations (on the contrary), but it does bring religious communities onto an 
even playing field. By this, they are able to participate in the constant 
negotiation of political identity, which arguably is an equal right shared with any 
other social group in civil society.  
Building on the analysis in this thesis, it appears to me that the normative 
promise of multiculturalism is not the creation of political identity, but points to 
the legitimate claim of equal respect for all cultural entities in society. I do not 
dispute Modood's regimes of moderate secularism, which empirically can be 
observed in Europe. In many respects his model shares many similar 
dimensions to mine. However, I do question his unwillingness to acknowledge 
the persistence of political identity, which may hinder existing institutional 
arrangements in fulfilling the normative demands of multiculturalism. The 
accommodationist variant of Danish secularism can be considered central to an 
old establishment doctrine into an age of multiculturalism. But even so, it has 
not been able to follow through clear multiculturalist policies because of its 
dependence on Danish peoplehood.  
If secularism as an ideological concept contains peoplehood as a central 
element, we will need to consider how separation of religion and politics can 
coincide with an appeal to the worth, and distinctiveness of national 
membership and multiculturalism. If this is the ambition, then maintaining or 
even strengthening the current arrangement of the Folkekirke as the only 
religious community subjected to potentially unfettered state regulation does 
not seem to be a viable solution.   
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Appendix I: Names and abbreviations of Danish 
political parties in parliament  
 
Name Abbreviation
96 
Seats in Parliament 
since the last election 
in 201197 
Enhedslisten (Red-Green Alliance) EL 12/179 
Dansk Folkeparti (Danish People's 
Party) 
DF 22/179 
Konservative Folkeparti 
(Conservatives) 
KF 8/179 
Kristendemokraterne (Christian 
Democrats) 
K 0//179 
Liberal Alliance (Liberal Alliance) LA 9/179 
Radikale Venstre (Social Liberals) RV 17/179 
Socialdemokraterne (Social 
Democrats) 
S 45/179 
Socialistisk Folkeparti (Socialists) SF 15/179 
Venstre (Liberals) V 47/179 
 
                                               
 
 
96 The abbreviations used of the political parties are different from the official 
letters representing them on campaign posters and other election materials – in 
order from top to bottom these are: Ø, O, C, K, I, B, A, F and V. 
97In addition to the 175 seats listed here, The Faroe Island and Greenland hold 2 
seats each.  
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Appendix II: Legislative work concerning 
homosexual living arrangements 
 
A. On registered partnership and adoption 
First piece of legislation passed in 1988 as L117 (the term ‘registered 
partnership’ was originally introduced by the LGBT Denmark in 1983 to the 
parliament (Lauersen, 2012), and has since spread internationally). It was 
proposed by S and SF, and was a reproposal of the earlier rejected 1987, L182 by 
S, SF, RV.  
It was revoked by the new marriage act, which was proposed as L106 by 
Minister of Social Affairs and Integration, Karen Hækkerup, and by a majority of 
S, RV, SF, EL and LA in a parliamentary committee passed on unaltered, then to 
be passed by parliament in 2012, after which only marriage is recognized.  
In the intermediate time (1989-2012) several amendments to the law on 
partnership have been passed in parliament: e.g. on adoption by stepparents 
(Lov nr. 360 from 1999) or wider access to adoption and transferred 
parenthood (Lov nr. 537 from 2010). These were the result of a string of former 
attempts to expand adoption rights for same-sex couples, e.g. L91 (EL), L93 (SF), 
L119 (EL) and Betænkning 65 (RV) all in 2002-03, rejected in parliament.  
 
B. On artificial insemination 
Looking at the period from the initial law proposal in 1996 until 2006 the 
discussion in parliament of article 3 in Law in artificial insemination in 
connection with medical treatment, diagnostics and research (which allows 
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artificial insemination only to heterosexual women in marriage-like living 
arrangements), concerned the question of identifying the father more than 
applying limits according to sexual orientation, and the distribution of votes was 
fairly mixed. The legislative work in this period was:  
- Submitted to processing in the parliamentary health committee: LFS 
200 from 1996; LFS 61 from 1997; LF 118 from 2002; LF 187 from 
2003. 
- Legislation passed: BTL 5 from 1997; LF 209 from 2003; LF 188 from 
2004. L151 from 2005 proposed by Minister of Health, Lars Løkke 
Rasmussen (V), primarily concerning other technicalities. 
- Legislation rejected: LF 53 from 1998; LF 183 from 2000. 
- Legislation repealed: LF 115 from 2005. Proposed by EL. All left-wing 
parties supported the idea, but repealed the proposal together with 
other parties because the proposal was considered bad legislative 
work.  
 
But in 2006 during a proposal to amend some other technicalities in the law, 
much of the discussion during the first reading concerned article 3 in Law in 
artificial insemination in connection with medical treatment, diagnostics and 
research. It was therefore submitted to processing in the parliamentary health 
committee, in which EL, S, SF and RV would remove article 3 and make the law 
independent of civil status and sexual orientation. This was passed in 
parliament.  
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Abstract  
This PhD thesis asks how we can conceptualize the current separation doctrine 
of religion and politics in a country like Denmark, where the structure of the 
established church and peoplehood overlap. In order to answer this question, I 
map the current discussion of secularism and propose two conceptual 
expansions. The first is to include modest establishment in a framework of 
secularism defensible by political liberalism, and the second is to consider 
secularism in close connection to a theory of peoplehood. Methodologically 
positioned between interpretive realism and policy analysis, I study Danish 
secularism as an ideological concept. I find that the conceptual structure of 
Danish secularism holds separation-as-principled distance at its core. 
Institutionally this particularly pertains to the establishment arrangement, and 
in practice it translates into the principle of treating everybody equally (with 
religious freedom, equality and Danish peoplehood as the most important 
principles adjacent to secularism). In a study of the historical roots of the 
separation doctrine and two current policy cases (same-sex marriage and 
reforms of church governance), I show how an ideological concept like 
secularism does not hold one clear and final conception. Rather, its meaning is 
fluid and subject to constant contestation over time. Thus based on my empirical 
analysis, I identify two variants of Danish secularism dominating the ideological 
discourse today: assertive secularism and accommodationist secularism. I argue 
that it is the development of these two positions, and their mutual struggle that 
defines the future of political conditions of the established church and other 
minority religious communities in Denmark.  
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Opsummering 
Denne ph.d.-afhandling spørger hvorledes vi kan begrebsliggøre den nuværende 
adskillelsesdoktrin af religion og politik i et land som Danmark, hvor der er et 
strukturelt overlap mellem folkekirke og danskhed. For at besvare dette 
spørgsmål, kortlægger jeg sekularismediskussionen og foreslår i den forbindelse 
to begrebslige udvidelser. Den første er at inkludere moderat 
statsinstitutionalisering af trossamfund [’modet establishment’] inden for 
rammerne af sekularisme, der kan forsvares af politisk liberalisme. Den anden 
udvidelse medfører, at vi betragter sekularisme i tæt sammenhæng med teori 
om folkelighed [’peoplehood’]. Fra en metodologisk position mellem fortolkende 
realisme og policy-analyse studerer jeg dansk sekularisme som et ideologisk 
begreb. Jeg viser, at den begrebslige struktur af dansk sekularisme har 
’adskillelse som principiel afstand’ som sin kerne, hvilket institutionelt viser sig i 
form af især folkekirkeordningen og i praksis i form af princippet om at 
behandle alle ligeligt (med religionsfrihed og –lighed samt folkelighed som 
nærliggende principper). Gennem et studie af adskillelsesdoktrinens historiske 
rødder i Danmark og to aktuelle policy-sager (homoseksuelt ægteskab og 
folkekirkereformen) påviser jeg hvorledes et ideologiske begreb som 
sekularisme ikke rummer en klar og afsluttet betydning. Nærmere er der tale om 
en flydende struktur, hvis mening vedvarende bestrides over tid. Baseret på 
disse empiriske analyser identificerer jeg to varianter af dansk sekularisme, som 
dominerer den ideologiske diskurs i dag: assertiv og inkluderende sekularisme. 
Jeg argumenterer for, at det er udviklingen af disse to positioner og deres 
indbyrdes kamp, som former fremtiden for folkekirken og de andre 
minoritetstrossamfunds politiske vilkår i Danmark.  
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